by Wenran Jiang
(Aug 16, 2006)
Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Volume 6, Issue 17
Openly defiant of the mounting domestic opposition, the strong protests from Beijing and Seoul and the growing criticism of international opinion, on August 15 Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi paid homage to the Yasukuni Shrine where Class-A war criminals from World War II are honored among the fallen Japanese soldiers. Despite having made five visits in the past, for the first time, he chose to visit the shrine on August 15, the anniversary of Japan’s defeat in 1945. This fulfillment of his campaign pledge from earlier was clearly an affront to the leaders of China and South Korea, and damage to Japan’s relations with its neighbors is expected. Yet, Koizumi will step down from the prime minister’s post in September and the question now is whether his successor will seek reconciliation with Japan’s neighbors and end the country’s diplomatic stalemate.
Intensifying Efforts of Reconciliation
Having given up on Koizumi, Beijing is now looking ahead and has stepped up its diplomatic activities in the past few months to ensure that Japan’s next prime minister will not repeat Koizumi’s confrontational approach to China. While maintaining that there would be no bilateral summits so long as Japan’s prime minister visits Yasukuni, top Chinese leaders have met with several visiting Japanese delegations and leaders, including the new opposition party leader, Ichiro Ozawa of the Democratic Party of Japan, who is critical of Koizumi’s China policy.
While the bilateral talks on the dispute over the exploration of oil and gas fields in the East China Sea have stalled after several rounds of negotiations, Beijing has been trying to find a new focus in its relations with Japan through cooperation in the areas of energy conservation, efficiency and environmental protection. Led by China’s powerful National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), a multi-ministry effort has resulted in Sino-Japanese cooperation on Energy Saving and Environmental Protection in Kyoto a few months ago and was met with much greater interest and participation from both sides than expected (the author’s interview with NDRC officials; China Brief, June 7).
In the recently held Beijing-Tokyo Forum, Chinese Ambassador to Japan Wang Yi, Japan’s chief cabinet secretary and the leading candidate to replace Koizumi, Shinzo Abe, and other high-profile figures from China and Japan exchanged views on possible ways to improve bilateral relations in the post-Koizumi era. Viewing these developments in a broader context, Koizumi’s latest Yasukuni visit may have a short-lived negative impact on the future of Japan’s relations with China. The focus seems to be on the most promising things that the two countries can do to advance reconciliation and there are a number of emerging policy options that are being discussed by policy makers, academics and the mass media in both China and Japan [1].
Three Possible Ways of Advancing Reconciliation
First, as a short-term solution, many agree that it would benefit Japan as well its neighbors if top Japanese leaders were to stop visiting the Yasukuni Shrine. This would certainly place Sino-Japanese relations back on track for the “second normalization” process—regular bilateral meetings at all levels, especially the summit meetings. Clearly, the Yasukuni Shrine remains the central issue of the current deadlock in Sino-Japanese relations, and no additional reconciliation measures can take place without sorting out this controversial issue between Tokyo and its neighbors. Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni have damaged Japan’s relations with China as well as with others. It has put Tokyo’s ties with Seoul at the lowest point in many years, and there is growing evidence that the Yasukuni issue and Japan’s deteriorating relations with its neighboring countries are perceived in Washington as detrimental to U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Prominent U.S. Congressman Henry Hyde wrote a letter prior to Koizumi’s visit to the United States in May, demanding as a precondition for any consideration of addressing the U.S. Congress the commitment by the Japanese prime minister to cease his visits to the Yasukuni Shrine.
There have been promising signs of a potential breakthrough on the issue of Yasukuni. In spite of grassroots pressure to get tough with Japan, Chinese leaders have instead decided to look for a “face-saving” way for Japan to end the Yasukuni visits. There also have been growing voices in Japan that oppose visits to the Yasukuni Shrine by future Japanese prime ministers. In a recent opinion poll, 60 percent of the Japanese public indicated that they are opposed to Koizumi’s Yasukuni visits, with only 20 percent supporting them. Furthermore, an overwhelming 82 percent of those surveyed said that the next prime minister should not visit Yasukuni, while only 10 percent supported the continued homage (Asahi Shimbun, July 25). The changing tide of public opinion in Japan has also been strengthened by a memo made public by an imperial household official, which clearly indicated that the late-Emperor Hirohito was critical of putting the war criminals into Yasukuni back in the late 1970s and stopped going to the shrine ever since. The coming departure of Koizumi will provide an opportunity for Shinzo Abe and other potential successors to make a firm commitment against visiting the shrine.
Second, in the medium-term, many advocate that China and Japan should establish a number of mechanisms to manage the bilateral relationship of the new century: institutionalized official dialogues that address bilateral differences, private sector associations that deal with bilateral business ties and regular track-II style meetings that bring government officials, business, academics and public opinion leaders together. While historical issues may dominate the headlines, China-Japan relations are multi-dimensional and require extensive care at several levels. The existing institutions, largely built in the 1970s after the two countries established diplomatic relations, are either outdated or ineffective. Many old “Japan hands” in China and old “China hands” in Japan, who bridged both sides for most of the postwar decades, have passed away. “Friendship” organizations on both sides have had difficulties coping with the new changes and the growing negative attitudes of peoples in both countries toward one another. In addition, the crucial institutions that can effectively address bilateral differences are very few in number. Meaningful and effective working institutions, as many have realized, will improve communications, benefit mutual understanding and lead to reconciliation between Japan and China.
Such institution-building projects may produce tangible results in the near future because there is a certain consensus in both countries that the communication channels established in the 1970s and 1980s are no longer suitable for the 21st century. At the same time, the attempt to cope with pressing issues such as the East China Sea energy dispute and the North Korean nuclear crisis has resulted in existing management mechanisms (although not institutionalized) between Tokyo and Beijing. The challenge for both countries will be the task of making them more permanent and effective. The task may also be made easier now that both countries have much younger and more professional diplomats, a much more internationalized business community and an academic workforce with significantly more international exposure. These developments will no doubt facilitate the task of reconciliation between Japan and China.
Finally, in the long-term, there have been calls for Japan to undergo a thorough national reflection on its war past. Simultaneously, there have also been voices advocating that China should be more self-reflective and forgiving in order to establish a future-oriented, healthy bilateral relationship. The momentum for such long-term solutions is partly due to the recognition that true reconciliation must be based on soul-searching and nationwide reflections of the past. There are also concerns that the growing negative feelings of the two peoples only fuel narrow-minded nationalism. It is necessary for the leaders of both countries to resist the temptations of using nationalism for political gains. Both peoples need to come to terms with each other at the emotional level and learn to treat each other as equals. With the realization that external forces, international institutions and world opinions can affect the behaviors of Japan and China—both powerful states—substantial international initiatives around the world are gradually becoming a part of the China-Japan reconciliation process.
There are reasons to be cautiously optimistic for the long-term reconciliation between China and Japan. An unintended consequence of Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, a purely political move to benefit his leadership ambitions, has been the nationwide debate in Japan on its attitude toward its past aggressions. In China, internal and open debates about Beijing’s Japan policy have also been going on for sometime, with ideas such as the “new thinking” on Japan being proposed (China Brief, February 1, 2005). Meanwhile, world opinion, assisted by the rapidly evolving communication technologies, will have a continual impact on the leadership and the public in both Japan and China.
It was not so long ago when Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso described his resentment of Chinese criticism of the Japanese leadership’s Yasukuni visits in such a way: “The more China voices [opposition], the more one feels like going there. It’s just like when you’re told ‘Don’t smoke cigarettes,’ it actually makes you want to smoke” (Xinhua, January 30). In an about face, Aso now openly calls for the reform of the Yasukuni Shrine, even proposing that the Yasukuni Shrine lose its religious status and hinting at the possibility of separating the Class-A war criminals from the other soldiers (Mainichi Shimbun, August 8) . Beijing’s latest outrage over Koizumi’s Yasukuni visit aside, the good news may well be that the Japanese have finally come to realize it is not in their own national interest to continue to inhale Koizumi’s second-hand smoke.
Notes:
1. This is the central theme of an international workshop organized by Professor Peter Van Ness at the Australian National University from August 17-18, with participants coming from Japan, China, Australia and other parts of the world, including this author.
Wednesday, August 16, 2006
Beijing hopes visits to the shrine will be a thing of the past
On August 16, 2006, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by South China Morning Post on Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's recent visit to the Yasukuni Shrine on the 61st anniversary of Japan's surrender in the second world war.
Mr Koizumi is likely to be replaced by Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe. Although Mr Abe is a part of the conservative faction of the Liberal Democratic Party, and has taken a hawkish stance on China and North Korea, Beijing is hoping growing public opinion against visits to the shrine and pressure from Japanese business to improve relations will force him to end the controversial visits and pave the way for normalisation of relations.
Dr. Jiang said Mr Abe, the grandson of a member of Japan's second world war cabinet, was a staunch nationalist and favoured visits to the shrine. He said, however, "the pressure now is enormous" not only from China, South Korea and the United States, but increasingly from the Japanese public.
Public opinion has turned against the visits after it was recently disclosed that Emperor Hirohito stopped visiting the shrine when Yasukuni secretly honoured 14 class-A war criminals - including the executed wartime prime minister General Hideki Tojo - in 1978.
You can read the article here.
Mr Koizumi is likely to be replaced by Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe. Although Mr Abe is a part of the conservative faction of the Liberal Democratic Party, and has taken a hawkish stance on China and North Korea, Beijing is hoping growing public opinion against visits to the shrine and pressure from Japanese business to improve relations will force him to end the controversial visits and pave the way for normalisation of relations.
Dr. Jiang said Mr Abe, the grandson of a member of Japan's second world war cabinet, was a staunch nationalist and favoured visits to the shrine. He said, however, "the pressure now is enormous" not only from China, South Korea and the United States, but increasingly from the Japanese public.
Public opinion has turned against the visits after it was recently disclosed that Emperor Hirohito stopped visiting the shrine when Yasukuni secretly honoured 14 class-A war criminals - including the executed wartime prime minister General Hideki Tojo - in 1978.
You can read the article here.
Friday, July 14, 2006
China's Party All Aglow, but May Be Blinkered
On July 14, 2006, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Los Angeles Times on Chinese Communist Party's ideological campaign. "History will once again prove that the Communist Party of China is a glorious, great and correct party," said Ouyang Song, deputy head of the party's organization department, who helped oversee the campaign.
From the outside, the campaign looks increasingly out of step with much of the rest of China, which has seen a capitalist-style leap in economic growth, highlighted by an explosion of consumer choice, including entertainment options from MTV to MP3, soap operas to beauty pageants.
"Very few people take it seriously," said Dr. Jiang. "But to totally dismiss it is not quite accurate either. They hope to go back to the original party ideals, a cleaner organization that's closer to the people and more disciplined."
You can read the article here.
From the outside, the campaign looks increasingly out of step with much of the rest of China, which has seen a capitalist-style leap in economic growth, highlighted by an explosion of consumer choice, including entertainment options from MTV to MP3, soap operas to beauty pageants.
"Very few people take it seriously," said Dr. Jiang. "But to totally dismiss it is not quite accurate either. They hope to go back to the original party ideals, a cleaner organization that's closer to the people and more disciplined."
You can read the article here.
Monday, July 10, 2006
China Isn't Desperate For Canadian Oil
On July 10, 2006, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Daily Oil Bulletin on China's interest in Canada's oilsands.
Wenran suggested that major Canadian oilsands producers are indifferent to the Chinese market, but part of the explanation may also be that Chinese oil companies don't have to come to Canada.
You can read the article here.
Wenran suggested that major Canadian oilsands producers are indifferent to the Chinese market, but part of the explanation may also be that Chinese oil companies don't have to come to Canada.
You can read the article here.
Friday, July 07, 2006
China wants nothing less than equity stake in oilsands
On July 7, 2006, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Calgary Herald on Chinese investment in Alberta's oilsands industry.
Song Yiwu, vice-president of the China National Oil and Gas Exploration and Development Corporation the international wing of the Chinese National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC) told a TD oilsands conference his company is looking to secure a minimum of 200,000 barrels per day (bpd) from Canada as part of his country's efforts to diversify oil supplies from around the globe.
Dr. Jiang said it's in Canada's interest to engage China. "China is coming it's the reality. The issue is, how do we work with China? We should work with China together to help solve their problems and benefit ourselves at the same time."
You can read the article here.
Song Yiwu, vice-president of the China National Oil and Gas Exploration and Development Corporation the international wing of the Chinese National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC) told a TD oilsands conference his company is looking to secure a minimum of 200,000 barrels per day (bpd) from Canada as part of his country's efforts to diversify oil supplies from around the globe.
Dr. Jiang said it's in Canada's interest to engage China. "China is coming it's the reality. The issue is, how do we work with China? We should work with China together to help solve their problems and benefit ourselves at the same time."
You can read the article here.
Wednesday, June 21, 2006
China's Booming Energy Relations With Africa
by Wenran Jiang
(Jun 21, 2006)
Jamestown Foundation, China Brief
With continuous economic growth averaging an astonishing annual rate of 10 percent over the past quarter century, China has transformed its landscape, become one of the largest economic powerhouses on earth, created development opportunities for its trading partners around the world and, in the process, generated huge demands for new sources of energy and other resources. Africa, on the other hand, has been left behind in the global quest for industrial modernization, economic prosperity and political stability. Yet, into Africa the Chinese are coming. They are coming for trade, investment and joint ventures, and they are consuming all the energy, minerals and other raw materials that the continent can offer.
An Evolution of Traditional Sino-African Ties
Africa's importance to China is reflected by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's ongoing tour of Africa. According to China's Ministry of Commerce, the seven countries on his itinerary—Egypt, Ghana, the Republic of Congo, Angola, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda—have a combined trade volume of over US$20 billion with China, or 50.6 percent of total China-Africa trade last year. Only two months earlier, Chinese President Hu Jintao visited three other African states—Morocco, Nigeria and Kenya—following his trip to the United States and Saudi Arabia.
Such high-profile visits, a recurring practice over the past few years, have aroused speculation that Beijing's pursuit of great power status may include a new grand strategy regarding Africa. After all, top Chinese leaders have done the same extensive tours to Latin American countries since late 2004 when President Hu first visited Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Cuba. China's ties with African countries, however, can be traced back to the 1950s when newly emerging African states declared their independence. From the 1950s to 1970s, China developed close relations with many of these countries based primarily on shared ideological belief and political identity: anti-colonialism, national independence, economic self-reliance and Third World cooperation. Beijing provided substantial aid and other assistance to struggling African states in order to demonstrate that China was on the side of the Third World.
Things changed in the late 1970s. China's economic reforms gradually moved China away from its radical revolutionary worldview of the past. Beijing's open-door policy, primarily designed to attract foreign trade, investment and joint-venture opportunities from Western countries and to facilitate China's entry into the World Trade Organization, moved China much closer to a market economy where profits, not political agendas, drove most of the economic and trade activities. In this process, China's relations with African and other Third World countries have also evolved from anti-colonial brothers-in-arms to economic and trade partners based on market principles. Yet, many things have remained the same. Beijing continues to pay and train young African diplomats in the Chinese Foreign Ministry's prestigious Foreign Affairs University, a practice that has continued for many years; China continues to present itself as a member of the Third World; and since 1991, every Chinese foreign minister's first visit abroad each year has been to an African country. Beijing has even named 2006 the "Year of Africa," and it is getting ready to host a Sino-African summit toward the end of this year. Furthermore, according to Beijing's report to the People's Congress, most of China's foreign aid—totaling 7.5 billion yuan ($950 million) last year—has gone to more than 50 African countries. In fact, Wen claimed that China has offered Africa more than $44 billion in aid over the past 50 years to finance 900 infrastructure projects (AP, June 18). Meanwhile, all signs indicate that China-African relations are entering a new phase centered on energy and raw materials.
The New Focus on Energy
China's relentless pursuit of economic development turned the country into a net petroleum importer in 1993, and by the turn of the new century, its dependency on foreign oil had jumped to about 40 percent of its demand. Beijing's new target is to quadruple its economy again by 2020, as it did from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s. To achieve this goal, however, China must rely even more on external energy supplies as the Middle Kingdom already burns through 6.3 million barrels of oil a day. Although still far behind the United States, which consumes some 20 million barrels a day, the International Energy Bureau projects that Chinese consumption will reach a daily level of 10 million barrels within the next two decades or so.
Thus, China's quest for energy and other resources has brought China to Africa with urgency. Chinese customs statistics reveal that from 2001 to 2005, China's trade with Africa increased 268 percent, slower only than the growth of China's trade with the Middle East in the same period (367 percent), but faster than China's trade growth with Latin America (238 percent), ASEAN (170 percent), European Union (184 percent) and North America (163 percent). In the first quarter of 2006, the Ministry of Commerce reported that China's trade with the seven countries on Premier Wen's current African touring list amounted to $6.56 billion dollars, a surge of 168.2 percent. It is not surprising, therefore, that in such a broad economic context, Africa has turned into a major energy supplier to China in recent years. Back in 2003, both President Hu and Premier Wen visited several oil-producing African states with Chinese energy company executives, and since then China has become involved in an increasing number of energy deals on the continent that bear a number of unique characteristics.
Energy Security with Chinese Characteristics
First, Beijing is willing to get into the "troubled zones" with bold investment and aid packages in exchange for energy. When Angola ended its 27-year civil war in 2002, few foreign countries and firms were willing to invest in the country. China, on the other hand, committed a $3 billion oil-backed credit line to rebuild the country's shattered infrastructure. Beijing also made Angola its largest foreign aid destination. Now, Angola is the second largest oil producer after Nigeria in sub-Saharan Africa, producing 1.4 million barrels per day with one-third of its oil exports—13 percent of total Chinese imports—going to China. In the first four months of this year, Angola was also the largest supplier of crude to the Chinese market after Saudi Arabia (AFP, June 20). Similar arrangements have been made with Nigeria and other countries as well.
Second, Chinese energy companies are committing large amounts of funding and labor for exploration and development rights in resource-rich countries. Sudan is one of the earliest and largest overseas energy projects by China's major energy companies. Chinese operations in Sudan include investment, development, pipeline building and a large number of Chinese labor deployments. Today, China has $4 billion of investment in the country. The China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC) has a 40 percent controlling stake in Greater Nile Petroleum that dominates Sudan's oilfields. Last year, China purchased more than half of Sudan's oil exports, and earlier this year, China National Offshore Oil Corp. (CNOOC) announced that it had bought a 45 percent stake in a Nigerian oil-and-gas field for $2.27 billion and also purchased 35 percent of an exploration license in the Niger Delta for $60 million. Chinese companies have made similar investments in Angola and other countries.
Third, Chinese energy companies enter into joint-ventures with national governments, state-controlled energy companies or individual enterprises in order to establish a long-term local presence. It appears that the Chinese companies are often willing to outbid their competitors in major contracts awarded by African governments because their concerns are not in short-term returns but rather in strategic positioning for the future.
Fourth, China does not take into consideration the particular concerns of the United States or other Western countries when selecting energy cooperation partners and has a different set of standards on how to advance political reform and human rights in Africa. Most notoriously, China has been willing to engage in energy deals with the Sudanese government despite the ongoing crisis in Darfur. Likewise, China has just reached an energy and mining deal worth $1.3 billion with Zimbabwe. In exchange for building three coal-fired thermal power stations, Zimbabwe is likely to repay the Chinese investment with its rich deposits of platinum, gold, coal nickel and diamonds (The Guardian, June 16).
A Model for Future Cooperation or a Return to the Past?
In the past few years, the demands from China and other developing economies for oil and natural gas have become the major factor, although not the only one, that has driven up world energy prices. Chinese energy companies' extensive activities in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and Central Asia in search of oil and gas assets have created anxiety regarding the world's future supply of energy. Discussions of a new "great game"—a term traditionally associated with competition among major world powers for the control of Eurasian oil resources since the late nineteenth century—have become frequent among observers of energy security.
Today, Africa supplies China with nearly a third of its oil imports. Beijing's extensive engagement and its ascending status in Africa also raises important questions on the nature of China's involvement in the continent as well as Beijing's long-term objectives in the region. Critics charge that China has pursued mercantilist policies in the region for pure economic benefits without human rights or environmental concerns. Due to China's support, they argue, the Sudanese government has been able to continue its genocidal policy in the Darfur region, and the Mugabe regime has been able to survive and carry on its abuses of human rights in Zimbabwe.
Officially, Beijing rejects the criticism with two arguments. The first is China's trademark policy of non-interference in domestic affairs. As Premier Wen stated, "We believe that people in different regions and countries, including those in Africa, have their right and ability to handle their own issues" (South China Morning Post, June 19). The second is China's emphasis that its involvement in Africa is different from the colonialism of the past, and that an affluent China is now putting money back into the local African economy. As Chinese leaders like to say, it is a win-win situation.
With China speedily expanding its activities in Africa, international concerns over Chinese behavior are also deepening and calls for Beijing to be a more responsible world power are becoming stronger. There are also indications that Chinese policy makers, academics, NGOs and even enterprises are beginning to reflect upon China's role in Africa. Many African countries are benefiting from a "China boom," but they would be better served if Beijing were to take further steps in balancing between economic interests and the welfare of the African people. Only by doing so would China be able to demonstrate to the world that its arrival in Africa is indeed different from the old colonial powers.
(Jun 21, 2006)
Jamestown Foundation, China Brief
With continuous economic growth averaging an astonishing annual rate of 10 percent over the past quarter century, China has transformed its landscape, become one of the largest economic powerhouses on earth, created development opportunities for its trading partners around the world and, in the process, generated huge demands for new sources of energy and other resources. Africa, on the other hand, has been left behind in the global quest for industrial modernization, economic prosperity and political stability. Yet, into Africa the Chinese are coming. They are coming for trade, investment and joint ventures, and they are consuming all the energy, minerals and other raw materials that the continent can offer.
An Evolution of Traditional Sino-African Ties
Africa's importance to China is reflected by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's ongoing tour of Africa. According to China's Ministry of Commerce, the seven countries on his itinerary—Egypt, Ghana, the Republic of Congo, Angola, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda—have a combined trade volume of over US$20 billion with China, or 50.6 percent of total China-Africa trade last year. Only two months earlier, Chinese President Hu Jintao visited three other African states—Morocco, Nigeria and Kenya—following his trip to the United States and Saudi Arabia.
Such high-profile visits, a recurring practice over the past few years, have aroused speculation that Beijing's pursuit of great power status may include a new grand strategy regarding Africa. After all, top Chinese leaders have done the same extensive tours to Latin American countries since late 2004 when President Hu first visited Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Cuba. China's ties with African countries, however, can be traced back to the 1950s when newly emerging African states declared their independence. From the 1950s to 1970s, China developed close relations with many of these countries based primarily on shared ideological belief and political identity: anti-colonialism, national independence, economic self-reliance and Third World cooperation. Beijing provided substantial aid and other assistance to struggling African states in order to demonstrate that China was on the side of the Third World.
Things changed in the late 1970s. China's economic reforms gradually moved China away from its radical revolutionary worldview of the past. Beijing's open-door policy, primarily designed to attract foreign trade, investment and joint-venture opportunities from Western countries and to facilitate China's entry into the World Trade Organization, moved China much closer to a market economy where profits, not political agendas, drove most of the economic and trade activities. In this process, China's relations with African and other Third World countries have also evolved from anti-colonial brothers-in-arms to economic and trade partners based on market principles. Yet, many things have remained the same. Beijing continues to pay and train young African diplomats in the Chinese Foreign Ministry's prestigious Foreign Affairs University, a practice that has continued for many years; China continues to present itself as a member of the Third World; and since 1991, every Chinese foreign minister's first visit abroad each year has been to an African country. Beijing has even named 2006 the "Year of Africa," and it is getting ready to host a Sino-African summit toward the end of this year. Furthermore, according to Beijing's report to the People's Congress, most of China's foreign aid—totaling 7.5 billion yuan ($950 million) last year—has gone to more than 50 African countries. In fact, Wen claimed that China has offered Africa more than $44 billion in aid over the past 50 years to finance 900 infrastructure projects (AP, June 18). Meanwhile, all signs indicate that China-African relations are entering a new phase centered on energy and raw materials.
The New Focus on Energy
China's relentless pursuit of economic development turned the country into a net petroleum importer in 1993, and by the turn of the new century, its dependency on foreign oil had jumped to about 40 percent of its demand. Beijing's new target is to quadruple its economy again by 2020, as it did from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s. To achieve this goal, however, China must rely even more on external energy supplies as the Middle Kingdom already burns through 6.3 million barrels of oil a day. Although still far behind the United States, which consumes some 20 million barrels a day, the International Energy Bureau projects that Chinese consumption will reach a daily level of 10 million barrels within the next two decades or so.
Thus, China's quest for energy and other resources has brought China to Africa with urgency. Chinese customs statistics reveal that from 2001 to 2005, China's trade with Africa increased 268 percent, slower only than the growth of China's trade with the Middle East in the same period (367 percent), but faster than China's trade growth with Latin America (238 percent), ASEAN (170 percent), European Union (184 percent) and North America (163 percent). In the first quarter of 2006, the Ministry of Commerce reported that China's trade with the seven countries on Premier Wen's current African touring list amounted to $6.56 billion dollars, a surge of 168.2 percent. It is not surprising, therefore, that in such a broad economic context, Africa has turned into a major energy supplier to China in recent years. Back in 2003, both President Hu and Premier Wen visited several oil-producing African states with Chinese energy company executives, and since then China has become involved in an increasing number of energy deals on the continent that bear a number of unique characteristics.
Energy Security with Chinese Characteristics
First, Beijing is willing to get into the "troubled zones" with bold investment and aid packages in exchange for energy. When Angola ended its 27-year civil war in 2002, few foreign countries and firms were willing to invest in the country. China, on the other hand, committed a $3 billion oil-backed credit line to rebuild the country's shattered infrastructure. Beijing also made Angola its largest foreign aid destination. Now, Angola is the second largest oil producer after Nigeria in sub-Saharan Africa, producing 1.4 million barrels per day with one-third of its oil exports—13 percent of total Chinese imports—going to China. In the first four months of this year, Angola was also the largest supplier of crude to the Chinese market after Saudi Arabia (AFP, June 20). Similar arrangements have been made with Nigeria and other countries as well.
Second, Chinese energy companies are committing large amounts of funding and labor for exploration and development rights in resource-rich countries. Sudan is one of the earliest and largest overseas energy projects by China's major energy companies. Chinese operations in Sudan include investment, development, pipeline building and a large number of Chinese labor deployments. Today, China has $4 billion of investment in the country. The China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC) has a 40 percent controlling stake in Greater Nile Petroleum that dominates Sudan's oilfields. Last year, China purchased more than half of Sudan's oil exports, and earlier this year, China National Offshore Oil Corp. (CNOOC) announced that it had bought a 45 percent stake in a Nigerian oil-and-gas field for $2.27 billion and also purchased 35 percent of an exploration license in the Niger Delta for $60 million. Chinese companies have made similar investments in Angola and other countries.
Third, Chinese energy companies enter into joint-ventures with national governments, state-controlled energy companies or individual enterprises in order to establish a long-term local presence. It appears that the Chinese companies are often willing to outbid their competitors in major contracts awarded by African governments because their concerns are not in short-term returns but rather in strategic positioning for the future.
Fourth, China does not take into consideration the particular concerns of the United States or other Western countries when selecting energy cooperation partners and has a different set of standards on how to advance political reform and human rights in Africa. Most notoriously, China has been willing to engage in energy deals with the Sudanese government despite the ongoing crisis in Darfur. Likewise, China has just reached an energy and mining deal worth $1.3 billion with Zimbabwe. In exchange for building three coal-fired thermal power stations, Zimbabwe is likely to repay the Chinese investment with its rich deposits of platinum, gold, coal nickel and diamonds (The Guardian, June 16).
A Model for Future Cooperation or a Return to the Past?
In the past few years, the demands from China and other developing economies for oil and natural gas have become the major factor, although not the only one, that has driven up world energy prices. Chinese energy companies' extensive activities in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and Central Asia in search of oil and gas assets have created anxiety regarding the world's future supply of energy. Discussions of a new "great game"—a term traditionally associated with competition among major world powers for the control of Eurasian oil resources since the late nineteenth century—have become frequent among observers of energy security.
Today, Africa supplies China with nearly a third of its oil imports. Beijing's extensive engagement and its ascending status in Africa also raises important questions on the nature of China's involvement in the continent as well as Beijing's long-term objectives in the region. Critics charge that China has pursued mercantilist policies in the region for pure economic benefits without human rights or environmental concerns. Due to China's support, they argue, the Sudanese government has been able to continue its genocidal policy in the Darfur region, and the Mugabe regime has been able to survive and carry on its abuses of human rights in Zimbabwe.
Officially, Beijing rejects the criticism with two arguments. The first is China's trademark policy of non-interference in domestic affairs. As Premier Wen stated, "We believe that people in different regions and countries, including those in Africa, have their right and ability to handle their own issues" (South China Morning Post, June 19). The second is China's emphasis that its involvement in Africa is different from the colonialism of the past, and that an affluent China is now putting money back into the local African economy. As Chinese leaders like to say, it is a win-win situation.
With China speedily expanding its activities in Africa, international concerns over Chinese behavior are also deepening and calls for Beijing to be a more responsible world power are becoming stronger. There are also indications that Chinese policy makers, academics, NGOs and even enterprises are beginning to reflect upon China's role in Africa. Many African countries are benefiting from a "China boom," but they would be better served if Beijing were to take further steps in balancing between economic interests and the welfare of the African people. Only by doing so would China be able to demonstrate to the world that its arrival in Africa is indeed different from the old colonial powers.
Friday, June 16, 2006
The Dirty Secret of China's Economy
On June 16, 2006, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the BusinessWeek on China's worsening environmental problems.
The "policy elite has realized that China, with its huge scale of economic development and emissions, cannot consume energy and pollute the earth the way traditional economies have done in the past," says Dr. Jiang.
You can read the article here.
The "policy elite has realized that China, with its huge scale of economic development and emissions, cannot consume energy and pollute the earth the way traditional economies have done in the past," says Dr. Jiang.
You can read the article here.
Thursday, June 08, 2006
The changing hues of China
In June 2006, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Oilweek Magazine on China's energy industry and its foray into the Canadian oil sands development.
Dr. Jiang rails against the Canadian government’s short-sightedness when it comes to allowing business exchange between the two countries.
You can read the article here.
Dr. Jiang rails against the Canadian government’s short-sightedness when it comes to allowing business exchange between the two countries.
You can read the article here.
Wednesday, June 07, 2006
China Looks Beyond Koizumi in its Japan Diplomacy
by Wenran Jiang
Volume 6, Issue 12 (June 07, 2006)
China Brief, Jamestown Foundation
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi is reportedly preparing for another visit to the Yasukuni Shrine where World War II war criminals are being honored among the war dead. If he carries out his sixth homage before stepping down as the prime minister in September, Tokyo’s relations with China, South Korea and other Asian countries are certain to become more strained. There are positive signs, however, that Sino-Japanese relations are improving—an indication that both senior Chinese leaders and their Japanese counterparts are willing to look beyond Koizumi.
Resumption of High-Level Contacts
Political relations between China and Japan have been at low ebb for much of the past five years since Koizumi began his pilgrimages to Yasukuni. The deadlock over the issue, combined with the large-scale anti-Japanese demonstrations in major Chinese cities in the spring of 2005, has cut off much of the senior level contacts between Tokyo and Beijing. Chinese President Hu Jintao reiterated China’s bottom line on its policy toward Japan in late March: there would be no summit between the two countries as long as Japan’s prime minister visits the Yasukuni Shrine. Nevertheless, in spite of the political impasse, bilateral economic relations have developed along a separate track.
Two years ago, China became Japan’s largest trading partner and Tokyo is keenly aware that much of Japan’s economic recovery in the past years is due primarily to a growing Chinese market. China and Japan have continued to hold bilateral strategic consultations and negotiations aimed at resolving disputes over territories and exclusive economic zones in the East China Sea. After much speculation and negotiation, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing met with Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso on the sidelines of an Asia economic conference in Doha, Qatar. This was the first foreign-minister level meeting of the two countries in a year and the first time for Aso in his capacity as the foreign minister to meet his Chinese counterpart. The two ministers chatted about sports and took a forward-looking posture. “We will benefit from good relations,” Li said. “But if we fight, we will both be worse off. The world also wants Japan-China relations to improve.” Aso’s response echoed this tone: “We should have more dialogue. We should do that especially when we have difficulties, and Japan is open to this” (The Daily Yomiuri, May 25).
Both Li and Aso agreed that the two sides should speed up negotiations on the East China Sea dispute where Japan fears that China’s development of gas fields on the Chinese side of Japan’s declared “median line” (not acknowledged by Beijing) might lead to the loss of resources on the Japanese side. Aso has also proposed another meeting in Malaysia as a part of the “ASEAN+3” (Association of Southeast Asian Nations plus South Korea, Japan and China) next month when ASEAN foreign ministers will meet with their counterparts from China, Japan and South Korea. Aso even predicted with optimism that Japan is on its way to restoring relations with both China and South Korea.
A New Focus of Bilateral Cooperation
A few days after the meeting of the two foreign ministers, China’s Minister of Commerce Bo Xilai met with Japan’s Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Toshihiro Nikai while attending the Sino-Japan Forum on Energy Saving and Environmental Protection in Kyoto. Participating in one of the largest bilateral events in recent memory with 700 government and business leaders from both sides, Bo was received by the Japanese side with formal head-of-the-state status (Kyodo, May 28). He talked to Nikai about the importance of bilateral commerce and how cold political relations have affected economic ties. In the end, both agreed to pursue further collaboration in the areas of energy efficiency and environmental protection.
Senior-level attention in these areas has marked a renewed focus in the development of bilateral relations. China’s “11th five-year program” has placed a tremendous emphasis on energy conservation and environment-friendly measures. Japan, on the other hand, is one of the most energy efficient users in the world and is a leader in many of the technologies needed by China. Nobuyori Kodaira, director-general of Japan’s Natural Resources and Energy Agency, who recently engaged in bitter talks with China over the East China Sea dispute, has now signed a memorandum of cooperation with China on energy conservation.
But Bo went further to suggest broader, long-term cooperation based on energy and the environment. He drew a comparison to the European Union that began with the European Coal and Steel Community centered on France and Germany. "If China and Japan can do better in the area of energy and environmental cooperation, Sino-Japanese relations will be pushed to a new platform,” said Bo (Kyodo, May 30).
Tokyo seems to have sensed the new momentum. In what will certainly be seen by Beijing as a positive step forward, it announced that Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA) to China for the 2005 fiscal year—frozen due to the deadlock over the East China Sea negotiations—will be resumed with 74 billion yen (US$650 million) worth of low interest loans and assistance being dispersed soon (Asahi Shimbun, June 6). When Tokyo began to provide China with ODA in the late 1970s, it was part and parcel of Japan’s energy security policy. The initial projects focused on large infrastructure projects that directly benefited Chinese exports of coal and oil to Japan. After becoming a net oil importer in 1993, China continued to supply Japan with good-quality, low-cost crude from its Northeast Daqing Oil Fields, only stopping in early 2004 when the two sides could not agree on the pricing. At the same time, China, with its own energy in serious short supply, overtook Japan as the second-largest energy consumer in the world. Although Japan has substantially decreased its ODA to China since the 1990s and expects a total suspension in the near future, it remains an important source of finance and is a symbol of close economic relations between the two countries. In the past few years, Japanese ODA to China has shifted to environment-related projects since China’s growth has caused many environmental problems that have an increasingly detrimental effect on Japan.
Post-Koizumi Diplomacy in Full Swing but Obstacles Ahead
These developments are certainly music to the ears of those who would like to see China and Japan overcome the “Yasukuni syndrome” and move forward to build better relations that will benefit not only the two countries, but also the entire Asia-Pacific region. Even on issues of history, Beijing has indicated through informal channels that it is willing to conduct joint studies with Japan—a sign of flexibility in searching for a breakthrough in this sensitive area. Beijing’s new posture toward Japan recalls its efforts in the 2001-2004 period when Chinese leaders implicitly endorsed the “new thinking” on Japan advocated by some scholars and journalists who argued that China should move beyond issues of history and forge a future-oriented relationship with Japan. Unfortunately, neither the Japanese leadership nor other segments of Japanese society responded with positive measures and the “new thinking” lost its appeal in China and was largely discarded.
The tide seems to be changing now and the Japanese public is overwhelmingly concerned about the state of Japan’s deteriorating relations with China. Furthermore, seven former prime ministers have called on Koizumi to stop visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, the business community has clearly voiced its opposition to Koizumi’s homage and consensus is growing that the next prime minister should refrain from going to Yasukuni in order to repair relations with Japan’s Asian neighbors. Shinzo Abe, Koizumi’s chief cabinet secretary and a leading contender for the prime minister’s position, has recently softened his hawkish stand on the Yasukuni issue. Once adamant about going to Yasukuni if selected as the next prime minister, Abe is now refusing to give a clear answer. Aso, another contender for the prime minister position and an advocate for the emperor’s worshipping at Yasukuni, also treads carefully on the issue: “I’ll make an appropriate decision with both my personal belief and my public duty taken into consideration” (The Daily Yomiuri, May 25). Additionally, former cabinet secretary Yasuo Fukuda has clearly expressed his opposition to the Yasukuni visit and has built his bid for the prime minister’s post mainly on the resumption of healthy, friendly ties with Beijing and Seoul.
While it is unclear how the Yasukuni issue and the “history question” will manifest itself in Japanese politics in the next few months, it is unlikely to be a source of military conflict. A much more difficult obstacle, however, lies in the East China Sea where territorial claims by both China and Japan have caused much tension. In a world of diminishing resources, it is estimated that there are 200 trillion cubic feet of potential gas reserves and up to 100 billion barrels of oil deposits on the entire shelf of the East China Sea. The reserves, close to both Japan and China, could provide a long-term, secure supply to both countries if a cooperative solution is worked out. Yet, the complex interdependence between Beijing and Tokyo has created an economic security dilemma—one country’s drive to secure its own energy supply has turned into a real or perceived depletion of the other’s potential resources.
Although the positions of Beijing and Tokyo remain at odds after the fourth round of negotiations, both sides have expressed willingness to continue negotiations that would allow for joint-exploration. It is evident that both countries are attempting to search for grounds of cooperation and are making an effort to move beyond the areas of contention. One can only hope that the potential Koizumi visit to the Yasukuni shrine will not derail the hard-earned progress in Sino-Japanese relations.
Volume 6, Issue 12 (June 07, 2006)
China Brief, Jamestown Foundation
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi is reportedly preparing for another visit to the Yasukuni Shrine where World War II war criminals are being honored among the war dead. If he carries out his sixth homage before stepping down as the prime minister in September, Tokyo’s relations with China, South Korea and other Asian countries are certain to become more strained. There are positive signs, however, that Sino-Japanese relations are improving—an indication that both senior Chinese leaders and their Japanese counterparts are willing to look beyond Koizumi.
Resumption of High-Level Contacts
Political relations between China and Japan have been at low ebb for much of the past five years since Koizumi began his pilgrimages to Yasukuni. The deadlock over the issue, combined with the large-scale anti-Japanese demonstrations in major Chinese cities in the spring of 2005, has cut off much of the senior level contacts between Tokyo and Beijing. Chinese President Hu Jintao reiterated China’s bottom line on its policy toward Japan in late March: there would be no summit between the two countries as long as Japan’s prime minister visits the Yasukuni Shrine. Nevertheless, in spite of the political impasse, bilateral economic relations have developed along a separate track.
Two years ago, China became Japan’s largest trading partner and Tokyo is keenly aware that much of Japan’s economic recovery in the past years is due primarily to a growing Chinese market. China and Japan have continued to hold bilateral strategic consultations and negotiations aimed at resolving disputes over territories and exclusive economic zones in the East China Sea. After much speculation and negotiation, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing met with Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso on the sidelines of an Asia economic conference in Doha, Qatar. This was the first foreign-minister level meeting of the two countries in a year and the first time for Aso in his capacity as the foreign minister to meet his Chinese counterpart. The two ministers chatted about sports and took a forward-looking posture. “We will benefit from good relations,” Li said. “But if we fight, we will both be worse off. The world also wants Japan-China relations to improve.” Aso’s response echoed this tone: “We should have more dialogue. We should do that especially when we have difficulties, and Japan is open to this” (The Daily Yomiuri, May 25).
Both Li and Aso agreed that the two sides should speed up negotiations on the East China Sea dispute where Japan fears that China’s development of gas fields on the Chinese side of Japan’s declared “median line” (not acknowledged by Beijing) might lead to the loss of resources on the Japanese side. Aso has also proposed another meeting in Malaysia as a part of the “ASEAN+3” (Association of Southeast Asian Nations plus South Korea, Japan and China) next month when ASEAN foreign ministers will meet with their counterparts from China, Japan and South Korea. Aso even predicted with optimism that Japan is on its way to restoring relations with both China and South Korea.
A New Focus of Bilateral Cooperation
A few days after the meeting of the two foreign ministers, China’s Minister of Commerce Bo Xilai met with Japan’s Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Toshihiro Nikai while attending the Sino-Japan Forum on Energy Saving and Environmental Protection in Kyoto. Participating in one of the largest bilateral events in recent memory with 700 government and business leaders from both sides, Bo was received by the Japanese side with formal head-of-the-state status (Kyodo, May 28). He talked to Nikai about the importance of bilateral commerce and how cold political relations have affected economic ties. In the end, both agreed to pursue further collaboration in the areas of energy efficiency and environmental protection.
Senior-level attention in these areas has marked a renewed focus in the development of bilateral relations. China’s “11th five-year program” has placed a tremendous emphasis on energy conservation and environment-friendly measures. Japan, on the other hand, is one of the most energy efficient users in the world and is a leader in many of the technologies needed by China. Nobuyori Kodaira, director-general of Japan’s Natural Resources and Energy Agency, who recently engaged in bitter talks with China over the East China Sea dispute, has now signed a memorandum of cooperation with China on energy conservation.
But Bo went further to suggest broader, long-term cooperation based on energy and the environment. He drew a comparison to the European Union that began with the European Coal and Steel Community centered on France and Germany. "If China and Japan can do better in the area of energy and environmental cooperation, Sino-Japanese relations will be pushed to a new platform,” said Bo (Kyodo, May 30).
Tokyo seems to have sensed the new momentum. In what will certainly be seen by Beijing as a positive step forward, it announced that Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA) to China for the 2005 fiscal year—frozen due to the deadlock over the East China Sea negotiations—will be resumed with 74 billion yen (US$650 million) worth of low interest loans and assistance being dispersed soon (Asahi Shimbun, June 6). When Tokyo began to provide China with ODA in the late 1970s, it was part and parcel of Japan’s energy security policy. The initial projects focused on large infrastructure projects that directly benefited Chinese exports of coal and oil to Japan. After becoming a net oil importer in 1993, China continued to supply Japan with good-quality, low-cost crude from its Northeast Daqing Oil Fields, only stopping in early 2004 when the two sides could not agree on the pricing. At the same time, China, with its own energy in serious short supply, overtook Japan as the second-largest energy consumer in the world. Although Japan has substantially decreased its ODA to China since the 1990s and expects a total suspension in the near future, it remains an important source of finance and is a symbol of close economic relations between the two countries. In the past few years, Japanese ODA to China has shifted to environment-related projects since China’s growth has caused many environmental problems that have an increasingly detrimental effect on Japan.
Post-Koizumi Diplomacy in Full Swing but Obstacles Ahead
These developments are certainly music to the ears of those who would like to see China and Japan overcome the “Yasukuni syndrome” and move forward to build better relations that will benefit not only the two countries, but also the entire Asia-Pacific region. Even on issues of history, Beijing has indicated through informal channels that it is willing to conduct joint studies with Japan—a sign of flexibility in searching for a breakthrough in this sensitive area. Beijing’s new posture toward Japan recalls its efforts in the 2001-2004 period when Chinese leaders implicitly endorsed the “new thinking” on Japan advocated by some scholars and journalists who argued that China should move beyond issues of history and forge a future-oriented relationship with Japan. Unfortunately, neither the Japanese leadership nor other segments of Japanese society responded with positive measures and the “new thinking” lost its appeal in China and was largely discarded.
The tide seems to be changing now and the Japanese public is overwhelmingly concerned about the state of Japan’s deteriorating relations with China. Furthermore, seven former prime ministers have called on Koizumi to stop visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, the business community has clearly voiced its opposition to Koizumi’s homage and consensus is growing that the next prime minister should refrain from going to Yasukuni in order to repair relations with Japan’s Asian neighbors. Shinzo Abe, Koizumi’s chief cabinet secretary and a leading contender for the prime minister’s position, has recently softened his hawkish stand on the Yasukuni issue. Once adamant about going to Yasukuni if selected as the next prime minister, Abe is now refusing to give a clear answer. Aso, another contender for the prime minister position and an advocate for the emperor’s worshipping at Yasukuni, also treads carefully on the issue: “I’ll make an appropriate decision with both my personal belief and my public duty taken into consideration” (The Daily Yomiuri, May 25). Additionally, former cabinet secretary Yasuo Fukuda has clearly expressed his opposition to the Yasukuni visit and has built his bid for the prime minister’s post mainly on the resumption of healthy, friendly ties with Beijing and Seoul.
While it is unclear how the Yasukuni issue and the “history question” will manifest itself in Japanese politics in the next few months, it is unlikely to be a source of military conflict. A much more difficult obstacle, however, lies in the East China Sea where territorial claims by both China and Japan have caused much tension. In a world of diminishing resources, it is estimated that there are 200 trillion cubic feet of potential gas reserves and up to 100 billion barrels of oil deposits on the entire shelf of the East China Sea. The reserves, close to both Japan and China, could provide a long-term, secure supply to both countries if a cooperative solution is worked out. Yet, the complex interdependence between Beijing and Tokyo has created an economic security dilemma—one country’s drive to secure its own energy supply has turned into a real or perceived depletion of the other’s potential resources.
Although the positions of Beijing and Tokyo remain at odds after the fourth round of negotiations, both sides have expressed willingness to continue negotiations that would allow for joint-exploration. It is evident that both countries are attempting to search for grounds of cooperation and are making an effort to move beyond the areas of contention. One can only hope that the potential Koizumi visit to the Yasukuni shrine will not derail the hard-earned progress in Sino-Japanese relations.
Tuesday, May 09, 2006
China Attacks Its Woes With an Old Party Ritual
On March 9, 2006, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the New York Times on the Chinese Communist Party's recent "preserving the progressiveness" ideological campaign.
For 14 months and counting, the party's 70 million rank-and-file members have been ordered to read speeches by Mao and Deng Xiaoping, as well as the numbing treatise of 17,000-plus words that is the party constitution. Mandatory meetings include sessions where cadres must offer self-criticisms and also criticize everyone else.
Dr. Jiang observed that it is an effort to cope with the declining reputation of the party and the distrust of the people toward party officials.
"The executives were asking me if this political movement will affect China's way of doing business," Mr. Jiang said. "The Chinese immediately reassured us that it wouldn't."
You can read the article here.
For 14 months and counting, the party's 70 million rank-and-file members have been ordered to read speeches by Mao and Deng Xiaoping, as well as the numbing treatise of 17,000-plus words that is the party constitution. Mandatory meetings include sessions where cadres must offer self-criticisms and also criticize everyone else.
Dr. Jiang observed that it is an effort to cope with the declining reputation of the party and the distrust of the people toward party officials.
"The executives were asking me if this political movement will affect China's way of doing business," Mr. Jiang said. "The Chinese immediately reassured us that it wouldn't."
You can read the article here.
Wednesday, April 19, 2006
CHINA: New rules 'aimed at tightening local media'
On April 19, 2006, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Straits Times on China's recent media rules aimed at cleaning up and filtering out foreign influences from local news and entertainment content.
Dr. Jiang noted that the oscillation of positions on media control is inextricably linked to which faction within the Communist Party is having the upper hand. "The recent clampdown is a sign that at this point in time, the conservatives, who favour tight control, appear to be winning," he said.
You can read the article here.
Dr. Jiang noted that the oscillation of positions on media control is inextricably linked to which faction within the Communist Party is having the upper hand. "The recent clampdown is a sign that at this point in time, the conservatives, who favour tight control, appear to be winning," he said.
You can read the article here.
Friday, April 14, 2006
US-China Differences Go Way Beyond Protocol for Hu's Visit
On April 14, 2006, Dr. Jiang was interviewed by CNSNews on Chinese President Hu Jintao's debut trip to the U.S. last fall.
China's embassy in Washington, official media, and -- more than once this week -- the foreign ministry in Beijing all have referred to the April 18-21 trip as a "state visit." But the White House pointedly described it as merely "a visit" and the agenda does not include the official state dinner or banquet traditionally associated with the highest-level visit by a head of state.
Professor Jiang says getting the full state-visit treatment "is important for Hu politically back home, and for the international image of this ascending economic power abroad."
But the move from Washington will be seen as "a slap in Hu's face," Jiang said. "It suggests that Washington doesn't fundamentally acknowledge the legitimacy of China's authoritarian communist government."
You can read the article here.
China's embassy in Washington, official media, and -- more than once this week -- the foreign ministry in Beijing all have referred to the April 18-21 trip as a "state visit." But the White House pointedly described it as merely "a visit" and the agenda does not include the official state dinner or banquet traditionally associated with the highest-level visit by a head of state.
Professor Jiang says getting the full state-visit treatment "is important for Hu politically back home, and for the international image of this ascending economic power abroad."
But the move from Washington will be seen as "a slap in Hu's face," Jiang said. "It suggests that Washington doesn't fundamentally acknowledge the legitimacy of China's authoritarian communist government."
You can read the article here.
Monday, February 27, 2006
Farmers take fight to Internet arena
On February 27, 2006, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Straits Times on how Chinese discontented farmers are using the internet to vent their grievances.
In the past, Beijing could regard the peasants as a backward lot whose interests were strictly parochial. Their grievances, no matter how intense, were isolated from the outside world, said Wenran.
You can read the article here.
In the past, Beijing could regard the peasants as a backward lot whose interests were strictly parochial. Their grievances, no matter how intense, were isolated from the outside world, said Wenran.
You can read the article here.
Saturday, February 25, 2006
Land rights and graft a thorny issue
On February 25, 2006, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Straits Times on the growing rights movement among Chinese peasants stemming from China's ambiguous and frequently abused land ownership-acquisition policies.
Analysts are divided on whether China's rural reforms can succeed without addressing the thorny questions of land-ownership and rights.
Professor Jiang Wenran thinks the land issue will neither make nor break the bid to improve rural living. He commented that the land-rights issue is not the key issue that is going to make Chinese peasants better or worse off.
You can read the article here.
Analysts are divided on whether China's rural reforms can succeed without addressing the thorny questions of land-ownership and rights.
Professor Jiang Wenran thinks the land issue will neither make nor break the bid to improve rural living. He commented that the land-rights issue is not the key issue that is going to make Chinese peasants better or worse off.
You can read the article here.
Rural unrest not near any 'tipping point'
On February 25, 2006, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Straits Times on rural unrest in China.
For now, experts do not think the country is close to any 'tipping point', citing the lack of an organised political opposition.
But Wenran noted that it would be a mistake for Beijing to take comfort from such observations, adding that every new protest inched the regime closer to a potential crisis.
You can read the article here.
For now, experts do not think the country is close to any 'tipping point', citing the lack of an organised political opposition.
But Wenran noted that it would be a mistake for Beijing to take comfort from such observations, adding that every new protest inched the regime closer to a potential crisis.
You can read the article here.
Wednesday, February 22, 2006
China: threat or victim of U.S. fuels policy?
Washington accused of manipulating oil markets to slow pace of modernization
by Wenran Jiang
(Feb 22, 2006)
Edmonton Journal
China's growing appetite for energy has caused widespread concern around the world.
The Middle Kingdom is blamed for the sharp increase in global oil prices in the past few years. The United States is uneasy about Beijing's evolving cosy relations with major oil producers such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Venezuela, many of which are hostile toward Washington. And there are growing calls for containing China as an energy threat in a world of diminishing resources.
But many Chinese are resentful of such attitudes. Rather, they argue that China is the victim of mounting oil prices. In 2004 alone, Beijing spent an extra $7 billion US of its foreign exchange due to climbing oil prices, with payment totalling more than $43 billion US, making oil the country's largest single import item.
While the Western mainstream holds that the global increase in demand -- especially from China and India -- and decreasing spare production capacity will keep oil prices high, Beijing sees the real cause of high oil prices as manipulation of the energy markets by Western government-backed, profit-seeking "international petroleum crocodiles." Reports of huge earnings by Western energy firms only enhance such perceptions.
When the U.S. Congress voted overwhelmingly to block the sale of American energy company Unocal to China's National Offshore Oil Corp. last fall, it became further proof to many in China that the United States doesn't play by market rules -- its intention is to halt China's pace of modernization by keeping energy prices dear and keeping Chinese firms out of the global energy equity market.
CHINESE ENERGY FIRMS BITTER
Chinese energy companies are keenly aware of the volatile situation and high risks involved in their energy investment ventures in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. And they are bitter when Western media accuse them of being in bed with dictators or "rogue states" as defined by the United States.
Given the perception gap, the recent Chinese debates on energy security have resulted in some people strongly advocating for a speedy buildup of China's navy in order to protect vital energy shipping routes.
Currently, a popular Chinese online novel, The Battle in Protecting Key Oil Routes, depicts a war scenario in 2008 near the Strait of Malacca where the Chinese navy destroys the entire U.S. Pacific carrier group in a decisive sea battle.
But more seriously, all Chinese government officials who talk about energy nowadays emphasize that China is not just the second-largest energy consumer on earth but also the second-largest energy producer, with only six per cent of its annual energy needs coming from abroad.
They quote statistics that China accounts for only three per cent of overall global oil trade. The psychological impact of the dragon's thirst for oil aside, this does not seem to be the number that will drive up energy prices.
Beijing also announced recently that China's demands for external oil grew by only 3.3 per cent last year, which is more than 30 per cent lower than in 2004. "China will import less oil and oil products in 2006 than in the previous years," says Lu Jianhua, director of the foreign trade department of the Ministry of Commerce. "It is unfair to blame China for the rising international oil prices."
Meanwhile, China has begun to implement a range of policies to boost domestic energy exploration and production, together with energy diversification and conservation measures. We also hear that China is not in a hurry to fill its strategic oil reserve under current conditions, and that the newly added electricity supply will meet China's demands this year.
Such a calculated move reflects at least four policy priorities of the Chinese leadership on energy security:
- China is refocusing on the self-reliance strategy that depends primarily on domestic energy sources to meet economic development needs;
- Beijing's drive to increase energy and power production to satisfy the explosive demands for energy in the past two years has some initial success;
- China does not want to be seen as so desperate for oil that it would pursue a scorched-earth strategy for energy acquisitions around the world;
- China is learning to play the psychological game in the global marketplace by lowering expectations of China's demands for oil, thus taking away what Beijing believes to be an unjustifiable excuse for big Western oil companies to increase oil prices.
It may well be the case that China's energy demand will slow down substantially this year. It is also true that China, with 22 per cent of the world's population, consumes just over six per cent of global oil production while the United States, with only five per cent of the world's population, uses 20 per cent of the world's daily oil supply.
On a per capita basis, the Chinese only consume a fraction of the oil that their American counterparts do.
BIG GREENHOUSE GAS EMITTER
But China remains the second largest emitter of carbon-dioxide after the Unites States; most of its cities and rivers are severely polluted; it burns three times as much energy as the global average and many times more than industrialized countries in producing every unit of GDP; and it is willing to spend $150 billion on renewable and alternative energy in the next 15 years.
Instead of blaming Beijing for its energy demands or containing China as an energy threat, industrialized countries should seize China's vast energy market potential in technologies of energy conservation and efficiency, environmental protection techniques and know-how, renewable and alternative energy production, and joint-efforts in managing global warming.
A co-operative approach to solving common energy securities concerns between China and the West will moderate Beijing's foreign policy behaviour, thus making easier the task of solving tough issues such as the ongoing Iranian nuclear crisis.
by Wenran Jiang
(Feb 22, 2006)
Edmonton Journal
China's growing appetite for energy has caused widespread concern around the world.
The Middle Kingdom is blamed for the sharp increase in global oil prices in the past few years. The United States is uneasy about Beijing's evolving cosy relations with major oil producers such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Venezuela, many of which are hostile toward Washington. And there are growing calls for containing China as an energy threat in a world of diminishing resources.
But many Chinese are resentful of such attitudes. Rather, they argue that China is the victim of mounting oil prices. In 2004 alone, Beijing spent an extra $7 billion US of its foreign exchange due to climbing oil prices, with payment totalling more than $43 billion US, making oil the country's largest single import item.
While the Western mainstream holds that the global increase in demand -- especially from China and India -- and decreasing spare production capacity will keep oil prices high, Beijing sees the real cause of high oil prices as manipulation of the energy markets by Western government-backed, profit-seeking "international petroleum crocodiles." Reports of huge earnings by Western energy firms only enhance such perceptions.
When the U.S. Congress voted overwhelmingly to block the sale of American energy company Unocal to China's National Offshore Oil Corp. last fall, it became further proof to many in China that the United States doesn't play by market rules -- its intention is to halt China's pace of modernization by keeping energy prices dear and keeping Chinese firms out of the global energy equity market.
CHINESE ENERGY FIRMS BITTER
Chinese energy companies are keenly aware of the volatile situation and high risks involved in their energy investment ventures in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. And they are bitter when Western media accuse them of being in bed with dictators or "rogue states" as defined by the United States.
Given the perception gap, the recent Chinese debates on energy security have resulted in some people strongly advocating for a speedy buildup of China's navy in order to protect vital energy shipping routes.
Currently, a popular Chinese online novel, The Battle in Protecting Key Oil Routes, depicts a war scenario in 2008 near the Strait of Malacca where the Chinese navy destroys the entire U.S. Pacific carrier group in a decisive sea battle.
But more seriously, all Chinese government officials who talk about energy nowadays emphasize that China is not just the second-largest energy consumer on earth but also the second-largest energy producer, with only six per cent of its annual energy needs coming from abroad.
They quote statistics that China accounts for only three per cent of overall global oil trade. The psychological impact of the dragon's thirst for oil aside, this does not seem to be the number that will drive up energy prices.
Beijing also announced recently that China's demands for external oil grew by only 3.3 per cent last year, which is more than 30 per cent lower than in 2004. "China will import less oil and oil products in 2006 than in the previous years," says Lu Jianhua, director of the foreign trade department of the Ministry of Commerce. "It is unfair to blame China for the rising international oil prices."
Meanwhile, China has begun to implement a range of policies to boost domestic energy exploration and production, together with energy diversification and conservation measures. We also hear that China is not in a hurry to fill its strategic oil reserve under current conditions, and that the newly added electricity supply will meet China's demands this year.
Such a calculated move reflects at least four policy priorities of the Chinese leadership on energy security:
- China is refocusing on the self-reliance strategy that depends primarily on domestic energy sources to meet economic development needs;
- Beijing's drive to increase energy and power production to satisfy the explosive demands for energy in the past two years has some initial success;
- China does not want to be seen as so desperate for oil that it would pursue a scorched-earth strategy for energy acquisitions around the world;
- China is learning to play the psychological game in the global marketplace by lowering expectations of China's demands for oil, thus taking away what Beijing believes to be an unjustifiable excuse for big Western oil companies to increase oil prices.
It may well be the case that China's energy demand will slow down substantially this year. It is also true that China, with 22 per cent of the world's population, consumes just over six per cent of global oil production while the United States, with only five per cent of the world's population, uses 20 per cent of the world's daily oil supply.
On a per capita basis, the Chinese only consume a fraction of the oil that their American counterparts do.
BIG GREENHOUSE GAS EMITTER
But China remains the second largest emitter of carbon-dioxide after the Unites States; most of its cities and rivers are severely polluted; it burns three times as much energy as the global average and many times more than industrialized countries in producing every unit of GDP; and it is willing to spend $150 billion on renewable and alternative energy in the next 15 years.
Instead of blaming Beijing for its energy demands or containing China as an energy threat, industrialized countries should seize China's vast energy market potential in technologies of energy conservation and efficiency, environmental protection techniques and know-how, renewable and alternative energy production, and joint-efforts in managing global warming.
A co-operative approach to solving common energy securities concerns between China and the West will moderate Beijing's foreign policy behaviour, thus making easier the task of solving tough issues such as the ongoing Iranian nuclear crisis.
Friday, February 10, 2006
The world's energy reserves: Where the buffalo roam...
On February 10, 2006, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Independence Online Edition on China's commercial interests in Canada's oil sands sector.
The province of Alberta in Canada's west is sitting on the world's second largest oil reserves. Its vast fields cover 149,000 square kilometres, an area larger than England, and experts estimate it holds 1.7 trillion barrels of oil. A mere sliver, 10 per cent, is recoverable at today's oil prices, but that is enough to make Canada's viable supply second only to that of Saudi Arabia.
"Some Americans think one more barrel to China means one less barrel to America," said Professor Jiang. "China's investment is still a cautious one as they watch and see if the oil sands are viable and profitable."
Click here to read the article.
The province of Alberta in Canada's west is sitting on the world's second largest oil reserves. Its vast fields cover 149,000 square kilometres, an area larger than England, and experts estimate it holds 1.7 trillion barrels of oil. A mere sliver, 10 per cent, is recoverable at today's oil prices, but that is enough to make Canada's viable supply second only to that of Saudi Arabia.
"Some Americans think one more barrel to China means one less barrel to America," said Professor Jiang. "China's investment is still a cautious one as they watch and see if the oil sands are viable and profitable."
Click here to read the article.
Thursday, February 09, 2006
Energy reshapes China's priorities
On February 9, 2006, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by Seattel Times on China's global quest for crude oil.
Jiang described the country's energy grab as "driven by desperation." Already there are blackouts in major cities. If development hits a speed bump, the Communist Party in power may lose its grip if it can't deliver jobs and economic growth.
Although China's rise is often viewed negatively in the U.S., evidenced by political interference in the Unocal deal, perceptions of China are more positive elsewhere, Jiang said.
You can read the article here.
Jiang described the country's energy grab as "driven by desperation." Already there are blackouts in major cities. If development hits a speed bump, the Communist Party in power may lose its grip if it can't deliver jobs and economic growth.
Although China's rise is often viewed negatively in the U.S., evidenced by political interference in the Unocal deal, perceptions of China are more positive elsewhere, Jiang said.
You can read the article here.
Thursday, February 02, 2006
Ignoring China's energy needs risky: expert
On February 2, 2006, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Business Edge, warning the Canadian government and the energy industry that they must make China more of a priority or risk losing out on potential billions in future business.
You can read the article here.
You can read the article here.
Friday, January 06, 2006
China's energy security strategy
My keynote speech at the 3rd Canadian Oil Sands Summit on January 18th in Calgary. Details of the conference HERE.
Sunday, December 18, 2005
My recent op-ed & comments in the press
CBC Radio Edmonton | On Internet censorship in China, Feb. 22, 2006
BBC | On Sino-Japanese relations, Feb. 22, 2006
BBC | On China-Pakistan relations, Feb. 19, 2006
Aljazeera | On Chinese media: reform or on ice? Feb. 14, 2006
Voice of America | In-stadio guest on Issues & Opinions, Feb. 14, 2006
The Independent | On Canadian oil sands, Feb. 9, 2006
Seattle Times | Report on my talk at Seattle Economists Club, Feb. 9, 2006
Sing Tao Daily | On Canada's new cabinet & relations with China, Feb. 6, 06
Business Edge | On China-Canada energy relations, Feb. 3, 2006
The Standard | Social cost of China's prosperity, Jan. 26, 2006
First Business News | On Canadian election, Jan. 26, 2006
Sing Tao Daily | On Canadian election, Jan. 25, 2006
Ta Kung Pao | On Canada Chinese in Canadian politics, Jan. 24, 2006
BBC World Service | On Canadian election, Jan. 24, 2006
CRI | On Canadian election & Canada-China relations, Jan. 24, 2006
LA Times | On China's energy development strategy, Jan. 23, 2006
BBC World Service | On high police casualties in China, Jan. 23, 2006
New China News Agency | On Chinese Canadians in politics, Jan. 22, 2006
China Brief | Special issue on social unrest in China, Jan. 20, 2006
BBC World Service | On Chinese farmers protest movement, Jan. 15, 2006
Reuters | China's position on Iran's nuclear standoff, Jan. 13, 2006
The Globe & Mail op-ed | The casualties of China's rising tide, Jan. 9, 2006
CBC Radio International | On China's development outlook, Jan. 5, 2006
Sing Tao Daily | On Canadian election & foreign policy, Jan. 4, 2006
China Central TV 9 Dialogue |On the person(s) of the year, Jan. 3, 2006
CBC Radio As It Happens | On the rise of China, Jan. 2, 2006
NPR | On China's crackdown on liberal press, Jan. 2, 2006
BBC World Service| On Hu Jintao's new year address, Jan. 1, 2006
Voice of America | China's latest media crackdown, Dec. 30, 2005
Voice of America | China's latest media crackdown (Chinese), Dec. 30, 2005
BBC World Service| On Japan's relations with China, Dec. 25, 2005
Danish Radio | On China's western development, Dec. 22, 2005
UPI | On China's urban-rural divide, Dec. 19, 2005
BBC World Service | On the Kazakhstan-China pipeline, Dec. 15, 2005
CBC Radio International | On WTO Hong Kong meeting, Dec. 15, 2005
CNN | Internview on China's growing social unrest, Dec. 13, 2005
The Globe & Mail | On East Asia Summit, Dec. 13, 2005
Edmonton Journal | My full page article: Fallout of China's boom, Dec. 11,05
China Brief features my article: The cost of China's modernization, Dec. 6, 05
L.A. Times | On Shonghua River pollution, Dec. 4, 2005
BBC World Service | On the cost of China's modernization, Dec. 4, 2005
Voice of America |On China's increasing coalmine accidents, Dec. 3, 2005
Danish Radio | On the lack of responsibility in China's mines, Dec. 3, 2005
BBC World Service | On Montreal Climate Conference, Dec. 3, 2005
NPR Marketplace | On Songhua River pollution, Dec. 2, 2005
Danish Radio | On China's environment decision making, Dec. 2, 2005
The Straits Times | On China's treatment of bad news, Nov. 30, 2005
China Central TV| On the fall of the Martin cabinet, Nov. 29, 2005
BBC World Service | The "head tax" on Chinese immigrants, Nov. 28, 2005
Voice of America | On China's environmental disasters, Nov. 28, 2005
BBC World Service | On UN climate conference in Montreal, Nov.27, 2005
Danish Radio | On Harbin river pollution & enviroment, Nov. 30, 2005
The Globe & Mail Commentary | Free trade and APEC, Nov. 25, 2005
L.A. Times | On Harbin Songhua river pollution, Nov. 25, 2005
BBC World Service | On CCP commemoration of Hu Yaobang, Nov. 17, 2005
CBC TV NewsWorld | Live on Japan's imperial family politics, Nov. 15, 2005
BBC News World Edition | On rural-urban divide in China, Nov.10, 2005
Xinhua | On my speech at the China Rising conference, Nov. 10, 2005
Edmonton Journal/Ideas | China's hunger for nuclear power, Nov. 9, 2005
The Japan Times | On Sino-Japanese relations, Nov. 8, 2005
CBC Radio Edmonton | On Alberta-China relations, Nov. 4, 2005
BBC World Service | On civilian deaths in Iraq (in Chinese), Oct. 30, 2005
The Globe & Mail | On Chinese perceptions of Canada, Oct. 29, 2005
The Globe & Mail | On Canada's economic ties with China, Oct. 29, 2005
South China Morning Post Column | on Yasukuni, Oct. 20, 2005
The Globe & Mail Column| On Koizumi's visit to Yasukuni, Oct. 18, 2005
South China Morning Post Column | on Chinese politics, Oct. 17, 2005
BBC World Service | On Koizumi's Yasukuni visit (in Chinese), Oct. 17, 2005
BBC World Service | On Rumsfeld's visit to China (in Chinese), Oct. 16, 2005
CBC Viewpoint Column| Chinese leaders' priorities, Oct. 14, 2005
CBC Radio | On Canada-US-China relations, Oct. 14, 2005
Reuters | On China's wealth gap reaching critical level, Oct. 7, 2005
BBC World Service | On East China Sea energy dispute (in Chinese), Oct.4, 2005
BBC World Service | Interview on Iran's nuclear issue (in Chinese), Sept. 25, 2005
The Straits Times | On Hu Jintao's North American visit, Sept. 23, 2005
World Journal | Featured interview on Canada-China relations, Sept. 19, 2005
The Globe & Mail | Comments on Hu Jintao's visit to Canada, Sept. 16, 2005
Knight Rider | Interview on Sino-Japanese relations, Sept. 16, 2005
VOA | Interview on Hu Jintao's North American trip, Sept. 14, 2005
Sing Tao Daily | On Canada-China strategic partnership, Sept. 13, 2005
AFP | On the ruch by the US and China to Alberta oil, Sept. 12, 2005
The Globe & Mail | Commentary: How do we engage China? Sept. 8, 2005
Radio Canada International | On Hu Jintao's visit to Canada, Sept. 8, 2005
Sohu.com | Comments on Hu Jintao's Canadian visit, Sept. 6, 2005
The Macleans | Interview on Chinese politics, Aug. 29, 2005
BusinessWeek | Special on China and India: Experts Roundtable, Aug. 22, 2005
Reuters | Interview on Chinese energy firm CNOOC's bid for Unocal, Aug. 5, 2005
KCRW Radio/NBR | Interview on US-China energy relations, Aug.2, 2005
China Brief | The Unocal Bid: China's Treasure Hunt of the Century, July 19, 2005
Sing Tao Daily | On China's overseas corporate expansion, July 17, 2005
Los Angeles Times | A new player in the Canadian sandbox, July 17, 2005
NPR - To the Point | Panel interview on China's quest for energy, June 29, 2005
BBC | On Sino-Japanese relations, Feb. 22, 2006
BBC | On China-Pakistan relations, Feb. 19, 2006
Aljazeera | On Chinese media: reform or on ice? Feb. 14, 2006
Voice of America | In-stadio guest on Issues & Opinions, Feb. 14, 2006
The Independent | On Canadian oil sands, Feb. 9, 2006
Seattle Times | Report on my talk at Seattle Economists Club, Feb. 9, 2006
Sing Tao Daily | On Canada's new cabinet & relations with China, Feb. 6, 06
Business Edge | On China-Canada energy relations, Feb. 3, 2006
The Standard | Social cost of China's prosperity, Jan. 26, 2006
First Business News | On Canadian election, Jan. 26, 2006
Sing Tao Daily | On Canadian election, Jan. 25, 2006
Ta Kung Pao | On Canada Chinese in Canadian politics, Jan. 24, 2006
BBC World Service | On Canadian election, Jan. 24, 2006
CRI | On Canadian election & Canada-China relations, Jan. 24, 2006
LA Times | On China's energy development strategy, Jan. 23, 2006
BBC World Service | On high police casualties in China, Jan. 23, 2006
New China News Agency | On Chinese Canadians in politics, Jan. 22, 2006
China Brief | Special issue on social unrest in China, Jan. 20, 2006
BBC World Service | On Chinese farmers protest movement, Jan. 15, 2006
Reuters | China's position on Iran's nuclear standoff, Jan. 13, 2006
The Globe & Mail op-ed | The casualties of China's rising tide, Jan. 9, 2006
CBC Radio International | On China's development outlook, Jan. 5, 2006
Sing Tao Daily | On Canadian election & foreign policy, Jan. 4, 2006
China Central TV 9 Dialogue |On the person(s) of the year, Jan. 3, 2006
CBC Radio As It Happens | On the rise of China, Jan. 2, 2006
NPR | On China's crackdown on liberal press, Jan. 2, 2006
BBC World Service| On Hu Jintao's new year address, Jan. 1, 2006
Voice of America | China's latest media crackdown, Dec. 30, 2005
Voice of America | China's latest media crackdown (Chinese), Dec. 30, 2005
BBC World Service| On Japan's relations with China, Dec. 25, 2005
Danish Radio | On China's western development, Dec. 22, 2005
UPI | On China's urban-rural divide, Dec. 19, 2005
BBC World Service | On the Kazakhstan-China pipeline, Dec. 15, 2005
CBC Radio International | On WTO Hong Kong meeting, Dec. 15, 2005
CNN | Internview on China's growing social unrest, Dec. 13, 2005
The Globe & Mail | On East Asia Summit, Dec. 13, 2005
Edmonton Journal | My full page article: Fallout of China's boom, Dec. 11,05
China Brief features my article: The cost of China's modernization, Dec. 6, 05
L.A. Times | On Shonghua River pollution, Dec. 4, 2005
BBC World Service | On the cost of China's modernization, Dec. 4, 2005
Voice of America |On China's increasing coalmine accidents, Dec. 3, 2005
Danish Radio | On the lack of responsibility in China's mines, Dec. 3, 2005
BBC World Service | On Montreal Climate Conference, Dec. 3, 2005
NPR Marketplace | On Songhua River pollution, Dec. 2, 2005
Danish Radio | On China's environment decision making, Dec. 2, 2005
The Straits Times | On China's treatment of bad news, Nov. 30, 2005
China Central TV| On the fall of the Martin cabinet, Nov. 29, 2005
BBC World Service | The "head tax" on Chinese immigrants, Nov. 28, 2005
Voice of America | On China's environmental disasters, Nov. 28, 2005
BBC World Service | On UN climate conference in Montreal, Nov.27, 2005
Danish Radio | On Harbin river pollution & enviroment, Nov. 30, 2005
The Globe & Mail Commentary | Free trade and APEC, Nov. 25, 2005
L.A. Times | On Harbin Songhua river pollution, Nov. 25, 2005
BBC World Service | On CCP commemoration of Hu Yaobang, Nov. 17, 2005
CBC TV NewsWorld | Live on Japan's imperial family politics, Nov. 15, 2005
BBC News World Edition | On rural-urban divide in China, Nov.10, 2005
Xinhua | On my speech at the China Rising conference, Nov. 10, 2005
Edmonton Journal/Ideas | China's hunger for nuclear power, Nov. 9, 2005
The Japan Times | On Sino-Japanese relations, Nov. 8, 2005
CBC Radio Edmonton | On Alberta-China relations, Nov. 4, 2005
BBC World Service | On civilian deaths in Iraq (in Chinese), Oct. 30, 2005
The Globe & Mail | On Chinese perceptions of Canada, Oct. 29, 2005
The Globe & Mail | On Canada's economic ties with China, Oct. 29, 2005
South China Morning Post Column | on Yasukuni, Oct. 20, 2005
The Globe & Mail Column| On Koizumi's visit to Yasukuni, Oct. 18, 2005
South China Morning Post Column | on Chinese politics, Oct. 17, 2005
BBC World Service | On Koizumi's Yasukuni visit (in Chinese), Oct. 17, 2005
BBC World Service | On Rumsfeld's visit to China (in Chinese), Oct. 16, 2005
CBC Viewpoint Column| Chinese leaders' priorities, Oct. 14, 2005
CBC Radio | On Canada-US-China relations, Oct. 14, 2005
Reuters | On China's wealth gap reaching critical level, Oct. 7, 2005
BBC World Service | On East China Sea energy dispute (in Chinese), Oct.4, 2005
BBC World Service | Interview on Iran's nuclear issue (in Chinese), Sept. 25, 2005
The Straits Times | On Hu Jintao's North American visit, Sept. 23, 2005
World Journal | Featured interview on Canada-China relations, Sept. 19, 2005
The Globe & Mail | Comments on Hu Jintao's visit to Canada, Sept. 16, 2005
Knight Rider | Interview on Sino-Japanese relations, Sept. 16, 2005
VOA | Interview on Hu Jintao's North American trip, Sept. 14, 2005
Sing Tao Daily | On Canada-China strategic partnership, Sept. 13, 2005
AFP | On the ruch by the US and China to Alberta oil, Sept. 12, 2005
The Globe & Mail | Commentary: How do we engage China? Sept. 8, 2005
Radio Canada International | On Hu Jintao's visit to Canada, Sept. 8, 2005
Sohu.com | Comments on Hu Jintao's Canadian visit, Sept. 6, 2005
The Macleans | Interview on Chinese politics, Aug. 29, 2005
BusinessWeek | Special on China and India: Experts Roundtable, Aug. 22, 2005
Reuters | Interview on Chinese energy firm CNOOC's bid for Unocal, Aug. 5, 2005
KCRW Radio/NBR | Interview on US-China energy relations, Aug.2, 2005
China Brief | The Unocal Bid: China's Treasure Hunt of the Century, July 19, 2005
Sing Tao Daily | On China's overseas corporate expansion, July 17, 2005
Los Angeles Times | A new player in the Canadian sandbox, July 17, 2005
NPR - To the Point | Panel interview on China's quest for energy, June 29, 2005
Wednesday, November 30, 2005
China: Officials still tend to hide bad news
On November 30, 2005, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Straits Times on a recent blast at a PetroChina plant in north-eastern Jilin province on Nov 13, spiltting 100 tonnes of benzene into the Songhua River.
But if change does not come soon, there will be more accidents and deaths -- resulting in high economic cost, warned Professor Jiang.
A systemic overhaul is needed for things to improve, said Prof Jiang. He said: "Detailed instructions on every level of government's role and responsibility must be spelt out. This will ensure officials are accountable as they cannot push the blame to someone else."
Click here to read the article.
But if change does not come soon, there will be more accidents and deaths -- resulting in high economic cost, warned Professor Jiang.
A systemic overhaul is needed for things to improve, said Prof Jiang. He said: "Detailed instructions on every level of government's role and responsibility must be spelt out. This will ensure officials are accountable as they cannot push the blame to someone else."
Click here to read the article.
Monday, November 28, 2005
Coal Mine Explosion Kills 134 Workers in China
On November 28, 2005, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Voice of America on the recent mine explosion in northeastern China that killed 134 workers. The blast at Qitaihe in China's Heilongjiang Province happened at a time when China is stocking up on coal supplies ahead of the approaching winter.
"China uses a lot of energy, so therefore [there are] a lot of energy-related accidents. Almost every other week, we have such accidents," Dr. Jiang said. "These are actually partly [caused by] the industrialization process, and partly due to the market-driven, all-for-money drive by local governments."
Read the article here.
"China uses a lot of energy, so therefore [there are] a lot of energy-related accidents. Almost every other week, we have such accidents," Dr. Jiang said. "These are actually partly [caused by] the industrialization process, and partly due to the market-driven, all-for-money drive by local governments."
Read the article here.
Friday, November 25, 2005
With free trade all talk, APEC risks becoming irrelevant
by Wenran Jiang
(Nov 25, 2005)
The Global and Mail
Prime Minister Paul Martin must have heaved a sigh of relief to leave domestic headaches behind for a few days when he flew to South Korea for the annual APEC summit last week.
The Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation forum seems an ideal international stage for Mr. Martin and many of his 20 counterparts to boost their image. Representing more than 40 per cent of the world's population, the APEC group is the largest regional trading bloc, commanding nearly 50 per cent of global trade volume and 60 per cent of GDP. It has generated nearly 70 per cent of global economic growth in the past decade. In a joint declaration, members expressed support for the World Trade Organization talks in Hong Kong next month, combatting the spread of avian flu, and fighting terrorism.
But image-polishing is not quite the same as tangible achievement. Contrary to the carefully chosen theme of this year's forum -- "Toward One Community: Meet the Challenge, Make the Change" -- beneath the surface, APEC is disintegrating into regional and bilateral blocs and lacks the leadership to meet many of its challenges.
Free-trade rhetoric has never been as strongly propagated by governments as the dominant ideology and unmistakable path to prosperity, yet every major global free-trade mechanism has trouble reaching a consensus. The implementation of the WTO's 2001 Doha commitment to global open trade is stalled; the coming talks are at risk because rich countries won't end domestic agricultural subsidies. Similar issues caused the dismal failure of the recently held Summit of the Americas, where the Free Trade Area of the Americas, being negotiated for more than a decade, faced fierce resistance from Southern Latin American states.
The APEC club, hailed as a major free-trade advocate, has done little beyond issue statements. Nor is there any clear road map on how to realize the goals of an Asia Pacific open market by all advanced economies in 2010, followed by all others in 2020.
The APEC community is gradually becoming an empty shell, shrinking into isolated resort gatherings of government elites, while mass protests gain momentum, intensifying global discontent.
While most countries belong to some form of global, regional and bilateral trade regimes, they tend to employ protectionist measures whenever self-perceived interests are at stake. The U.S. refusal to abide by NAFTA rulings over the softwood lumber dispute with Canada is a frustrating example. China complains bitterly that its textile exports, which comply with the WTO-mandated schedule that all barriers be lifted this year, are being blocked by the United States and European Union.
APEC countries are committed to mutual tariff reduction but a mechanism is missing to move beyond paperwork.
Threatened by the growing and perceived protectionist movements, many countries are seeking bilateral and intraregional trade deals, making WTO and larger regional organizations such as APEC more and more a theatre for talk rather than serious action. China has moved to establish a free-trade zone with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); its free-market status has been recognized by New Zealand and South Korea; Australia and the EU are negotiating with Beijing for the same arrangement; Japan is chasing China, in fear of lagging behind.
Next month, there will be several summits centred on ASEAN and China: The ASEAN plus Three
(China, Japan, South Korea) conference, the ASEAN-India conference, and the ASEAN plus Russia conference.
However, the most visible challenge and alternative to the U.S.-centred Asia Pacific order will come when the first East Asian Summit is held in Malaysia next month. While ASEAN, China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and India will all be at the table, neither the U.S. nor Canada is invited. This is a serious development, if not a setback for Ottawa's Asian diplomacy. Mr. Martin has threatened Washington with closer ties to Asia as a counterbalance to U.S. protectionism. But everyone knows he has no action plan to back up his rhetoric. The only way to get back in the game is to take aggressive measures that reconnect Canada with other Asia Pacific countries. The newly established free-trade negotiation with Japan is a step in the right direction but it is not bold enough. For Canada not to be left out of the world's emerging and most dynamic trading bloc, similar actions must be taken with China and ASEAN.
Unfortunately, rather than asserting much-needed leadership and projecting a distinct Canadian mark on the other side of the Pacific, Mr. Martin is busy marking his calendar for a federal election.
(Nov 25, 2005)
The Global and Mail
Prime Minister Paul Martin must have heaved a sigh of relief to leave domestic headaches behind for a few days when he flew to South Korea for the annual APEC summit last week.
The Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation forum seems an ideal international stage for Mr. Martin and many of his 20 counterparts to boost their image. Representing more than 40 per cent of the world's population, the APEC group is the largest regional trading bloc, commanding nearly 50 per cent of global trade volume and 60 per cent of GDP. It has generated nearly 70 per cent of global economic growth in the past decade. In a joint declaration, members expressed support for the World Trade Organization talks in Hong Kong next month, combatting the spread of avian flu, and fighting terrorism.
But image-polishing is not quite the same as tangible achievement. Contrary to the carefully chosen theme of this year's forum -- "Toward One Community: Meet the Challenge, Make the Change" -- beneath the surface, APEC is disintegrating into regional and bilateral blocs and lacks the leadership to meet many of its challenges.
Free-trade rhetoric has never been as strongly propagated by governments as the dominant ideology and unmistakable path to prosperity, yet every major global free-trade mechanism has trouble reaching a consensus. The implementation of the WTO's 2001 Doha commitment to global open trade is stalled; the coming talks are at risk because rich countries won't end domestic agricultural subsidies. Similar issues caused the dismal failure of the recently held Summit of the Americas, where the Free Trade Area of the Americas, being negotiated for more than a decade, faced fierce resistance from Southern Latin American states.
The APEC club, hailed as a major free-trade advocate, has done little beyond issue statements. Nor is there any clear road map on how to realize the goals of an Asia Pacific open market by all advanced economies in 2010, followed by all others in 2020.
The APEC community is gradually becoming an empty shell, shrinking into isolated resort gatherings of government elites, while mass protests gain momentum, intensifying global discontent.
While most countries belong to some form of global, regional and bilateral trade regimes, they tend to employ protectionist measures whenever self-perceived interests are at stake. The U.S. refusal to abide by NAFTA rulings over the softwood lumber dispute with Canada is a frustrating example. China complains bitterly that its textile exports, which comply with the WTO-mandated schedule that all barriers be lifted this year, are being blocked by the United States and European Union.
APEC countries are committed to mutual tariff reduction but a mechanism is missing to move beyond paperwork.
Threatened by the growing and perceived protectionist movements, many countries are seeking bilateral and intraregional trade deals, making WTO and larger regional organizations such as APEC more and more a theatre for talk rather than serious action. China has moved to establish a free-trade zone with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); its free-market status has been recognized by New Zealand and South Korea; Australia and the EU are negotiating with Beijing for the same arrangement; Japan is chasing China, in fear of lagging behind.
Next month, there will be several summits centred on ASEAN and China: The ASEAN plus Three
(China, Japan, South Korea) conference, the ASEAN-India conference, and the ASEAN plus Russia conference.
However, the most visible challenge and alternative to the U.S.-centred Asia Pacific order will come when the first East Asian Summit is held in Malaysia next month. While ASEAN, China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and India will all be at the table, neither the U.S. nor Canada is invited. This is a serious development, if not a setback for Ottawa's Asian diplomacy. Mr. Martin has threatened Washington with closer ties to Asia as a counterbalance to U.S. protectionism. But everyone knows he has no action plan to back up his rhetoric. The only way to get back in the game is to take aggressive measures that reconnect Canada with other Asia Pacific countries. The newly established free-trade negotiation with Japan is a step in the right direction but it is not bold enough. For Canada not to be left out of the world's emerging and most dynamic trading bloc, similar actions must be taken with China and ASEAN.
Unfortunately, rather than asserting much-needed leadership and projecting a distinct Canadian mark on the other side of the Pacific, Mr. Martin is busy marking his calendar for a federal election.
Friday, November 11, 2005
China's post-Unocal energy strategy
I was invited to give the opening keynote speech on this subject at the Regional Economic Leadership Forum, Whistler, BC on Nov. 17, 2005, organized by Pacific NorthWest Economic Region.
Is China's media fairer toward Japan?
This Japan Times article, with my interview in it, is also carried by China's offical China Daily.
Thursday, November 10, 2005
China celebrates 50 years of nuclear achievements
My latest article in the Jamestown Foundation's China Brief. READ HEAR.
Monday, October 31, 2005
Sunday, October 23, 2005
Honouring aggression at Yasukuni
South China Morning PostKOIZUMI'S PILGRIMAGE
Honouring aggression at Yasukuni
WENRAN JIANG
In open defiance against growing domestic and international criticism, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi went to the Yasukuni Shrine on Monday, his fifth such visit since coming to power in 2001. The following day, a large number of other politicians paid tribute at the shrine.
Two weeks ago, a Japanese high court ruled that Mr Koizumi's pilgrimage to Yasukuni, where convicted war criminals are honoured among the war dead, violated the constitutional separation of church and state. A number of Asian countries - former victims of Japanese militarism - have always opposed such visits. They have repeatedly asked Mr Koizumi not to go to the shrine this year, the 60th anniversary of the end of the second world war.
Mr Koizumi's latest action immediately pushed Japan's relations with its neighbours to a new low. China, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan all lodged strong protests. Scheduled diplomatic meetings between Tokyo and other Asian capitals were cancelled or postponed.
But the long-term damage to the region by the latest shrine visit will become even more severe. Unlike in Europe, where Germany's thorough reflection on history has led to continental reconciliation, East Asia has suffered from Japan's lack of remorse for its aggressive war. The annual visit to Yasukuni by Mr Koizumi and a large number of Japanese parliamentarians simply makes a mockery of any "sincere apologies" offered in the past.
First, Mr Koizumi and company justify the shrine visit as following Japanese culture and tradition. But Yasukuni was created by the Japanese government, in the late 19th century, to honour overseas expansion and imperialist war efforts. It was the designated institution for state Shinto indoctrination and the propaganda and mobilisation centre of Japanese militarism.
Yasukuni represents a culture of blind obedience to a totalitarian state, and a tradition of colonialism and imperialism through war and aggression.
Second, Mr Koizumi rebutted criticism by insisting that he goes to Yasukuni only to show respect to those who sacrificed themselves for the country's current prosperity, and to pray for peace. Yet, if one takes a tour of the war museum attached to the shrine, as I did a few months ago, it is clear that the shrine demands all who pray there should live the way those enshrined there lived.
At the shrine you find a history that says Japan did no wrong, and waged no aggressive wars, in the past. It claims all the sacrifices made by Japanese were not for a militaristic state, but for Japan's own defence and for liberating Asians from white imperialism.
Third, the prime minister has accused Beijing and Seoul of interfering in Japan's domestic affairs. Knowing full well the potential for backlash from neighbouring countries, Mr Koizumi promised right-wing groups that he would make annual visits to the shrine in exchange for their support in his leadership bid four years ago.
He then manipulated the Japanese public's resentment of foreign criticism by presenting himself as standing tall. As a result, he managed to remain popular and even won a majority in the recent lower-house election.
Unfortunately, Mr Koizumi has faced only a very limited domestic challenge to his shrine pilgrimages. That is another reflection of his country's failure as a democracy to collectively face its war responsibilities.
The Japanese voters who put Mr Koizumi in office should pursue a much brighter option, constructing a path to reconciliation in East Asia while firmly blocking the way to Yasukuni.
Wenran Jiang is an associate professor of political science at the University of Alberta, Canada.
Wednesday, October 19, 2005
My comment on Koizumi's Yasukuni homage
Comment
18 October 2005
The Globe and Mail
A25
At what price Koizumi's homage to Japan's war dead . . .
WENRAN JIANG18 October 2005
The Globe and Mail
A25
The setting is the Yasukuni Shrine in central Tokyo. The sole cast member is Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. And his ritual is to honour Japan's war dead, including thousands of convicted war criminals from the Second World War.
Mr. Koizumi's pilgrimage to the controversial Shinto site yesterday, his fifth such annual practice since taking office in 2001, is a staged act of defiance against growing domestic and international criticism. Only two weeks ago, a Japanese high court ruled that Mr. Koizumi's acts violated the constitutional separation of religion and state. Asian countries, former victims of Japanese militarism, have always opposed such a visit.
Mr. Koizumi's latest action pushed Japan's relations with its neighbours to a new low. The Chinese were particularly irritated by the timing — they were celebrating the return of their astronauts from a five-day, Earth-orbiting journey. While Seoul cancelled President Roh Moo-hyun's meeting with Mr. Koizumi at next month's APEC meeting, Beijing sent home Japanese diplomats attending high-level bilateral consultations and scrapped this weekend's visit by Japan's foreign minister.
The long-term damage to the region is much more severe. Unlike in Europe, where Germany's thorough reflection of history has led to continental reconciliation, East Asia has suffered from Japan's lack of remorse for its past wars. Yes, Japanese leaders have issued a number of apologies, including a statement that Mr. Koizumi read on Aug. 15, the date of Japan's defeat 60 years ago. But many remarks made by senior members of the Liberal Democratic Party, which has ruled Japan in the postwar era, have either rejected these apologies or undermined them.
To those who were victimized by Japanese militarism and to those who have a clear sense of history and justice, the annual visits to Yasukuni by Mr. Koizumi and a large number of Japanese parliamentarians simply make a mockery of their “deep remorse” rhetoric.
Mr. Koizumi and company justify the shrine visit as following Japanese culture and tradition. But Yasukuni is the creation of the Japanese state in the late 19th century for overseas expansion and imperialist war efforts. It was the designated institution for state Shinto indoctrination and the propaganda and mobilization centre of Japanese militarism; the sole purpose of its existence was to convince Japanese that, if they killed and died for the Emperor, their souls would be enshrined there. The Yasukuni culture is one of blind obedience to a totalitarian state, and the Yasukuni tradition is one of colonialism and imperialism through war and aggression.
Mr. Koizumi insists that he goes to Yasukuni only to show respect to those who sacrificed themselves for the country's prosperity today and to pray for peace. Yet, if one takes a tour of the state-of-the-art war museum attached to the shrine, it is clear that the shrine demands all those who pray there to live the way those enshrined there lived. And you find there a history in which Japan has done no wrong: All sacrifices were for Japan's defence, and for liberating Asians from white imperialism. The Yasukuni narrative of history is not the elimination of twisted nationalism but the revival of it. The Yasukuni notion of peace is to glorify war criminals as peace lovers. And the Yasukuni interpretation of sacrifice is the total rejection of the international war tribunal's verdict on Japan's war criminals.
Four years ago, in exchange for right-wing support for his bid as prime minister, Mr. Koizumi pledged to make annual visits to Yasukuni. He then manipulated the public's resentment of foreign criticism by presenting himself as standing tall. He managed to remain popular, and even received a majority in the latest lower-house election. Unfortunately, the very limited challenge Mr. Koizumi has faced domestically for his Yasukuni venture is also a reflection of Japan's failure as a nation to collectively face its past war responsibilities.
Internationally, Mr. Koizumi has lost credibility in Asia. On the other hand, while it is hard to imagine a German chancellor visiting a Nazi memorial and telling the world it's just for peace, Mr. Koizumi has escaped from much wider international condemnation.
“To go is hell; and not to go is hell, too,” Mr. Koizumi told his aides when trying to assess the fallout before his first official trip to Yasukuni in 2001. His gamble has certainly kept him at the edge of hell. But for the Japanese nation not to go over the edge with him, a path to the future must be constructed while the way to Yasukuni is firmly blocked.
Wenran Jiang, twice a Japan Foundation fellow, is associate professor of political science at the University of Alberta.
Sunday, October 16, 2005
Beyond the politics of power
WENRAN JIANG
In its reporting on the 16th Central Committee's fifth plenum, which has just concluded, the overseas media has focused on elite politics - with much speculation about a power struggle and personnel changes. Yet, this overemphasis on the top leadership comes at the expense of a comprehensive analysis of mainland politics, economy and social changes at this very important stage of
Many fail to realise that
That said, every new leadership takes certain steps to consolidate power, and the team headed by President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao is no exception. But specific circumstances and factors differentiate this leadership from previous ones.
First, Mr Hu does not have Deng Xiaoping's personal clout, and has to rely more on the collective decision-making process. Other leaders are likely to put the emphasis on policy rather than group around an individual or a particular region. In that sense, the obsession with the factional affiliations of certain top party members may be heading in the wrong direction.
Second, there was no promotion of Mr Hu's future successors at the plenum, as had been widely anticipated. After only a few years in power, he may not have the kind of power base to reshuffle the leadership. Nor does he necessarily want to be seen to be pursuing such an agenda while trying to project a closer-to-the-people image.
Mr Hu and Mr Wen have other priorities: they have realised that unless they emphasise balanced development, more equality, harmony in society and measures to protect the environment,
Two major pillars of the new approach to solving
Both goals are, in fact, what the mainland really needs today. The irony is that Mr Hu and Mr Wen seem to have decided that they can implement these by maintaining tight control, at the expense of more political openness and civil liberty.
That is a fatal mistake. For without political reforms, broader participation, an open press and strengthened rule of law, a harmonious society and the scientific concept of development will remain largely political slogans. And the outside world will continue to be obsessed with the elite power struggle within Zhongnanhai.
Wenran Jiang is an associate professor of political science at the University of Alberta,
Saturday, October 15, 2005
China Rising: Will it Join the World or Change It?
I will speak at the one day conference on the rise of China
Sponsored by Canadian Institute of International Affairs &
Foreign Affairs Canada, Ottawa, Oct. 28, 2005
Get more details and the program
Sponsored by Canadian Institute of International Affairs &
Foreign Affairs Canada, Ottawa, Oct. 28, 2005
Get more details and the program
Friday, October 14, 2005
Ottawa touts China's energy needs as chance to move from U.S. market
Tara Perkins, Canadian Press October 14, 2005
China's growing appetite for oil, which will see it battle the United States and other trading partners for investment opportunities in the Canadian oilsands, will boost profits in numerous ways.
Read it here
China's growing appetite for oil, which will see it battle the United States and other trading partners for investment opportunities in the Canadian oilsands, will boost profits in numerous ways.
Read it here
Sunday, October 09, 2005
Local beating of Chinese farmer & foreign journalists
Benjamin Joffe-Walt of The Guardian is honest in his report. He should have known better but he does not. Every foreign reporter intended to go to the countryside for such an investigation should have read the book, A Survey of Chinese Peasants, by Chen Guidi and Chuntao.
New Five-Year Plan called 'revolutionary'
From "getting rich first" to "common prosperity"From "growth rate" to "sustainable development"
Read it here
Read it here
Hu brought down to earth
Hu brought down to earth
By a Special Correspondent
Even as China celebrated sending two men into space, Chinese President Hu Jintao was in no mood to join in the back-slapping. His political agenda received a thumbs-down at the Communist Party's central committee plenum. This is certainly a setback for Hu, but the game is far from over.
Read it here
By a Special Correspondent
Even as China celebrated sending two men into space, Chinese President Hu Jintao was in no mood to join in the back-slapping. His political agenda received a thumbs-down at the Communist Party's central committee plenum. This is certainly a setback for Hu, but the game is far from over.
Read it here
Sino-U.S. Energy Competition in Africa
With oil prices hitting record levels of US$70 per barrel in recent weeks, major energy-consuming countries are engaging in an increasingly heated competition for energy resources on the world stage. Nowhere is this more evident than between the United States and China, the world's first and second-largest energy consuming countries respectively.
Read it here
Read it here
U.S. Energy Future Rests with Development of Canadian Oil Sands
U.S. Energy Future Rests with Development of Canadian Oil Sands
Along a giant patch of Canada's Far North, where moose outnumber people, a vital part of America's energy future seeps out of riverbanks and is hidden below soft prairie grass. These Canadian oil sands will help keep American SUVs running in the years to come.
Read it here
Along a giant patch of Canada's Far North, where moose outnumber people, a vital part of America's energy future seeps out of riverbanks and is hidden below soft prairie grass. These Canadian oil sands will help keep American SUVs running in the years to come.
Read it here
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