On March 2, 2007, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Global and Mail on China's Prime Minister's recent comments ruling out any dramatic political reforms for the foreseeable future.
Wenran noted that the Chinese leaders are convinced that they should keep the one-party system and they're not ready for the issues of political reform. "They want to show the world that 'We're in charge, we're in control, and don't expect any dramatic changes,' " said Wenran.
Mr. Wen's comments are also a sign of China's increasing certainty in itself. "There's a growing confidence in the Chinese model of development," Wenran said. "The Chinese leaders are confident that they will be able to stick to their existing model."
You can read the article here.
On world politics, globalization, development, energy security, East Asia, Canadian foreign policy ...
Friday, March 02, 2007
Thursday, February 22, 2007
China diplomat: North Korea gets 'money and respect'
On February 22, 2007, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by CNN on the North Korea nuclear issue. "China does not wish to see an implosion that would send North Korean refugees streaming into its borders," said Wenran. "Neither does it like to sit beside a unified Korea loyal to America."
You can read the article here.
You can read the article here.
Tuesday, February 06, 2007
Flaherty, Emerson praised for China visit: The two ministers 'said all the right things'
On February 6, 2007, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Vancouver Sun on federal Finance Minister Jim Flaherty and Trade Minister David Emerson's recent China trip. The senior Conservatives visited Beijing, Shanghai and Hong Kong to promote trade, but mainly to revive a diplomatically strained relationship between Canada and China.
"[But] it has to come from the highest level," said Wenran, who rejected the idea that Canada can take a two-pronged approach in dealing with China; that is, to be hot on trade and to be cold on politics.
You can read the article here.
"[But] it has to come from the highest level," said Wenran, who rejected the idea that Canada can take a two-pronged approach in dealing with China; that is, to be hot on trade and to be cold on politics.
You can read the article here.
Saturday, February 03, 2007
China oil demand growth ends strong 06 on modest note
On February 3, 2007, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by Reuters on China's oil imports growth in the year of 2006.
China's oil demand rose a modest 2.6 percent in December, the slowest rate since last January, but enough to bring full-year 2006 growth to nearly 8 percent despite official efforts to curb consumption and boost efficiency. Dr. Jiang commented that the government is "putting in a lot of effort, but good intentions may not produce all the results."
You can read the article here.
China's oil demand rose a modest 2.6 percent in December, the slowest rate since last January, but enough to bring full-year 2006 growth to nearly 8 percent despite official efforts to curb consumption and boost efficiency. Dr. Jiang commented that the government is "putting in a lot of effort, but good intentions may not produce all the results."
You can read the article here.
Wednesday, January 24, 2007
China keeps mum despite furore over missile test
On January 24, 2007, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Strait Times on China's recent anit-satellite missile test. Professor Jiang said the test was a 'calculated, strategic decision'. 'It sends an unmistakable message that China has precision technology and in the event of a military confrontation, has the capability to strike at the heart of the US military intelligence,' he said.
Beijing confirms missile test on satellite
On January 24, 2007, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by Chicago Tribune on China's recent test of a new anti-satellite missile. Dr. Jiang observes that China wants military parity with the U.S.. "The question is how fast and how will it get there," he said.
You can read the article here.
You can read the article here.
Friday, January 19, 2007
Chinese missile strikes satellite
On January 19, 2007, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Los Angles Times on China's anti-satellite missile launch. Last week, the Chinese military shot down one of its own aging satellites with a ground-based ballistic missile, demonstrating a new technological capability at a time of growing Bush administration concern over Beijing's military modernization and its intentions in space.Dr. Jiang noted that China's space modernization effort is part of a campaign to defend itself against the U.S. government's missile defense program, which officials in Beijing view as a militarization of outer space.
You can read the article here.
It's a mistake to blow hot and cold on China
By Wenran Jiang
(Jan 19, 2007)
The Globe and Mail
Finally, a long overdue positive development in Canada's bumpy relations with China: International Trade Minister David Emerson's current mission there, with a good number of Canadian businesses in tow.
For most of 2006, the Conservatives paid little attention to China. And when they did, controversy was the norm. Remember Foreign Minister Peter MacKay's comments that Chinese spies were engaging in industrial espionage in Canada; some Conservative MPs' seemingly intense interest in participating in Taiwan-organized activities; the offering of an honorary Canadian citizenship to the Dalai Lama, to name just a few?
Then came the confusing story of whether Prime Minister Stephen Harper would meet — or not meet — with Chinese President Hu Jintao at the APEC summit last November. Mr. Harper's chosen polemic has since become the signature of the government's China policy position: Canada will not sacrifice human rights on the altar of the “almighty dollar” in its relations with China.
Such grandstanding, while celebrated by some as principled, is both intellectually flawed and politically manipulative. It is intellectually flawed because establishing and imposing such a false dichotomy between trade and human rights demonstrates a poor understanding of China's development dynamics. It is politically manipulative because the statement was designed as a partisan shot to show the Conservatives are different from the Liberals who had “sold out” Canadian values to seek closer economic ties with Beijing.
The real problem is that the Conservatives have done little beyond partisan politics to promote Canadian national interests in our relations with China. As the months pass, it becomes clear the minority government has not formulated a coherent China policy. It behaves more like it's in opposition, holding hearings rather than making and implementing policies.
Take human rights, for example. The Conservatives have criticized previous Liberal governments for neglecting China's human-rights issues, suspended the annual government-level human-rights dialogue, and positioned themselves on a moral high ground. Yet, they have no programs in place for Canada to promote effective and meaningful changes in China.
Granted, the government's annual human-rights dialogue was not working well and a new approach was needed. But there have been a range of CIDA programs and good governance projects in China that have, over the years, made significant contributions to the rule of law and human-rights improvements. The Conservative government's throw-the-baby-out-with-the-bathwater approach has created confusion for our diplomats who work on these projects.
Now, certain policy-makers in Ottawa are flirting with the idea of pursuing “hot” economic relations with Beijing, while maintaining “cold,” winter-like political relations. They argue the Chinese “should not be rewarded” for bad human-rights behaviour and that they should learn to live with political criticism; they reason Beijing will accept such a formula due to commercial concerns.
Hence, the federal government dispatched its ministers of agriculture and natural resources to Beijing in recent months, signalling business as usual. And now, with both Mr. Emerson and Finance Minister Jim Flaherty in Beijing, the Conservatives are seeking new momentum in China that was lost for most of the past year.
But the idea of separating politics from economics in dealing with China does not serve Canada's national interests well. Nor will it work. Globalization will spur commerce between the two countries, but when it comes to large projects, it is the countries that have positive political relations with China that will be given priority.
Furthermore, political disengagement will shut Canada out of China's reform process, making it impossible for Canada to play a constructive role in promoting human rights and democracy in China, a goal this government has stated is a priority in its foreign policy platform.
While Mr. Emerson may have succeeded in reversing the negative trend of Canada-China relations, the real challenge for the Conservative government is to go beyond the “rights versus trade” dichotomy, develop a China strategy beyond partisan politics, manage to engage China positively on both economic and political fronts, and develop a vision that not only serves Canada's own interests, but also generates change inside China that can move that country toward democracy and a better protection of human rights.
(Jan 19, 2007)
The Globe and Mail
Finally, a long overdue positive development in Canada's bumpy relations with China: International Trade Minister David Emerson's current mission there, with a good number of Canadian businesses in tow.
For most of 2006, the Conservatives paid little attention to China. And when they did, controversy was the norm. Remember Foreign Minister Peter MacKay's comments that Chinese spies were engaging in industrial espionage in Canada; some Conservative MPs' seemingly intense interest in participating in Taiwan-organized activities; the offering of an honorary Canadian citizenship to the Dalai Lama, to name just a few?
Then came the confusing story of whether Prime Minister Stephen Harper would meet — or not meet — with Chinese President Hu Jintao at the APEC summit last November. Mr. Harper's chosen polemic has since become the signature of the government's China policy position: Canada will not sacrifice human rights on the altar of the “almighty dollar” in its relations with China.
Such grandstanding, while celebrated by some as principled, is both intellectually flawed and politically manipulative. It is intellectually flawed because establishing and imposing such a false dichotomy between trade and human rights demonstrates a poor understanding of China's development dynamics. It is politically manipulative because the statement was designed as a partisan shot to show the Conservatives are different from the Liberals who had “sold out” Canadian values to seek closer economic ties with Beijing.
The real problem is that the Conservatives have done little beyond partisan politics to promote Canadian national interests in our relations with China. As the months pass, it becomes clear the minority government has not formulated a coherent China policy. It behaves more like it's in opposition, holding hearings rather than making and implementing policies.
Take human rights, for example. The Conservatives have criticized previous Liberal governments for neglecting China's human-rights issues, suspended the annual government-level human-rights dialogue, and positioned themselves on a moral high ground. Yet, they have no programs in place for Canada to promote effective and meaningful changes in China.
Granted, the government's annual human-rights dialogue was not working well and a new approach was needed. But there have been a range of CIDA programs and good governance projects in China that have, over the years, made significant contributions to the rule of law and human-rights improvements. The Conservative government's throw-the-baby-out-with-the-bathwater approach has created confusion for our diplomats who work on these projects.
Now, certain policy-makers in Ottawa are flirting with the idea of pursuing “hot” economic relations with Beijing, while maintaining “cold,” winter-like political relations. They argue the Chinese “should not be rewarded” for bad human-rights behaviour and that they should learn to live with political criticism; they reason Beijing will accept such a formula due to commercial concerns.
Hence, the federal government dispatched its ministers of agriculture and natural resources to Beijing in recent months, signalling business as usual. And now, with both Mr. Emerson and Finance Minister Jim Flaherty in Beijing, the Conservatives are seeking new momentum in China that was lost for most of the past year.
But the idea of separating politics from economics in dealing with China does not serve Canada's national interests well. Nor will it work. Globalization will spur commerce between the two countries, but when it comes to large projects, it is the countries that have positive political relations with China that will be given priority.
Furthermore, political disengagement will shut Canada out of China's reform process, making it impossible for Canada to play a constructive role in promoting human rights and democracy in China, a goal this government has stated is a priority in its foreign policy platform.
While Mr. Emerson may have succeeded in reversing the negative trend of Canada-China relations, the real challenge for the Conservative government is to go beyond the “rights versus trade” dichotomy, develop a China strategy beyond partisan politics, manage to engage China positively on both economic and political fronts, and develop a vision that not only serves Canada's own interests, but also generates change inside China that can move that country toward democracy and a better protection of human rights.
Wednesday, January 17, 2007
Ottawa aims to rebuild frayed ties with China
On January 17, 2007, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Globe and Mail on Harper government's recent push to rebuild ties with Beijing, including plans to target China as one of 10 markets that will be the focus of Canada's trade efforts. But Wenran said the notion that two nations can have "cold" political relations but "hot" economic relations will not fly in Beijing. "That is not going to work with Canada and China," he said. "We have cold politics and lukewarm economics." He said the Chinese can take criticism but not "grandstanding statements" such as the ones Mr. Harper made last year.
You can read the article here.
You can read the article here.
Tuesday, January 16, 2007
Canada Seeks New Chinese Investments in Oil Fields
On January 16, 2007, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Bloomberg on Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper's recent assurance to Chinese officials that the Asian country remains a welcome investor in Canada's energy industry. Two of Harper's senior cabinet ministers -- Trade Minister David Emerson and Finance Minister Jim Flaherty -- are in China this week canvassing for more Chinese investments and seeking to ensure better business ties.
"Canada believes it can move on with a relationship cold on the political side and warm economically," said Wenran. "That has some risks in it. The Chinese are interested in Canadian energy and resource sectors, but not to the extent they are going to die for it."
You can read the article here.
"Canada believes it can move on with a relationship cold on the political side and warm economically," said Wenran. "That has some risks in it. The Chinese are interested in Canadian energy and resource sectors, but not to the extent they are going to die for it."
You can read the article here.
Tuesday, December 12, 2006
If Trade With China Is Vital to Our Future, What is Harper up to?
On December 12, 2006, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Edmonton Journal, questioning Stephen Harper's actions of restricting certain kinds of foreign investment, including China's state-owned enterprises. Jiang says Harper is making a mistake and his aggressive strategy won't help Canadian businesses trying to get into China.
You can read the article here.
You can read the article here.
Thursday, November 30, 2006
Ottawa open to China in small doses; Resources Minister says investment should be limited to minority stakes
On November 30, 2006, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Globe and Mail on Natural Resources Minister Gary Lunn's recent message during his China visit that Chinese investment in Canadian energy and natural resource sectors is welcome, but as minority interests in Canadian-controlled joint ventures.
Dr. Jiang said Chinese officials fear the investment monitoring could result in a highly politicized process, similar to the one in the United States that derailed a bid by Chinese National Offshore Oil Corp. to acquire Unocal Corp. But he noted that most Chinese companies are not looking for majority control in Canadian companies, preferring minority position along the lines of two recent investments in Canadian oil sands projects.
Dr. Jiang said Chinese officials fear the investment monitoring could result in a highly politicized process, similar to the one in the United States that derailed a bid by Chinese National Offshore Oil Corp. to acquire Unocal Corp. But he noted that most Chinese companies are not looking for majority control in Canadian companies, preferring minority position along the lines of two recent investments in Canadian oil sands projects.
Wednesday, November 29, 2006
Flaherty defends plan to screen foreign takeovers
On November 29, 2006, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Globe and Mail on Finance Minister Jim Flaherty's recently announced plan to "protect Canadian assets" against takeovers by some foreign state-owned companies.
Dr. Jiang said that Chinese company and government officials are increasingly skeptical about Canada's openness to Chinese investment.
Wenran said Canada is losing ground in the global competition to gain access to Chinese markets and be the recipient of out-bound Chinese investment. He said Canadian governments would have full power to regulate any foreign subsidiary that resulted from an acquisition.
You can read the article here.
Dr. Jiang said that Chinese company and government officials are increasingly skeptical about Canada's openness to Chinese investment.
Wenran said Canada is losing ground in the global competition to gain access to Chinese markets and be the recipient of out-bound Chinese investment. He said Canadian governments would have full power to regulate any foreign subsidiary that resulted from an acquisition.
You can read the article here.
Friday, November 17, 2006
Canadian-Chinese energy ties promoted
On November 17, 2006, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Business Edge, contending that the federal government's failure to understand Chinese intentions in Canada will jeopardize future investment. "We're facing a very uphill battle in winning Chinese investment in Canada," said Jiang, during a recent Asia-Pacific Summit held in Vancouver. "We are already in a position of needing China more than China needs us."
You can read the article here.
You can read the article here.
Minister criticizes China's human rights record
On November 17, 2006, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Globe and Mail on Canada's diplomatic friction with China over the latter's human rights record.
Ironically, the federal government has been much more active and positive in its engagement with China in recent weeks, Dr. Jiang said, but Beijing may still be focusing on the friction in the early months of the Harper government. “In its initial stages, this government gave a bit of a cold shoulder to China, and this might have had an effect on China. But now Canada is eager to engage China on all fronts.”
You can read the article here.
Ironically, the federal government has been much more active and positive in its engagement with China in recent weeks, Dr. Jiang said, but Beijing may still be focusing on the friction in the early months of the Harper government. “In its initial stages, this government gave a bit of a cold shoulder to China, and this might have had an effect on China. But now Canada is eager to engage China on all fronts.”
You can read the article here.
Friday, November 10, 2006
China, Africa forging closer ties
On November 10, 2006, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Globe and Mail on the recent China-Africa Cooperation Summit. The summit wrapped up yesterday with news of a further $1.9-billion (U.S.) in trade and investment deals between China and Africa, on top of the $10-billion in loans and assistance China offered on Saturday.
"This summit was quite unprecedented," said Wenran. "No other power has the will or ability to pull this off. It really marks the emergence of China as a dominant power in a faraway continent that was previously the back yard of the European powers."
You can read the article here.
On November 5, Dr. Jiang gave an interview on the same topic with the Guardian, read here.
The New York Times also interviewed Dr. Jiang on November 3, with a focus on China's strategic presence in Africa. “African leaders see China as a new kind of global partner that has lots of money but treats them as equals,” said Wenran. “Chinese leaders see Africa, in a strategic sense, as up for grabs.”
Dr. Jiang said that unlike in the cold war, when China’s foreign involvement was motivated by ideology, Beijing now had a commercial strategy as the developing world’s biggest beneficiary of globalization to unite with the region most conspicuously left behind.
It will be up to each country’s leaders, and ultimately each country’s people, to decide how to use the wealth, he said. “From China’s perspective the Western powers and Western companies have had their chance in Africa and really nothing has happened,” he said. Read the article here.

City safari … Beijing was festooned with posters of African wildlife in the run-up to the summit, with the main shopping street adorned with wooden animals.
Photograph: Jason Lee/Reuters

A policeman in Beijing passes by a billboard promoting the China-Africa diplomatic forum this weekend.
China Photos/Getty Images
"This summit was quite unprecedented," said Wenran. "No other power has the will or ability to pull this off. It really marks the emergence of China as a dominant power in a faraway continent that was previously the back yard of the European powers."
You can read the article here.
On November 5, Dr. Jiang gave an interview on the same topic with the Guardian, read here.
The New York Times also interviewed Dr. Jiang on November 3, with a focus on China's strategic presence in Africa. “African leaders see China as a new kind of global partner that has lots of money but treats them as equals,” said Wenran. “Chinese leaders see Africa, in a strategic sense, as up for grabs.”
Dr. Jiang said that unlike in the cold war, when China’s foreign involvement was motivated by ideology, Beijing now had a commercial strategy as the developing world’s biggest beneficiary of globalization to unite with the region most conspicuously left behind.
It will be up to each country’s leaders, and ultimately each country’s people, to decide how to use the wealth, he said. “From China’s perspective the Western powers and Western companies have had their chance in Africa and really nothing has happened,” he said. Read the article here.

City safari … Beijing was festooned with posters of African wildlife in the run-up to the summit, with the main shopping street adorned with wooden animals.
Photograph: Jason Lee/Reuters

A policeman in Beijing passes by a billboard promoting the China-Africa diplomatic forum this weekend.
China Photos/Getty Images
Tuesday, October 10, 2006
North Korea won't blink in the game of nuclear chicken
By Wenran Jiang
(Oct 10, 2006)
The Globe and Mail
In defiance of warnings from the international community, Pyongyang carried out its long-threatened nuclear weapons test yesterday, setting off worldwide condemnation and concern over nuclear arms proliferation in the region and around the globe.
Like Pyongyang's launch of seven missiles on July 4, its choice of timing in going nuclear was no accident. The United States has recently tightened its sanctions against North Korea, which views the measures as a declaration of war, and Beijing appears to be shifting away from its traditional support of the regime of Kim Jong-il. As well, South Korea's foreign minister is about to be voted in as the new United Nations Secretary-General, and Japan's new prime minister, a hard-liner against Pyongyang, is being welcomed in both Beijing and Seoul this week to resume long-interrupted summit diplomacy. Left behind, North Korea's own demands have failed to register a sympathetic hearing in the world.
For years, many believed that North Korea was just bluffing. How could an isolated, technologically backward, small Communist dictatorship with a starving population pull off a sophisticated nuclear arms operation that only half a dozen states could achieve. Such an attitude only propelled Pyongyang to be more resolute in proving its credentials. By failing to address repeated warning signs seriously, the world now must pay the price of either living with a nuclear North Korea or living without it.
For the United States, the test represents another foreign policy blunder of the Bush administration. Since 2000, Washington has been more obsessed with ending the Kim regime than ending its nuclear program. It discontinued the Clinton administration's 1994 "framework agreement" that provided aid to Pyongyang in exchange for the latter's suspension of its nuclear program. The Bush team labelled North Korea a "rogue state," part of an "axis of evil" and an "outpost of tyranny." After the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Pyongyang reactivated its nuclear operation hoping to avoid the fate of Saddam Hussein.
In the ensuing six-party talks designed to resolve the crisis, involving South Korea, China, Japan and Russia, the U.S. took a hard-line position. Instead of fully engaging North Korea and providing security guarantees, Washington sought to press Pyongyang to give up its nuclear ambition without preconditions. Mr. Kim, convinced that the current U.S. government has no intention of normalizing relations with North Korea, has refused to return to the negotiating table.
Yesterday's test is a wakeup call for the Bush hawks. Instead of a regime collapse, Pyongyang now has a nuclear arsenal of some seven to 10 weapons (in contrast with having a suspended nuclear facility and, at most, one or two nuclear bombs back in 2000). The cost of now reversing the course, either by carrot or stick, will be much higher.
For China, Pyongyang's nuclear escalation is a slap in the face at the worst time. Chinese leaders have spent much energy in playing host to the six-party talks over the past few years, trying to broker a compromise between North Korea and the United States, only to be frustrated by both sides. Beijing is facing mounting domestic challenges and needs a stable international environment, especially good relations with its trading partners -- the U.S., Japan and South Korea.
But unlike what is often portrayed in the press or argued by Bush administration supporters, Beijing's leverage over the secluded North Korea is not unlimited. Yes, China lost more than one million lives to save the North from being wiped out by U.S. forces in the Korean War in the early 1950s, and, yes, it is the de facto ally of the Kim regime, economically sustaining it from collapse.
But this doesn't automatically make North Korea a Chinese patron. In fact, Pyongyang has been angered by China's recent decision to join Washington's financial sanctions against the North, by China's siding with others in the UN in condemning the North Korean missiles test in July and by Beijing's warming relations with Japan's hawkish prime minister, Shinzo Abe, who came to prominence in Japanese politics largely through bashing Pyongyang. By moving away from its neutral position between Pyongyang and Washington, Beijing's leverage over North Korea, limited in the first place, is weakened rather than strengthened.
And sandwiched between the big powers, South Korea is the most vulnerable of all due to its close geographic location to the North.
Seoul has pursued a "sunshine policy" of economic co-operation and political engagement with Pyongyang for some time. The lack of support from the Bush administration has strained its allied relationship with Washington. Now, amidst the outrage and disappointment, the South must soberly reflect on what to do next.
Christopher Hill, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for Asia Pacific affairs, warned recently that North Korea can have either nuclear weapons or a future, but not both. Pyongyang, backed into a corner and desperate for regime survival, is not blinking in this high-stake game of chicken. The challenge for the Security Council, including the United States, is to go beyond tough words and come up with a well-thought-out solution to the crisis.
(Oct 10, 2006)
The Globe and Mail
In defiance of warnings from the international community, Pyongyang carried out its long-threatened nuclear weapons test yesterday, setting off worldwide condemnation and concern over nuclear arms proliferation in the region and around the globe.
Like Pyongyang's launch of seven missiles on July 4, its choice of timing in going nuclear was no accident. The United States has recently tightened its sanctions against North Korea, which views the measures as a declaration of war, and Beijing appears to be shifting away from its traditional support of the regime of Kim Jong-il. As well, South Korea's foreign minister is about to be voted in as the new United Nations Secretary-General, and Japan's new prime minister, a hard-liner against Pyongyang, is being welcomed in both Beijing and Seoul this week to resume long-interrupted summit diplomacy. Left behind, North Korea's own demands have failed to register a sympathetic hearing in the world.
For years, many believed that North Korea was just bluffing. How could an isolated, technologically backward, small Communist dictatorship with a starving population pull off a sophisticated nuclear arms operation that only half a dozen states could achieve. Such an attitude only propelled Pyongyang to be more resolute in proving its credentials. By failing to address repeated warning signs seriously, the world now must pay the price of either living with a nuclear North Korea or living without it.
For the United States, the test represents another foreign policy blunder of the Bush administration. Since 2000, Washington has been more obsessed with ending the Kim regime than ending its nuclear program. It discontinued the Clinton administration's 1994 "framework agreement" that provided aid to Pyongyang in exchange for the latter's suspension of its nuclear program. The Bush team labelled North Korea a "rogue state," part of an "axis of evil" and an "outpost of tyranny." After the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Pyongyang reactivated its nuclear operation hoping to avoid the fate of Saddam Hussein.
In the ensuing six-party talks designed to resolve the crisis, involving South Korea, China, Japan and Russia, the U.S. took a hard-line position. Instead of fully engaging North Korea and providing security guarantees, Washington sought to press Pyongyang to give up its nuclear ambition without preconditions. Mr. Kim, convinced that the current U.S. government has no intention of normalizing relations with North Korea, has refused to return to the negotiating table.
Yesterday's test is a wakeup call for the Bush hawks. Instead of a regime collapse, Pyongyang now has a nuclear arsenal of some seven to 10 weapons (in contrast with having a suspended nuclear facility and, at most, one or two nuclear bombs back in 2000). The cost of now reversing the course, either by carrot or stick, will be much higher.
For China, Pyongyang's nuclear escalation is a slap in the face at the worst time. Chinese leaders have spent much energy in playing host to the six-party talks over the past few years, trying to broker a compromise between North Korea and the United States, only to be frustrated by both sides. Beijing is facing mounting domestic challenges and needs a stable international environment, especially good relations with its trading partners -- the U.S., Japan and South Korea.
But unlike what is often portrayed in the press or argued by Bush administration supporters, Beijing's leverage over the secluded North Korea is not unlimited. Yes, China lost more than one million lives to save the North from being wiped out by U.S. forces in the Korean War in the early 1950s, and, yes, it is the de facto ally of the Kim regime, economically sustaining it from collapse.
But this doesn't automatically make North Korea a Chinese patron. In fact, Pyongyang has been angered by China's recent decision to join Washington's financial sanctions against the North, by China's siding with others in the UN in condemning the North Korean missiles test in July and by Beijing's warming relations with Japan's hawkish prime minister, Shinzo Abe, who came to prominence in Japanese politics largely through bashing Pyongyang. By moving away from its neutral position between Pyongyang and Washington, Beijing's leverage over North Korea, limited in the first place, is weakened rather than strengthened.
And sandwiched between the big powers, South Korea is the most vulnerable of all due to its close geographic location to the North.
Seoul has pursued a "sunshine policy" of economic co-operation and political engagement with Pyongyang for some time. The lack of support from the Bush administration has strained its allied relationship with Washington. Now, amidst the outrage and disappointment, the South must soberly reflect on what to do next.
Christopher Hill, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for Asia Pacific affairs, warned recently that North Korea can have either nuclear weapons or a future, but not both. Pyongyang, backed into a corner and desperate for regime survival, is not blinking in this high-stake game of chicken. The challenge for the Security Council, including the United States, is to go beyond tough words and come up with a well-thought-out solution to the crisis.
Friday, October 06, 2006
Japan, China reach agreement over shrine
On October 6, 2006, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Globe and Mail on the recent development of Sino-Japan relations. Japan's new Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, appears to have made a significant concession to China on the shrine. Analysts say he must have offered a private assurance to Beijing that he will refrain from high-profile visits there, although he could perhaps make personal visits without publicity.
"The Chinese are hinting that there was an agreement behind the scenes that China can accept," said Wenran Jiang. "I can't imagine that China would do this without getting acceptable terms from Japan. Otherwise, how could President Hu Jintao accept a visit at such short notice? The Chinese had to get something in return. It's a huge concession from Japan."
You can read the article here.
"The Chinese are hinting that there was an agreement behind the scenes that China can accept," said Wenran Jiang. "I can't imagine that China would do this without getting acceptable terms from Japan. Otherwise, how could President Hu Jintao accept a visit at such short notice? The Chinese had to get something in return. It's a huge concession from Japan."
You can read the article here.
Friday, September 29, 2006
China is job No.1 for Japanese PM
Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Globe and Mail on September 29, 2006, a day after Japan's hawkish new Prime Minister took power. Shinzo Abe, the tough-talking politician, faces an uphill battle as he seeks rapprochement with China and South Korea while still pushing his policies of patriotic education and national assertiveness.
"There are clear gains for Abe if he gets a quick summit with Hu Jintao," said Wenran. "He can demonstrate that he can manage relations with the two countries [China and South Korea] better than Koizumi. And it would create a positive international image for the new leader if he is capable of dealing with foreign-policy issues."
You can read the article here.
"There are clear gains for Abe if he gets a quick summit with Hu Jintao," said Wenran. "He can demonstrate that he can manage relations with the two countries [China and South Korea] better than Koizumi. And it would create a positive international image for the new leader if he is capable of dealing with foreign-policy issues."
You can read the article here.
Thursday, September 28, 2006
China Rebukes 2 Officials Over Farm Seizures
On September 28, 2006, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Los Angeles Times on internal discipline investigation against two Shanghai officials for illegally seizing farmland.
As the Shanghai inquiry continues, other disciplinary action could be taken against the city's senior leaders and their relatives. Reports are spreading that security has been stepped up at Shanghai airports and that officials' passports have been confiscated to prevent potential suspects from fleeing the country.
Dr. Jiang points out that Beijing has ample incentive to prevent the Shanghai scandal from undermining social stability and investor confidence in a city of 20 million that is home to the nation's fastest-growing concentration of middle-class residents and a favorite destination for foreign capital.
You can read the article here.
As the Shanghai inquiry continues, other disciplinary action could be taken against the city's senior leaders and their relatives. Reports are spreading that security has been stepped up at Shanghai airports and that officials' passports have been confiscated to prevent potential suspects from fleeing the country.
Dr. Jiang points out that Beijing has ample incentive to prevent the Shanghai scandal from undermining social stability and investor confidence in a city of 20 million that is home to the nation's fastest-growing concentration of middle-class residents and a favorite destination for foreign capital.
You can read the article here.
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