Wenran Jiang
28 May 2008
Ottawa Citizen
Prime Minister Stephen Harper is in Europe this week in part to lobby the leaders of Britain, France, Germany and Italy to pressure China on the issue of global warming. Even putting aside Canada's dismal record on controlling its own emission of CO2 for a moment, don't you wonder why Mr. Harper ventures into building a "coalition of the willing" before talking to the Chinese leaders?
After all, other heads of major industrialized countries visit China or receive their Chinese counterparts in their own capitals on a regular basis, and some of them do multiple mutual visits a year. U.S. President George W. Bush claims that he can just pick up the phone and talk to Chinese President Hu Jintao. French President Nicolas Sarkozy went to China only months after assuming his post, openly challenged the Chinese on global warming responsibilities, and then with a stroke of a pen, signed $30 billion worth of contracts selling Airbus planes and nuclear reactors.
British Prime Minister Gordon Brown travelled to China in January, also within months of taking over from Tony Blair. Joined by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, Brown engaged the Chinese people in a Q and A "town hall" meeting on a range of issues, offered to host 100 Chinese firms in Britain and promised to boost bilateral trade by 50 per cent, all in the next two years.
Australia's new Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, a China expert in his early training, headed to Beijing during the recent Tibet crisis. He delivered a speech in fluent Mandarin at Peking University. It was friendly, but frank, bringing up the Tibet issue. Instead of being booted, he was praised as being honest. His predecessor, the Conservative John Howard, actively engaged China, securing some $40 billion in long-term trade deals that have boosted the Australian economy.
So Mr. Harper's counterparts in Europe are likely to look him in the eye and ask two questions: Do you have strong environmental policy credentials at home? What do you have to offer from your own interactions with the Chinese leadership on the subject of global warming? Mr. Harper has neither.
While the world is busy engaging China for easily identifiable reasons, Mr. Harper has been missing in action. Two and half years after President Hu last visited Canada (fall of 2005) and more than two years after the Conservatives came to power, Mr. Harper has yet to find Beijing on the map, not to mention take a trip there anytime soon.
Foreign-policy and China-watching communities have both speculated and heard many reasons for Mr. Harper's lack of initiatives on China. First, there was the talk of an inexperienced young team that may take time to get the China file moving. Then, there was the all-consuming foreign policy challenge of Afghanistan that had to take priority over other things. Then there was the ever-looming domestic election that might come at any time, so a minority government must take care of that first ...
They all bear some truth. But they also sound more like bad excuses now that the Conservatives have been in office for 27 months. Mr. Harper's handling of Canada's China policy has been, by design or default, exactly opposite to that of other world leaders.
While others are emphasizing China's growing importance and forming a comprehensive China strategy, Canada has removed Beijing from its foreign policy priority list; while new leaders from Germany to Japan put summit diplomacy with the Chinese leaders as an indispensable part of their travel itinerary, Mr. Harper has stopped such a practice in Canada; while others are promoting investment and trade with China as a part of increasing jobs and competitiveness at home, the Harper government has let our proportion of trade and investment with China slip; and while others are in constant consultation on some of the most pressing global issues such as the environment and climate change, Mr. Harper is not even on talking terms with the Chinese.
So it is clear that Mr. Harper's China policy is anything but to have one. And contrary to the prevailing but misleading perception that somehow this government has emphasized human rights in its China policy, the Conservatives don't even deserve a passing grade on this subject.
They have suspended Canada's annual human rights dialogue and replaced it with nothing; they have been making grand, but largely self-congratulatory, moral statements regarding China's human rights record but have not implemented a single tangible project to advance human rights and democracy in that country; and Mr. Harper confuses trade with rights by stating that Canada would not sacrifice human rights for the mighty dollar, as if they are mutually exclusive objectives.
Instead of taking fresh China policy initiatives, various House and Senate committees have settled for endless hearings. What they have been told, including testimonies from this author, is very straightforward: we are losing our influence in China, we need a China strategy. Put national interests over and above narrow party politics, and engage China on a range of issues that are absolutely relevant to the long-term wellbeing of Canadians.
Yes, International Trade Minister David Emerson, the only cabinet member who has China expertise, has been going to China since last year and so have a few other ministers. But unless Mr. Harper is willing to engage the Chinese directly by making the long-overdue trip to Beijing, his China agenda on this European trip may yield very little success.
On world politics, globalization, development, energy security, East Asia, Canadian foreign policy ...
Wednesday, May 28, 2008
Aftershock and Quake Lake Threat
On May 28, 2008, Dr. Jiang, was interviewed live by CTV "Canada AM" on the aftershocks and earthquake-created lakes that threaten millions in China. View the clip here.
Tuesday, May 27, 2008
China enjoys rare moment of global support
On May 27, 2008, Dr. Jiang was quoted in the Christian Science Monitor on China's improved international image in the aftermath of the Sichuan earthquake. Read it here.
An earthquake-induced ceasefire, or a genuine truce?
On May 27, 2008, Dr. Jiang was quoted in the Canwest News on the political repercussion in the aftermath of the Sichuan earthquake. Read it here.
Saturday, May 24, 2008
Chinese volunteers soldier on in quake aftermath
On May 24, 2008, Dr. Jiang was quoted by Reuters on Chinese civic activism in the aftermath of the Sichuan earthquake. Read it here.
Friday, May 23, 2008
Crisis and Response
On May 23, 2008, Dr. Jiang was invited to write an article for the Yale University's YaleGlobal Online maganize on China's response to the earthquake. Read the article here.
Thursday, May 22, 2008
China: Roused by Disaster
On May 22, 2008, Dr. Jiang was quoted in the Time magazine on the political repercussion of the Sichuan earthquake. Read the article here.
Saturday, May 17, 2008
China's quake calms Olympic controversies
On May 17, 2008, Dr. Jiang was quoted by the Associated Press on political repercussion in the aftermath of the Sichuan earthquake. Read it here.
‘Shock of consciousness' sweeps China in wake of temblor
On May 17, 2008, Dr. Jiang was quoted in the Global and Mail on Chinese public reaction in the aftermath of the Sichuan earthquake. Read it here.
Friday, May 16, 2008
China's government gives rare transparent look at disaster
On May 16, 2008, Dr. Jiang was quoted in CNN on Chinese government's subtle policy changes in the aftermath of the Sichuan earthquake. Read it here.
Monday, May 05, 2008
China Tries Smile Diplomacy with Japan
Wednesday, April 30, 2008
Beijing needs gold-medal diplomacy
On April 30, 2008, Dr. Jiang was invited to write an article for the Edmonton Journal on the world-wide protests against China's Olympic torch relays after the Tibet riot. Read the article here.
Sunday, April 20, 2008
Tibet -- as China sees it
On April 20, 2008, Dr. Jiang was quoted in the Edmonton Journal on Chinese domestic reponse to Western critics of its Tibet policy. Read the article here.
Friday, April 18, 2008
Tibet Protests Stir Chinese Nationalism
On April 18, 2008, Dr. Jiang was interviewed by the National Public Radio on the Tibet situation and rising Chinese nationalism at home and abroad. You can listen to the report here.
Tibet Protests Stir Chinese Nationalism
On April 18, 2008, Dr. Jiang was interviewed by the National Public Radio on the Tibet situation and rising Chinese nationalism at home and abroad. You can listen to the report here.
Thursday, April 10, 2008
On Olympic Games
On April 10, 2008, Dr. Jiang was quoted again by the TIME Magazine on the current controversy over the Olympics. Read the article here.
Monday, April 07, 2008
Strong yuan may be China's savior
On April 7, 2008, Asia Times published Dr. Jiang's article on Chinese currency and the US-China relations. The full text is here.
Friday, April 04, 2008
On the other side of Tibet
On April 4, 2008, Dr. Jiang was invited to write an article for the Global and Mail on Chinese domestic public opinion after the Tibet riot. Read the article here.
Globe and Mail Op-ed on the Tibet situation
On April 4, 2008, Dr. Jiang was invited to write an op-ed article for the Globe and Mail on the rising emotions over the Tibetan crisis. Read the full text here.
Thursday, April 03, 2008
TIME Interview on Tibet Riot
On April 3, 2008, Dr. Jiang was interviewed by TIME magazine on the recent situation in Tibet. You can read the TIME article and Dr. Jiang's comments here.
Wednesday, April 02, 2008
CBC The Current Interview on rising nationalism in China
On April 2, 2008, Dr. Jiang was interviewed live by CBC Radio's The Current on the rising nationalism in China over the Tibetan issue. You can listen to the 30 minute discussion (part 3 of the program) here.
Wednesday, March 26, 2008
The Current Fuel Shortage in China
On March 26, 2008, Dr. Jiang was interviewed by Voice of America Chinese language program on the current fuel shortage in China. You can listen to the interview or read the article in Chinese here.
Sunday, March 23, 2008
The Tibetan Situation And Its Impact on the 2008 Beijing Olympics
On March 23, 2008, Dr. Jiang was invited by Mr. Rex Murphy of CBC Radio's Cross Country Checkup to provide analysis on the Tibetan situation and its impact on the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Dr. Jiang stayed on the show for over 20 minutes, discussing the subject with Mr. Murphy and responding to questions from the callers. You can listen to the program here.
Friday, March 21, 2008
China's Rising Soft Power And Its Impact
On March 21, 2008, Dr. Jiang was a guest speaker of the Asia Society at the New York City, discussing China's rising soft power and its impact. Dr. Jiang's analyses were reported by Radio Free Asia. You can read or listen to the Chinese report here.
Monday, March 17, 2008
Beijing's Dilemma
On March 17, 2008. Dr. Jiang was interviewed by the Globe and Mail on the riot in Tibet. Read the full story here.
China Raises Official Tibet Protest Death Toll
On March 17, 2008, Dr. Jiang was interviewed by Voice of America on the on-going tension in Tibet. Read or listen to the report here.
The Tibet Situation and Its Impact on the 2008 Beijing Olympics
On March 17, 2008, Dr. Jiang was interviewed by CBC Radio's Anna Maria Tremonti on the Current program regarding the Tibet situation and its impact on the 2008 Beijing Olympics. You can read the background or listen to the 25 minute segment here.
Saturday, March 15, 2008
China's Energy and Environment Issues
On March 15, 2008, Dr. Jiang was an invited guest on CCTV 9 special program on China's energy and environment issues. Broadcasting live from Beijing, Dr. Jiang joined two other experts for a full hour of discussion.
Thursday, February 28, 2008
Logistics and Other Related Issues on the Coming 2008 Olympics in Beijing
On February 28, 2008, Dr. Jiang was interviewed by the Newsworld of CBC TV on the coming 2008 Olympics in Beijing. He provided analysis on the concerns over the food supply to the athletes around the world, who will go to compete in Beijing in August, and other related issues.
Thursday, February 07, 2008
Parsing Chinese Snowstorms
On February 7, 2008, Dr. Jiang was featured by the AGENDA program's producer Daniel Kitts to comment on the latest snow storms in China, you can read The Inside Agenda here.
The Debate: Globalization Backlash
On February 7, 2008, Dr. Jiang was invited by TV Ontario's AGENDA program with Steven Paikin to debate on the growing discontent over globalization. You can see the details of the program, watch or listen the 40 minute debate here by click the "Globalization Backlash" tab on that web page.
Wednesday, February 06, 2008
The Growing Importance of Alberta's Energy Economy And Its Implications for Canada-China Relations
On February 6, 2008, Dr. Jiang gave a featured interview to Radio Canada International's Chinese language program on the growing importance of Alberta's energy economy and its implications for fostering a strong Canada-China relationship. You can listen to the 25 minute program in Chinese here.
Wednesday, January 09, 2008
Beijing wary of investing in oil sands
On January 9, 2008, Dr. Jiang was interviewed by the Global and Mail on the political and economic environment for Chinese investment in the Alberta oil sands industry. The full report is here.
Monday, January 07, 2008
Chinese mining takeovers in Canada not to be feared
On January 7, 2008, Dr. Jiang was interviewed by the Canadian Press on the implications of a number of recent Chinese takeovers of Canadian mining companies, and the broader bilateral economic relations. The full report is here.
Monday, December 10, 2007
Analysis on the Recent Billion dollar Oil Contract between Sinopec and Iran
On December 10, 2007, Dr. Jiang was interviewed by Voice of America on the implications of Iran's $2 billion contract with China's Sinopec to develop Iran's huge Yadavaran oil field. The full report is here.
Thursday, November 29, 2007
China Flexes Its Muscles on Wall Street
Tuesday, November 27, 2007
Japan PM arrives in China to forge warmer ties
On November 27, 2007, Dr. Jiang was quoted by the Reuters on the coming visit to China by Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda. Read the full report here.
Thursday, October 25, 2007
China cabinet to get energy law draft by early 2008
On October 25, 2007, Dr. Jiang was interviewed by Reuters energy affairs correspondent Emma Graham-Harrison to comment on China's energy law draft. Read the article here.
Wednesday, October 24, 2007
Chinese Firm To Buy Big Stake In Bear Stearns
On October 24, 2007, Dr. Jiang was interviewed by the Washington Post to comment on China's Citic Securities' pending acquisition of up to a 9.9 percent stake in Bear Stearns. Read the article here.
Friday, October 12, 2007
Is Ottawa closing door?
On October 12, 2007, Dr. Jiang was interviewed by the Globe and Mail to comment on the increasingly strained relationship between China and Canada. Read the article here.
Wednesday, September 19, 2007
Abe resignation signals new era of instability
On September 19, 2007, Dr. Jiang was interviewed by the Globe and Mail on former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's recent resignation from his post. He noted that the Chinese leaders would be disappointed as they had strong hope that they could work together with Abe to improve bilateral relationship damaged during Abe's predecessor, Junichiro Koizumi's term.
Read the article here.
Read the article here.
Wednesday, August 08, 2007
China-free shopping
On August 8, 2007, Dr. Jiang was interviewed by the Vancouver Sun on the safety concerns over goods and food products produced in China and marketed in North America. Read the article here.
Tuesday, July 31, 2007
The Current and Potential Uses of Alternative Fuels
On July 31, 2007, Dr. Jiang was interviewed by Global Journalist Website on the Current and Potential Uses of Alternative Fuels.
Listen Online: please go to Global Journalist Website for downloading the audio file in real player format.
Listen Online: please go to Global Journalist Website for downloading the audio file in real player format.
Chinese firm still interested in oilsands
On July 31, 2007, Dr. Jiang was interviewed by CanWest News Service on Chinese firm's continuing interest in Alberta's oilsands. China National Petroleum Corp. has made an extensive study on oilsands resources and technology, and acquired exploration rights to 11 oil blocks in Alberta early this year. Read the article here.
Tuesday, July 10, 2007
Chinese have hesitation about entry into oilsands
On July 10, 2007, Dr. Jiang was interviewed by Canada East Online on China's interest in Alberta's oilsands. He noted that Canada should be trying to develop a strategy to persuade Chinese investment in projects like refineries to get better value out of oilsands crude, rather than shipping it to the United States for processing. Read the article here.
Monday, July 09, 2007
On July 9, 2007, Dr. Jiang was interviewed by the Vancouver Sun on consumer products safety recalls on Chinese manufactured goods. He noted that the fundamental problem is that China's government is simply unable to monitor safety standards in the way richer countries do. Read the article here.
Wednesday, June 27, 2007
CBC Radio One Coverage on the 3rd Canada-China Energy Cooperation Conference (with Audio link)
By CBC News
(Jun 27, 2007)
Duration: 00:09:15
When executives from some of China's biggest oil companies touch down in the "Gateway to the Rockies," you know they're not in town just to hit the West Edmonton Mall. Instead, they've got their sights set on Alberta's bounteous tar sands.
It's no secret that China needs oil and lots of it. And Alberta has the reserves to quench its thirst. But the question remains: at what cost? Well, the "China-Canada Economic Cooperation Conference -- Energy and Beyond," may provide some answers. The conference kicked off in Edmonton today. This is the first time the conference has taken place in Canada and not Beijing.
Listen to Part 3 of As It Happens.
(Jun 27, 2007)
Duration: 00:09:15
When executives from some of China's biggest oil companies touch down in the "Gateway to the Rockies," you know they're not in town just to hit the West Edmonton Mall. Instead, they've got their sights set on Alberta's bounteous tar sands.
It's no secret that China needs oil and lots of it. And Alberta has the reserves to quench its thirst. But the question remains: at what cost? Well, the "China-Canada Economic Cooperation Conference -- Energy and Beyond," may provide some answers. The conference kicked off in Edmonton today. This is the first time the conference has taken place in Canada and not Beijing.
Listen to Part 3 of As It Happens.
Monday, June 25, 2007
Dangerous trade
By Wenran Jiang
(Jun 25, 2007)
Citizen Special
The spectacular rise of China as an economic powerhouse in the past three decades has brought countless consumer products to the world market, ranging from Christmas decorations to household electronics to many Father's Day presents that were opened last Sunday. Yet a flood of reports of late indicate that some of the Chinese exports are unsafe, contaminated and environmentally unfriendly, especially in the food and pharmaceutical sectors.
In March, pet food from China contaminated with melamine, a chemical used to make plastics, was recalled after the illness and death of large numbers of dogs and cats in North America. Melamine was also traced to feed additives from China for chicken, fish and hogs. Last month, Canada also found shipments of corn gluten from China contaminated with melamine and cyanuric acid. Then allegations came that some Chinese-made toys, makeup and pottery contain significant amounts of lead that may pose a health hazard.
The United States has banned Chinese toothpaste imports after a number of other countries detected diethylene glycol, a poisonous chemical used in antifreeze, in shipments. And in April, the United States turned back more than 230 Chinese food products at its borders, labelling most of them simply as "filthy."
There are good reasons for the rest of the world to be worried about such troublesome developments, especially health-conscious consumers in Western countries where food and drug regulatory regimes are facing the growing challenge of rapid globalization.
China's industrialization process has created unprecedented high mobility, with some 150 million people on the move from rural to urban areas for jobs and new economic opportunities. Reforms have weakened the central government's ability to effectively control or monitor an explosive market, now primarily driven by hundreds of thousands of private enterprises.
Cut-throat capitalism and pure greed for profits, 19th-century style, are raging in the world's fourth-largest economy. Longer working hours, lower wages, higher education costs, a collapsing health-care system, and destruction of the environment are just a few challenges among many. And some have ignored the rules and engaged in fake substitutes and cheating, just to make a buck.
Despite recent international complaints about the safety of China's exports, the Chinese people themselves, not foreigners, are the primary victims of many tragic food and drug scandals. Fake food and drugs are often found in the marketplace and are even sold to hospitals. Food and environment-related poisonings have caused many illnesses and deaths in recent years. In 2004, fake baby formula with little nutritious value caused severe health problems in many infants in central China, resulting in the loss of up to 60 young lives. And since 2005, the rate of malignant tumors, listed as the No. 1 killer in China, has shot up 18.6 per cent in the cities and 23.1 per cent in the countryside.
So it is pure sensationalism, if not Sino-phobia, for some U.S. pundits to pose such questions as "Is China trying to poison Americans and their pets?" In fact, Chinese consumers have become more vocal over the years about the country's public health and environment issues. Many Chinese media outlets, under threat of censorship, have produced large exposes on China's increasing food, work and environment safety weaknesses.
Ironically, it is the outcry of North America's pet owners that puts China under international pressure to pay more attention to the country's health risks. Chinese leaders now understand that China stands to lose hundreds of billions of trade dollars if it does not restore worldwide consumer confidence.
Chinese officials used to treat international complaints as isolated incidents or, in some cases, tried to avoid responsibility. But there are indications that China is taking the public health issues, domestic or international, very seriously.
First, it has acknowledged some of the problems reported in the press, and promised to investigate and resolve them.
Second, the Chinese leaders have launched a nationwide crackdown campaign. A Beijing court just sentenced the former head of the Chinese food and drug regulation administration to death for accepting bribes to certify manufacturers of fake drugs. And a range of investigations in response to reports of fake food and pharmaceutical products is going on.
Third, the Chinese government announced earlier this month a set of new regulations that are aimed at enhancing the nation's food and drug safety system. Based on measures first revealed in April, the State Council stressed that the new national monitoring system, to be put in place by 2010, will be able to trace products, deal with accidents, and handle food recalls.
For Canada and other countries, these are encouraging steps. But no one should take safety measures of other countries for granted. Canada should consider putting in extra resources and exercising greater caution in our overall food and drug inspection capabilities.
That should include not only more vigorous border checking and import control, but also lending a hand to China to share Canada's expertise in the food and drug safety area, so China can enhance the rule of law and speed up the process of establishing a robust monitoring system that will benefit both Chinese and people around the world.
Wenran Jiang is the director of the China Institute at the University of Alberta and a senior fellow at the Asia Pacific Foundation. He has been working with Canada's PrioNet Research Network on food safety monitoring in Asia.
(Jun 25, 2007)
Citizen Special
The spectacular rise of China as an economic powerhouse in the past three decades has brought countless consumer products to the world market, ranging from Christmas decorations to household electronics to many Father's Day presents that were opened last Sunday. Yet a flood of reports of late indicate that some of the Chinese exports are unsafe, contaminated and environmentally unfriendly, especially in the food and pharmaceutical sectors.
In March, pet food from China contaminated with melamine, a chemical used to make plastics, was recalled after the illness and death of large numbers of dogs and cats in North America. Melamine was also traced to feed additives from China for chicken, fish and hogs. Last month, Canada also found shipments of corn gluten from China contaminated with melamine and cyanuric acid. Then allegations came that some Chinese-made toys, makeup and pottery contain significant amounts of lead that may pose a health hazard.
The United States has banned Chinese toothpaste imports after a number of other countries detected diethylene glycol, a poisonous chemical used in antifreeze, in shipments. And in April, the United States turned back more than 230 Chinese food products at its borders, labelling most of them simply as "filthy."
There are good reasons for the rest of the world to be worried about such troublesome developments, especially health-conscious consumers in Western countries where food and drug regulatory regimes are facing the growing challenge of rapid globalization.
China's industrialization process has created unprecedented high mobility, with some 150 million people on the move from rural to urban areas for jobs and new economic opportunities. Reforms have weakened the central government's ability to effectively control or monitor an explosive market, now primarily driven by hundreds of thousands of private enterprises.
Cut-throat capitalism and pure greed for profits, 19th-century style, are raging in the world's fourth-largest economy. Longer working hours, lower wages, higher education costs, a collapsing health-care system, and destruction of the environment are just a few challenges among many. And some have ignored the rules and engaged in fake substitutes and cheating, just to make a buck.
Despite recent international complaints about the safety of China's exports, the Chinese people themselves, not foreigners, are the primary victims of many tragic food and drug scandals. Fake food and drugs are often found in the marketplace and are even sold to hospitals. Food and environment-related poisonings have caused many illnesses and deaths in recent years. In 2004, fake baby formula with little nutritious value caused severe health problems in many infants in central China, resulting in the loss of up to 60 young lives. And since 2005, the rate of malignant tumors, listed as the No. 1 killer in China, has shot up 18.6 per cent in the cities and 23.1 per cent in the countryside.
So it is pure sensationalism, if not Sino-phobia, for some U.S. pundits to pose such questions as "Is China trying to poison Americans and their pets?" In fact, Chinese consumers have become more vocal over the years about the country's public health and environment issues. Many Chinese media outlets, under threat of censorship, have produced large exposes on China's increasing food, work and environment safety weaknesses.
Ironically, it is the outcry of North America's pet owners that puts China under international pressure to pay more attention to the country's health risks. Chinese leaders now understand that China stands to lose hundreds of billions of trade dollars if it does not restore worldwide consumer confidence.
Chinese officials used to treat international complaints as isolated incidents or, in some cases, tried to avoid responsibility. But there are indications that China is taking the public health issues, domestic or international, very seriously.
First, it has acknowledged some of the problems reported in the press, and promised to investigate and resolve them.
Second, the Chinese leaders have launched a nationwide crackdown campaign. A Beijing court just sentenced the former head of the Chinese food and drug regulation administration to death for accepting bribes to certify manufacturers of fake drugs. And a range of investigations in response to reports of fake food and pharmaceutical products is going on.
Third, the Chinese government announced earlier this month a set of new regulations that are aimed at enhancing the nation's food and drug safety system. Based on measures first revealed in April, the State Council stressed that the new national monitoring system, to be put in place by 2010, will be able to trace products, deal with accidents, and handle food recalls.
For Canada and other countries, these are encouraging steps. But no one should take safety measures of other countries for granted. Canada should consider putting in extra resources and exercising greater caution in our overall food and drug inspection capabilities.
That should include not only more vigorous border checking and import control, but also lending a hand to China to share Canada's expertise in the food and drug safety area, so China can enhance the rule of law and speed up the process of establishing a robust monitoring system that will benefit both Chinese and people around the world.
Wenran Jiang is the director of the China Institute at the University of Alberta and a senior fellow at the Asia Pacific Foundation. He has been working with Canada's PrioNet Research Network on food safety monitoring in Asia.
A cooling off in Sino-Canadian relations
On Jun 25, 2007, Dr. Jiang was invited by the Edmonton Journal to write an Op-ed piece on the recent development of Canada-China relations.
Since the Conservatives ousted the Liberals and formed a minority government in early 2006, however, Sino-Canadian relations have entered a period of uncertainty. In this article, Wenran touched on a number of issues baffling both sides, including the Celil case.
You can read the article here.
Since the Conservatives ousted the Liberals and formed a minority government in early 2006, however, Sino-Canadian relations have entered a period of uncertainty. In this article, Wenran touched on a number of issues baffling both sides, including the Celil case.
You can read the article here.
Wednesday, June 20, 2007
Energy conference boosts relations with China
On June 20, 2007, Dr. Jiang was interviewed by the U of A ExpressNews on the 3rd Canada-China Economic Cooperation Conference. As the event organizer, Wenran said the event will explore a wide range of issues in bilateral energy relations. He believes Canada and China have a great deal to gain from one another. Stronger economic relations would help Canada diversify its economic activities, for instance.
You can read the article here.
You can read the article here.
Monday, June 04, 2007
China says climate policy must make room for growth
On June 4, 2007, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by Emma Graham-Harrison from the Reuters on China's climate policy.
China went on the global warming offensive on Monday, unveiling a climate change action plan while stressing it will not sacrifice economic ambitions to international demands to cut greenhouse gas pollution.
Wenran commented that "this is more of a mobilization rally to draw the battle line as the G8 approaches. Beijing wants to make sure that China is not the target of world opinion on global warming issues."
You can read the article here.
China went on the global warming offensive on Monday, unveiling a climate change action plan while stressing it will not sacrifice economic ambitions to international demands to cut greenhouse gas pollution.
Wenran commented that "this is more of a mobilization rally to draw the battle line as the G8 approaches. Beijing wants to make sure that China is not the target of world opinion on global warming issues."
You can read the article here.
In China, 'cutthroat capitalism' often means cutting corners
On June 4, 2007, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by International Herald Tribune on China's food safety issues. The recent melamine-contaminated pet food marketed in North America and poisonous syrup sold to Panama have triggered world-wide concerns.
"This is cutthroat market capitalism," said Wenran, "but the question has to be asked: is this uniquely Chinese or is there simply a lack of regulation in the market?"
You can read the article here.
"This is cutthroat market capitalism," said Wenran, "but the question has to be asked: is this uniquely Chinese or is there simply a lack of regulation in the market?"
You can read the article here.
Monday, May 28, 2007
True test of China's diplomatic intentions lies ahead
On May 28, 2007, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Globe and Mail, commenting on China's diplomatic deadlocks with the West on Darfur and North Korea issues. Wenran said China's leaders have gone through an evolution in their thinking on Darfur in recent years. At first they knew little about Darfur, focusing instead on Sudan's advantages as a reliable source of oil. Later there was growing awareness of Darfur, followed by internal debates and a greater willingness to be a "responsible power" on the issue.
Read the article here.
Read the article here.
Friday, May 18, 2007
An Export Boom Suddenly Facing a Quality Crisis
On May 18, 2007, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the New York Times on the tainted Chinese pet food discovered in U.S. market, threatening to undermine the credibility of this booming export.
Dr. Jiang argues that China is going through a radical transformation and it’s hard to manage. "The state just doesn’t have the expertise to keep up with these things,” he said.
You can read the article here.
Dr. Jiang argues that China is going through a radical transformation and it’s hard to manage. "The state just doesn’t have the expertise to keep up with these things,” he said.
You can read the article here.
Sunday, May 06, 2007
China's African venture is risky business
On May 6, 2007, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Australian on China's emerging oil interest in Africa. The Chinese public is expressing growing concern about the number of attacks on the rapidly increasing Chinese workforce in Africa, as Beijing's success in the global war for access to oil and other key commodities comes at a growing price in lives.
As an expert on China's role in Africa, Wenran said that some Chinese companies operating there use Chinese labour, others local labour, and yet others, both. There is no single model. But there is clear-cut economic logic for using Chinese labour. It is cheap, disciplined, well-trained, and easy to manage. He cautioned that if Chinese invested companies want to be there for the long run, they need to have local support.
You can read the article here.
As an expert on China's role in Africa, Wenran said that some Chinese companies operating there use Chinese labour, others local labour, and yet others, both. There is no single model. But there is clear-cut economic logic for using Chinese labour. It is cheap, disciplined, well-trained, and easy to manage. He cautioned that if Chinese invested companies want to be there for the long run, they need to have local support.
You can read the article here.
Thursday, May 03, 2007
Oil-field raid highlights danger for China
On May 3, 2007, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Globe and Mail on a recent armed attack toward Chinese-run oil field operation in eastern Ethiopia. Wenran said Chinese companies are only now coming to grips with the political risks that are associated with doing business in violence-prone countries. “The Chinese leaders are becoming more and more aware of the severe situation in these unstable countries where they have put in quite a bit of investment,” Wenran noted.
You can read the article here.
You can read the article here.
Tuesday, May 01, 2007
Canada not part of Olympic torch route
On May 1, 2007, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Vancouver Sun on China's decision to exclude Vancouver, host of the 2010 Winter Olympics, and former host cities Montreal and Calgary from its torch relay route.
Wenran noted that Vancouver, like San Francisco, has a huge ethnic Chinese population and would be a logical choice if Canada-China relations were strong. "But I'm not surprised that no Canadians cities were included," Wenran said. "I think the colder relationship definitely is a factor which might have contributed to Canadian cities not being included."
You can read the article here.
Wenran noted that Vancouver, like San Francisco, has a huge ethnic Chinese population and would be a logical choice if Canada-China relations were strong. "But I'm not surprised that no Canadians cities were included," Wenran said. "I think the colder relationship definitely is a factor which might have contributed to Canadian cities not being included."
You can read the article here.
Wednesday, April 11, 2007
New temper marks Wen visit

On April 11, 2007, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by Reuters on recent China-Japan relationship.
In a sign of Chinese government's changing tolerance level for public displays of nationalism, one of the student leaders from 2005 first accepted and then declined an interview, citing his university's more stringent regulations on speaking out on the issue. When Abe sparked an outcry last month by saying there was no proof of government or military involvement in the use of sex slaves during World War ll, the reaction from China was subdued.

But Jiang also thinks the 2005 protests caused a change in Japan. "It served as a shock, not only to the Japanese public, but also to the conservative- leaning political elites," he said. "The raw emotions expressed simply could not be explained away by pure manipulation by the Chinese party."
You can read the article here.
Japan and China put old hostilities aside
On April 11, 2007, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the London-based newspaper Telegraph on the improving relationship between China and Japan. This week, Wen Jiabao, the Chinese prime minister, lands in Japan amid mutual effusions of satisfaction at improvements in the two countries' relations. It is the first visit by a Chinese premier to Tokyo in seven years.
Dr. Jiang said Mr Abe had played a clever hand by making his first public move on China an offer to co-operate on energy conservation and security.
You can read the article here.
Dr. Jiang said Mr Abe had played a clever hand by making his first public move on China an offer to co-operate on energy conservation and security.
You can read the article here.
Sunday, March 25, 2007
China's Hu heads to Russia urgently seeking fuel
On March 25, 2007, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by Reuters on Chinese President Hu Jintao's visit to Moscow aimed at seeking oil, gas and assurance as the two countries eye each other's resurgent power.
"Both sides know they need to keep control of their energy resources, and new (Russian) rules to enhance state control are the same as what China is doing," said Wenran.
You can read the article here.
"Both sides know they need to keep control of their energy resources, and new (Russian) rules to enhance state control are the same as what China is doing," said Wenran.
You can read the article here.
Tuesday, March 13, 2007
Ottawa abused powers, Gao says
On March 13, 2007, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Global and Mail on Chinese fugitive banker Gao Shan's expatriation case heard in Canada. Lorne Waldman, Mr. Gao's representing lawyer, said Canada is trying to circumvent extradition law by removing the former banker for a minor offence.
Mr. Waldman said evidence provided by China is unreliable. "Until China can create a legal process that is respected, any country like Canada and any lawyer like me is going to do exactly what I'm doing," Mr. Waldman said. "You can't send people back to a judicial system like China."
Wenran said that Mr. Waldman's questions about the legitimacy of the Chinese judicial system fail to take into account the reforms the country is undergoing.
You can read the article here.
Mr. Waldman said evidence provided by China is unreliable. "Until China can create a legal process that is respected, any country like Canada and any lawyer like me is going to do exactly what I'm doing," Mr. Waldman said. "You can't send people back to a judicial system like China."
Wenran said that Mr. Waldman's questions about the legitimacy of the Chinese judicial system fail to take into account the reforms the country is undergoing.
You can read the article here.
Friday, March 02, 2007
Democracy can wait, Chinese PM says
On March 2, 2007, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Global and Mail on China's Prime Minister's recent comments ruling out any dramatic political reforms for the foreseeable future.
Wenran noted that the Chinese leaders are convinced that they should keep the one-party system and they're not ready for the issues of political reform. "They want to show the world that 'We're in charge, we're in control, and don't expect any dramatic changes,' " said Wenran.
Mr. Wen's comments are also a sign of China's increasing certainty in itself. "There's a growing confidence in the Chinese model of development," Wenran said. "The Chinese leaders are confident that they will be able to stick to their existing model."
You can read the article here.
Wenran noted that the Chinese leaders are convinced that they should keep the one-party system and they're not ready for the issues of political reform. "They want to show the world that 'We're in charge, we're in control, and don't expect any dramatic changes,' " said Wenran.
Mr. Wen's comments are also a sign of China's increasing certainty in itself. "There's a growing confidence in the Chinese model of development," Wenran said. "The Chinese leaders are confident that they will be able to stick to their existing model."
You can read the article here.
Thursday, February 22, 2007
China diplomat: North Korea gets 'money and respect'
On February 22, 2007, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by CNN on the North Korea nuclear issue. "China does not wish to see an implosion that would send North Korean refugees streaming into its borders," said Wenran. "Neither does it like to sit beside a unified Korea loyal to America."
You can read the article here.
You can read the article here.
Tuesday, February 06, 2007
Flaherty, Emerson praised for China visit: The two ministers 'said all the right things'
On February 6, 2007, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Vancouver Sun on federal Finance Minister Jim Flaherty and Trade Minister David Emerson's recent China trip. The senior Conservatives visited Beijing, Shanghai and Hong Kong to promote trade, but mainly to revive a diplomatically strained relationship between Canada and China.
"[But] it has to come from the highest level," said Wenran, who rejected the idea that Canada can take a two-pronged approach in dealing with China; that is, to be hot on trade and to be cold on politics.
You can read the article here.
"[But] it has to come from the highest level," said Wenran, who rejected the idea that Canada can take a two-pronged approach in dealing with China; that is, to be hot on trade and to be cold on politics.
You can read the article here.
Saturday, February 03, 2007
China oil demand growth ends strong 06 on modest note
On February 3, 2007, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by Reuters on China's oil imports growth in the year of 2006.
China's oil demand rose a modest 2.6 percent in December, the slowest rate since last January, but enough to bring full-year 2006 growth to nearly 8 percent despite official efforts to curb consumption and boost efficiency. Dr. Jiang commented that the government is "putting in a lot of effort, but good intentions may not produce all the results."
You can read the article here.
China's oil demand rose a modest 2.6 percent in December, the slowest rate since last January, but enough to bring full-year 2006 growth to nearly 8 percent despite official efforts to curb consumption and boost efficiency. Dr. Jiang commented that the government is "putting in a lot of effort, but good intentions may not produce all the results."
You can read the article here.
Wednesday, January 24, 2007
China keeps mum despite furore over missile test
On January 24, 2007, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Strait Times on China's recent anit-satellite missile test. Professor Jiang said the test was a 'calculated, strategic decision'. 'It sends an unmistakable message that China has precision technology and in the event of a military confrontation, has the capability to strike at the heart of the US military intelligence,' he said.
Beijing confirms missile test on satellite
On January 24, 2007, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by Chicago Tribune on China's recent test of a new anti-satellite missile. Dr. Jiang observes that China wants military parity with the U.S.. "The question is how fast and how will it get there," he said.
You can read the article here.
You can read the article here.
Friday, January 19, 2007
Chinese missile strikes satellite

Dr. Jiang noted that China's space modernization effort is part of a campaign to defend itself against the U.S. government's missile defense program, which officials in Beijing view as a militarization of outer space.
You can read the article here.
It's a mistake to blow hot and cold on China
By Wenran Jiang
(Jan 19, 2007)
The Globe and Mail
Finally, a long overdue positive development in Canada's bumpy relations with China: International Trade Minister David Emerson's current mission there, with a good number of Canadian businesses in tow.
For most of 2006, the Conservatives paid little attention to China. And when they did, controversy was the norm. Remember Foreign Minister Peter MacKay's comments that Chinese spies were engaging in industrial espionage in Canada; some Conservative MPs' seemingly intense interest in participating in Taiwan-organized activities; the offering of an honorary Canadian citizenship to the Dalai Lama, to name just a few?
Then came the confusing story of whether Prime Minister Stephen Harper would meet — or not meet — with Chinese President Hu Jintao at the APEC summit last November. Mr. Harper's chosen polemic has since become the signature of the government's China policy position: Canada will not sacrifice human rights on the altar of the “almighty dollar” in its relations with China.
Such grandstanding, while celebrated by some as principled, is both intellectually flawed and politically manipulative. It is intellectually flawed because establishing and imposing such a false dichotomy between trade and human rights demonstrates a poor understanding of China's development dynamics. It is politically manipulative because the statement was designed as a partisan shot to show the Conservatives are different from the Liberals who had “sold out” Canadian values to seek closer economic ties with Beijing.
The real problem is that the Conservatives have done little beyond partisan politics to promote Canadian national interests in our relations with China. As the months pass, it becomes clear the minority government has not formulated a coherent China policy. It behaves more like it's in opposition, holding hearings rather than making and implementing policies.
Take human rights, for example. The Conservatives have criticized previous Liberal governments for neglecting China's human-rights issues, suspended the annual government-level human-rights dialogue, and positioned themselves on a moral high ground. Yet, they have no programs in place for Canada to promote effective and meaningful changes in China.
Granted, the government's annual human-rights dialogue was not working well and a new approach was needed. But there have been a range of CIDA programs and good governance projects in China that have, over the years, made significant contributions to the rule of law and human-rights improvements. The Conservative government's throw-the-baby-out-with-the-bathwater approach has created confusion for our diplomats who work on these projects.
Now, certain policy-makers in Ottawa are flirting with the idea of pursuing “hot” economic relations with Beijing, while maintaining “cold,” winter-like political relations. They argue the Chinese “should not be rewarded” for bad human-rights behaviour and that they should learn to live with political criticism; they reason Beijing will accept such a formula due to commercial concerns.
Hence, the federal government dispatched its ministers of agriculture and natural resources to Beijing in recent months, signalling business as usual. And now, with both Mr. Emerson and Finance Minister Jim Flaherty in Beijing, the Conservatives are seeking new momentum in China that was lost for most of the past year.
But the idea of separating politics from economics in dealing with China does not serve Canada's national interests well. Nor will it work. Globalization will spur commerce between the two countries, but when it comes to large projects, it is the countries that have positive political relations with China that will be given priority.
Furthermore, political disengagement will shut Canada out of China's reform process, making it impossible for Canada to play a constructive role in promoting human rights and democracy in China, a goal this government has stated is a priority in its foreign policy platform.
While Mr. Emerson may have succeeded in reversing the negative trend of Canada-China relations, the real challenge for the Conservative government is to go beyond the “rights versus trade” dichotomy, develop a China strategy beyond partisan politics, manage to engage China positively on both economic and political fronts, and develop a vision that not only serves Canada's own interests, but also generates change inside China that can move that country toward democracy and a better protection of human rights.
(Jan 19, 2007)
The Globe and Mail
Finally, a long overdue positive development in Canada's bumpy relations with China: International Trade Minister David Emerson's current mission there, with a good number of Canadian businesses in tow.
For most of 2006, the Conservatives paid little attention to China. And when they did, controversy was the norm. Remember Foreign Minister Peter MacKay's comments that Chinese spies were engaging in industrial espionage in Canada; some Conservative MPs' seemingly intense interest in participating in Taiwan-organized activities; the offering of an honorary Canadian citizenship to the Dalai Lama, to name just a few?
Then came the confusing story of whether Prime Minister Stephen Harper would meet — or not meet — with Chinese President Hu Jintao at the APEC summit last November. Mr. Harper's chosen polemic has since become the signature of the government's China policy position: Canada will not sacrifice human rights on the altar of the “almighty dollar” in its relations with China.
Such grandstanding, while celebrated by some as principled, is both intellectually flawed and politically manipulative. It is intellectually flawed because establishing and imposing such a false dichotomy between trade and human rights demonstrates a poor understanding of China's development dynamics. It is politically manipulative because the statement was designed as a partisan shot to show the Conservatives are different from the Liberals who had “sold out” Canadian values to seek closer economic ties with Beijing.
The real problem is that the Conservatives have done little beyond partisan politics to promote Canadian national interests in our relations with China. As the months pass, it becomes clear the minority government has not formulated a coherent China policy. It behaves more like it's in opposition, holding hearings rather than making and implementing policies.
Take human rights, for example. The Conservatives have criticized previous Liberal governments for neglecting China's human-rights issues, suspended the annual government-level human-rights dialogue, and positioned themselves on a moral high ground. Yet, they have no programs in place for Canada to promote effective and meaningful changes in China.
Granted, the government's annual human-rights dialogue was not working well and a new approach was needed. But there have been a range of CIDA programs and good governance projects in China that have, over the years, made significant contributions to the rule of law and human-rights improvements. The Conservative government's throw-the-baby-out-with-the-bathwater approach has created confusion for our diplomats who work on these projects.
Now, certain policy-makers in Ottawa are flirting with the idea of pursuing “hot” economic relations with Beijing, while maintaining “cold,” winter-like political relations. They argue the Chinese “should not be rewarded” for bad human-rights behaviour and that they should learn to live with political criticism; they reason Beijing will accept such a formula due to commercial concerns.
Hence, the federal government dispatched its ministers of agriculture and natural resources to Beijing in recent months, signalling business as usual. And now, with both Mr. Emerson and Finance Minister Jim Flaherty in Beijing, the Conservatives are seeking new momentum in China that was lost for most of the past year.
But the idea of separating politics from economics in dealing with China does not serve Canada's national interests well. Nor will it work. Globalization will spur commerce between the two countries, but when it comes to large projects, it is the countries that have positive political relations with China that will be given priority.
Furthermore, political disengagement will shut Canada out of China's reform process, making it impossible for Canada to play a constructive role in promoting human rights and democracy in China, a goal this government has stated is a priority in its foreign policy platform.
While Mr. Emerson may have succeeded in reversing the negative trend of Canada-China relations, the real challenge for the Conservative government is to go beyond the “rights versus trade” dichotomy, develop a China strategy beyond partisan politics, manage to engage China positively on both economic and political fronts, and develop a vision that not only serves Canada's own interests, but also generates change inside China that can move that country toward democracy and a better protection of human rights.
Wednesday, January 17, 2007
Ottawa aims to rebuild frayed ties with China
On January 17, 2007, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Globe and Mail on Harper government's recent push to rebuild ties with Beijing, including plans to target China as one of 10 markets that will be the focus of Canada's trade efforts. But Wenran said the notion that two nations can have "cold" political relations but "hot" economic relations will not fly in Beijing. "That is not going to work with Canada and China," he said. "We have cold politics and lukewarm economics." He said the Chinese can take criticism but not "grandstanding statements" such as the ones Mr. Harper made last year.
You can read the article here.
You can read the article here.
Tuesday, January 16, 2007
Canada Seeks New Chinese Investments in Oil Fields
On January 16, 2007, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Bloomberg on Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper's recent assurance to Chinese officials that the Asian country remains a welcome investor in Canada's energy industry. Two of Harper's senior cabinet ministers -- Trade Minister David Emerson and Finance Minister Jim Flaherty -- are in China this week canvassing for more Chinese investments and seeking to ensure better business ties.
"Canada believes it can move on with a relationship cold on the political side and warm economically," said Wenran. "That has some risks in it. The Chinese are interested in Canadian energy and resource sectors, but not to the extent they are going to die for it."
You can read the article here.
"Canada believes it can move on with a relationship cold on the political side and warm economically," said Wenran. "That has some risks in it. The Chinese are interested in Canadian energy and resource sectors, but not to the extent they are going to die for it."
You can read the article here.
Tuesday, December 12, 2006
If Trade With China Is Vital to Our Future, What is Harper up to?
On December 12, 2006, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Edmonton Journal, questioning Stephen Harper's actions of restricting certain kinds of foreign investment, including China's state-owned enterprises. Jiang says Harper is making a mistake and his aggressive strategy won't help Canadian businesses trying to get into China.
You can read the article here.
You can read the article here.
Thursday, November 30, 2006
Ottawa open to China in small doses; Resources Minister says investment should be limited to minority stakes
On November 30, 2006, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Globe and Mail on Natural Resources Minister Gary Lunn's recent message during his China visit that Chinese investment in Canadian energy and natural resource sectors is welcome, but as minority interests in Canadian-controlled joint ventures.
Dr. Jiang said Chinese officials fear the investment monitoring could result in a highly politicized process, similar to the one in the United States that derailed a bid by Chinese National Offshore Oil Corp. to acquire Unocal Corp. But he noted that most Chinese companies are not looking for majority control in Canadian companies, preferring minority position along the lines of two recent investments in Canadian oil sands projects.
Dr. Jiang said Chinese officials fear the investment monitoring could result in a highly politicized process, similar to the one in the United States that derailed a bid by Chinese National Offshore Oil Corp. to acquire Unocal Corp. But he noted that most Chinese companies are not looking for majority control in Canadian companies, preferring minority position along the lines of two recent investments in Canadian oil sands projects.
Wednesday, November 29, 2006
Flaherty defends plan to screen foreign takeovers
On November 29, 2006, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Globe and Mail on Finance Minister Jim Flaherty's recently announced plan to "protect Canadian assets" against takeovers by some foreign state-owned companies.
Dr. Jiang said that Chinese company and government officials are increasingly skeptical about Canada's openness to Chinese investment.
Wenran said Canada is losing ground in the global competition to gain access to Chinese markets and be the recipient of out-bound Chinese investment. He said Canadian governments would have full power to regulate any foreign subsidiary that resulted from an acquisition.
You can read the article here.
Dr. Jiang said that Chinese company and government officials are increasingly skeptical about Canada's openness to Chinese investment.
Wenran said Canada is losing ground in the global competition to gain access to Chinese markets and be the recipient of out-bound Chinese investment. He said Canadian governments would have full power to regulate any foreign subsidiary that resulted from an acquisition.
You can read the article here.
Friday, November 17, 2006
Canadian-Chinese energy ties promoted
On November 17, 2006, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Business Edge, contending that the federal government's failure to understand Chinese intentions in Canada will jeopardize future investment. "We're facing a very uphill battle in winning Chinese investment in Canada," said Jiang, during a recent Asia-Pacific Summit held in Vancouver. "We are already in a position of needing China more than China needs us."
You can read the article here.
You can read the article here.
Minister criticizes China's human rights record
On November 17, 2006, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Globe and Mail on Canada's diplomatic friction with China over the latter's human rights record.
Ironically, the federal government has been much more active and positive in its engagement with China in recent weeks, Dr. Jiang said, but Beijing may still be focusing on the friction in the early months of the Harper government. “In its initial stages, this government gave a bit of a cold shoulder to China, and this might have had an effect on China. But now Canada is eager to engage China on all fronts.”
You can read the article here.
Ironically, the federal government has been much more active and positive in its engagement with China in recent weeks, Dr. Jiang said, but Beijing may still be focusing on the friction in the early months of the Harper government. “In its initial stages, this government gave a bit of a cold shoulder to China, and this might have had an effect on China. But now Canada is eager to engage China on all fronts.”
You can read the article here.
Friday, November 10, 2006
China, Africa forging closer ties
On November 10, 2006, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Globe and Mail on the recent China-Africa Cooperation Summit. The summit wrapped up yesterday with news of a further $1.9-billion (U.S.) in trade and investment deals between China and Africa, on top of the $10-billion in loans and assistance China offered on Saturday.
"This summit was quite unprecedented," said Wenran. "No other power has the will or ability to pull this off. It really marks the emergence of China as a dominant power in a faraway continent that was previously the back yard of the European powers."
You can read the article here.
On November 5, Dr. Jiang gave an interview on the same topic with the Guardian, read here.
The New York Times also interviewed Dr. Jiang on November 3, with a focus on China's strategic presence in Africa. “African leaders see China as a new kind of global partner that has lots of money but treats them as equals,” said Wenran. “Chinese leaders see Africa, in a strategic sense, as up for grabs.”
Dr. Jiang said that unlike in the cold war, when China’s foreign involvement was motivated by ideology, Beijing now had a commercial strategy as the developing world’s biggest beneficiary of globalization to unite with the region most conspicuously left behind.
It will be up to each country’s leaders, and ultimately each country’s people, to decide how to use the wealth, he said. “From China’s perspective the Western powers and Western companies have had their chance in Africa and really nothing has happened,” he said. Read the article here.

City safari … Beijing was festooned with posters of African wildlife in the run-up to the summit, with the main shopping street adorned with wooden animals.
Photograph: Jason Lee/Reuters

A policeman in Beijing passes by a billboard promoting the China-Africa diplomatic forum this weekend.
China Photos/Getty Images
"This summit was quite unprecedented," said Wenran. "No other power has the will or ability to pull this off. It really marks the emergence of China as a dominant power in a faraway continent that was previously the back yard of the European powers."
You can read the article here.
On November 5, Dr. Jiang gave an interview on the same topic with the Guardian, read here.
The New York Times also interviewed Dr. Jiang on November 3, with a focus on China's strategic presence in Africa. “African leaders see China as a new kind of global partner that has lots of money but treats them as equals,” said Wenran. “Chinese leaders see Africa, in a strategic sense, as up for grabs.”
Dr. Jiang said that unlike in the cold war, when China’s foreign involvement was motivated by ideology, Beijing now had a commercial strategy as the developing world’s biggest beneficiary of globalization to unite with the region most conspicuously left behind.
It will be up to each country’s leaders, and ultimately each country’s people, to decide how to use the wealth, he said. “From China’s perspective the Western powers and Western companies have had their chance in Africa and really nothing has happened,” he said. Read the article here.

City safari … Beijing was festooned with posters of African wildlife in the run-up to the summit, with the main shopping street adorned with wooden animals.
Photograph: Jason Lee/Reuters

A policeman in Beijing passes by a billboard promoting the China-Africa diplomatic forum this weekend.
China Photos/Getty Images
Tuesday, October 10, 2006
North Korea won't blink in the game of nuclear chicken
By Wenran Jiang
(Oct 10, 2006)
The Globe and Mail
In defiance of warnings from the international community, Pyongyang carried out its long-threatened nuclear weapons test yesterday, setting off worldwide condemnation and concern over nuclear arms proliferation in the region and around the globe.
Like Pyongyang's launch of seven missiles on July 4, its choice of timing in going nuclear was no accident. The United States has recently tightened its sanctions against North Korea, which views the measures as a declaration of war, and Beijing appears to be shifting away from its traditional support of the regime of Kim Jong-il. As well, South Korea's foreign minister is about to be voted in as the new United Nations Secretary-General, and Japan's new prime minister, a hard-liner against Pyongyang, is being welcomed in both Beijing and Seoul this week to resume long-interrupted summit diplomacy. Left behind, North Korea's own demands have failed to register a sympathetic hearing in the world.
For years, many believed that North Korea was just bluffing. How could an isolated, technologically backward, small Communist dictatorship with a starving population pull off a sophisticated nuclear arms operation that only half a dozen states could achieve. Such an attitude only propelled Pyongyang to be more resolute in proving its credentials. By failing to address repeated warning signs seriously, the world now must pay the price of either living with a nuclear North Korea or living without it.
For the United States, the test represents another foreign policy blunder of the Bush administration. Since 2000, Washington has been more obsessed with ending the Kim regime than ending its nuclear program. It discontinued the Clinton administration's 1994 "framework agreement" that provided aid to Pyongyang in exchange for the latter's suspension of its nuclear program. The Bush team labelled North Korea a "rogue state," part of an "axis of evil" and an "outpost of tyranny." After the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Pyongyang reactivated its nuclear operation hoping to avoid the fate of Saddam Hussein.
In the ensuing six-party talks designed to resolve the crisis, involving South Korea, China, Japan and Russia, the U.S. took a hard-line position. Instead of fully engaging North Korea and providing security guarantees, Washington sought to press Pyongyang to give up its nuclear ambition without preconditions. Mr. Kim, convinced that the current U.S. government has no intention of normalizing relations with North Korea, has refused to return to the negotiating table.
Yesterday's test is a wakeup call for the Bush hawks. Instead of a regime collapse, Pyongyang now has a nuclear arsenal of some seven to 10 weapons (in contrast with having a suspended nuclear facility and, at most, one or two nuclear bombs back in 2000). The cost of now reversing the course, either by carrot or stick, will be much higher.
For China, Pyongyang's nuclear escalation is a slap in the face at the worst time. Chinese leaders have spent much energy in playing host to the six-party talks over the past few years, trying to broker a compromise between North Korea and the United States, only to be frustrated by both sides. Beijing is facing mounting domestic challenges and needs a stable international environment, especially good relations with its trading partners -- the U.S., Japan and South Korea.
But unlike what is often portrayed in the press or argued by Bush administration supporters, Beijing's leverage over the secluded North Korea is not unlimited. Yes, China lost more than one million lives to save the North from being wiped out by U.S. forces in the Korean War in the early 1950s, and, yes, it is the de facto ally of the Kim regime, economically sustaining it from collapse.
But this doesn't automatically make North Korea a Chinese patron. In fact, Pyongyang has been angered by China's recent decision to join Washington's financial sanctions against the North, by China's siding with others in the UN in condemning the North Korean missiles test in July and by Beijing's warming relations with Japan's hawkish prime minister, Shinzo Abe, who came to prominence in Japanese politics largely through bashing Pyongyang. By moving away from its neutral position between Pyongyang and Washington, Beijing's leverage over North Korea, limited in the first place, is weakened rather than strengthened.
And sandwiched between the big powers, South Korea is the most vulnerable of all due to its close geographic location to the North.
Seoul has pursued a "sunshine policy" of economic co-operation and political engagement with Pyongyang for some time. The lack of support from the Bush administration has strained its allied relationship with Washington. Now, amidst the outrage and disappointment, the South must soberly reflect on what to do next.
Christopher Hill, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for Asia Pacific affairs, warned recently that North Korea can have either nuclear weapons or a future, but not both. Pyongyang, backed into a corner and desperate for regime survival, is not blinking in this high-stake game of chicken. The challenge for the Security Council, including the United States, is to go beyond tough words and come up with a well-thought-out solution to the crisis.
(Oct 10, 2006)
The Globe and Mail
In defiance of warnings from the international community, Pyongyang carried out its long-threatened nuclear weapons test yesterday, setting off worldwide condemnation and concern over nuclear arms proliferation in the region and around the globe.
Like Pyongyang's launch of seven missiles on July 4, its choice of timing in going nuclear was no accident. The United States has recently tightened its sanctions against North Korea, which views the measures as a declaration of war, and Beijing appears to be shifting away from its traditional support of the regime of Kim Jong-il. As well, South Korea's foreign minister is about to be voted in as the new United Nations Secretary-General, and Japan's new prime minister, a hard-liner against Pyongyang, is being welcomed in both Beijing and Seoul this week to resume long-interrupted summit diplomacy. Left behind, North Korea's own demands have failed to register a sympathetic hearing in the world.
For years, many believed that North Korea was just bluffing. How could an isolated, technologically backward, small Communist dictatorship with a starving population pull off a sophisticated nuclear arms operation that only half a dozen states could achieve. Such an attitude only propelled Pyongyang to be more resolute in proving its credentials. By failing to address repeated warning signs seriously, the world now must pay the price of either living with a nuclear North Korea or living without it.
For the United States, the test represents another foreign policy blunder of the Bush administration. Since 2000, Washington has been more obsessed with ending the Kim regime than ending its nuclear program. It discontinued the Clinton administration's 1994 "framework agreement" that provided aid to Pyongyang in exchange for the latter's suspension of its nuclear program. The Bush team labelled North Korea a "rogue state," part of an "axis of evil" and an "outpost of tyranny." After the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Pyongyang reactivated its nuclear operation hoping to avoid the fate of Saddam Hussein.
In the ensuing six-party talks designed to resolve the crisis, involving South Korea, China, Japan and Russia, the U.S. took a hard-line position. Instead of fully engaging North Korea and providing security guarantees, Washington sought to press Pyongyang to give up its nuclear ambition without preconditions. Mr. Kim, convinced that the current U.S. government has no intention of normalizing relations with North Korea, has refused to return to the negotiating table.
Yesterday's test is a wakeup call for the Bush hawks. Instead of a regime collapse, Pyongyang now has a nuclear arsenal of some seven to 10 weapons (in contrast with having a suspended nuclear facility and, at most, one or two nuclear bombs back in 2000). The cost of now reversing the course, either by carrot or stick, will be much higher.
For China, Pyongyang's nuclear escalation is a slap in the face at the worst time. Chinese leaders have spent much energy in playing host to the six-party talks over the past few years, trying to broker a compromise between North Korea and the United States, only to be frustrated by both sides. Beijing is facing mounting domestic challenges and needs a stable international environment, especially good relations with its trading partners -- the U.S., Japan and South Korea.
But unlike what is often portrayed in the press or argued by Bush administration supporters, Beijing's leverage over the secluded North Korea is not unlimited. Yes, China lost more than one million lives to save the North from being wiped out by U.S. forces in the Korean War in the early 1950s, and, yes, it is the de facto ally of the Kim regime, economically sustaining it from collapse.
But this doesn't automatically make North Korea a Chinese patron. In fact, Pyongyang has been angered by China's recent decision to join Washington's financial sanctions against the North, by China's siding with others in the UN in condemning the North Korean missiles test in July and by Beijing's warming relations with Japan's hawkish prime minister, Shinzo Abe, who came to prominence in Japanese politics largely through bashing Pyongyang. By moving away from its neutral position between Pyongyang and Washington, Beijing's leverage over North Korea, limited in the first place, is weakened rather than strengthened.
And sandwiched between the big powers, South Korea is the most vulnerable of all due to its close geographic location to the North.
Seoul has pursued a "sunshine policy" of economic co-operation and political engagement with Pyongyang for some time. The lack of support from the Bush administration has strained its allied relationship with Washington. Now, amidst the outrage and disappointment, the South must soberly reflect on what to do next.
Christopher Hill, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for Asia Pacific affairs, warned recently that North Korea can have either nuclear weapons or a future, but not both. Pyongyang, backed into a corner and desperate for regime survival, is not blinking in this high-stake game of chicken. The challenge for the Security Council, including the United States, is to go beyond tough words and come up with a well-thought-out solution to the crisis.
Friday, October 06, 2006
Japan, China reach agreement over shrine
On October 6, 2006, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Globe and Mail on the recent development of Sino-Japan relations. Japan's new Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, appears to have made a significant concession to China on the shrine. Analysts say he must have offered a private assurance to Beijing that he will refrain from high-profile visits there, although he could perhaps make personal visits without publicity.
"The Chinese are hinting that there was an agreement behind the scenes that China can accept," said Wenran Jiang. "I can't imagine that China would do this without getting acceptable terms from Japan. Otherwise, how could President Hu Jintao accept a visit at such short notice? The Chinese had to get something in return. It's a huge concession from Japan."
You can read the article here.
"The Chinese are hinting that there was an agreement behind the scenes that China can accept," said Wenran Jiang. "I can't imagine that China would do this without getting acceptable terms from Japan. Otherwise, how could President Hu Jintao accept a visit at such short notice? The Chinese had to get something in return. It's a huge concession from Japan."
You can read the article here.
Friday, September 29, 2006
China is job No.1 for Japanese PM
Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Globe and Mail on September 29, 2006, a day after Japan's hawkish new Prime Minister took power. Shinzo Abe, the tough-talking politician, faces an uphill battle as he seeks rapprochement with China and South Korea while still pushing his policies of patriotic education and national assertiveness.
"There are clear gains for Abe if he gets a quick summit with Hu Jintao," said Wenran. "He can demonstrate that he can manage relations with the two countries [China and South Korea] better than Koizumi. And it would create a positive international image for the new leader if he is capable of dealing with foreign-policy issues."
You can read the article here.
"There are clear gains for Abe if he gets a quick summit with Hu Jintao," said Wenran. "He can demonstrate that he can manage relations with the two countries [China and South Korea] better than Koizumi. And it would create a positive international image for the new leader if he is capable of dealing with foreign-policy issues."
You can read the article here.
Thursday, September 28, 2006
China Rebukes 2 Officials Over Farm Seizures
On September 28, 2006, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Los Angeles Times on internal discipline investigation against two Shanghai officials for illegally seizing farmland.
As the Shanghai inquiry continues, other disciplinary action could be taken against the city's senior leaders and their relatives. Reports are spreading that security has been stepped up at Shanghai airports and that officials' passports have been confiscated to prevent potential suspects from fleeing the country.
Dr. Jiang points out that Beijing has ample incentive to prevent the Shanghai scandal from undermining social stability and investor confidence in a city of 20 million that is home to the nation's fastest-growing concentration of middle-class residents and a favorite destination for foreign capital.
You can read the article here.
As the Shanghai inquiry continues, other disciplinary action could be taken against the city's senior leaders and their relatives. Reports are spreading that security has been stepped up at Shanghai airports and that officials' passports have been confiscated to prevent potential suspects from fleeing the country.
Dr. Jiang points out that Beijing has ample incentive to prevent the Shanghai scandal from undermining social stability and investor confidence in a city of 20 million that is home to the nation's fastest-growing concentration of middle-class residents and a favorite destination for foreign capital.
You can read the article here.
Saturday, September 23, 2006
Many Questions for Koizumi's Successor
By Wenran Jiang
Sep 23, 2006
BusinessWeek Online
Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe just celebrated his 52nd birthday. And he could not have wished for a better present: The Liberal Democratic Party, which has ruled Japan for the past six decades, overwhelmingly voted him in as its new president, replacing retiring Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. Since the LDP controls the Lower House of the Diet, Abe on Sept. 26 will become Prime Minister and assume stewardship of the world's second largest economy.
Like his predecessor and mentor Koizumi, Abe belongs to a political family dynasty that goes back three generations: his grandfather, an accused war criminal, went on to be Prime Minister in the late 1950s, and his grand-uncle took the same job a decade later. His father was Foreign Minister.
Like Koizumi, Abe comes to power with a lot of media worship and fanfare. He's riding a wave of public adulation, and there will be great expectations attached to his premiership.
LIKE FATHER, LIKE SON.
Abe is no slouch as a political tactician. His popularity owes much to his hawkish stance toward North Korea and China, and he has portrayed himself as a true economic reformer, though that remains to be seen. He's telegenic, charismatic, talks of "creating a new and beautiful nation," and is an advocate of revising the section of Japan's constitution that prevents the country from using military means to settle international disputes.
Abe is Japan's youngest postwar Prime Minister and the first one born after World War II. He represents his generation with energy but is untested as a leader and has benefited from Japan's largely uncritical media.
Abe served as his father's secretary until his death in 1991, and first entered politics in 1993. That's a common practice in a country where sons and daughters routinely inherit their parents' parliamentary seats with the endorsement of the party. He never took a cabinet position until appointed Chief Cabinet Secretary last year. ??Abe has given few hints on how he will manage the country's economy, and the social disparity that grew under Koizumi. Nor has there been much meaningful debate about these domestic issues. Abe's popularity has shielded him from any tough questions.
NOT A FOLLOWER.
An extremely hawkish line on North Korea several years ago, over the issue of Japanese abducted by Pyongyang's secret agents, brought Abe to the nation's attention. The recent missile tests by North Korea have further enhanced his position at a time when the Japanese public is concerned about its security.
Unlike Koizumi, who has pursued a close relationship with the U.S.—whether by sending Japanese troops to Iraq or impersonating Elvis—Abe has declared that he wants Japan to be more than just a follower in international affairs. He thinks Japan should be in the ranks of rule-setting states.
Abe has made it clear that he intends to revise Japan's constitution, originally written by the U.S. after the war, within the next five years. Japan's military, one of the strongest and probably the most technically sophisticated in the world, is likely to see its status raised from the rank of an agency to a ministry under Abe.
WAR SHRINE WAFFLE.
Also unlike Koizumi, who has isolated Japan diplomatically in Asia by insisting on worshiping at the Yasukuni Shrine where war criminals are buried among the war dead, Abe has shown some flexibility in how he will handle relations with China and South Korea. Both countries view the Yasukuni Shrine as a symbol of past Japanese militarism and so have stopped holding summits with Koizumi.
Abe has not made a pledge to the right wing of the LDP, as Koizumi did five years ago, that he would worship at Yasukuni annually. Stating earlier that he would pay homage to Yasukuni on Aug. 15, the date of Japan's defeat in World War II, Abe has dodged the question of whether he would do so as the Prime Minister.
Instead, Abe revealed that he made a private visit to Yasukuni back in April, clearly a calculated move to satisfy the conservatives of the LDP. This will also give him time to repair ties with Beijing without the shadow of Yasukuni. A Japan-China summit would certainly boost Abe's international standing, as most Japanese want to improve relations with China and South Korea.
U.S. OPINIONS.
But whether true reconciliation between Japan and its neighboring countries can be sustained under the Abe administration is uncertain. Abe has been a core supporter of a revisionist history textbook that glosses over Japan's past militarism. He sees it as enhancing Japanese patriotism.
He has openly questioned the legitimacy of the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal that prosecuted Japanese war criminals at the end of World War II. And in recent LDP leadership debates, he was the only candidate who refused to use the word "aggression" to describe Japanese war activities in the Asia Pacific in the last century.
Even the U.S. is taking a closer look at where all these history-related issues are heading. In a House of Representatives Committee on International Relations hearing last week, Republican Chairman Henry Hyde demanded that the Yasukuni Shrine change its war exhibits to reflect the facts. Meanwhile, ranking Democratic member Tom Lantos has compared the Japanese Prime Minister's worshiping of war criminals as equal to honoring Nazi leaders.
With Koizumi stepping down, all eyes are on Abe. Will he look back into Japan's troubled history for inspiration, as Koizumi has done? Or will he look into the future by building bridges with Japan's neighbors as the new leader of a generation?
Sep 23, 2006
BusinessWeek Online
Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe just celebrated his 52nd birthday. And he could not have wished for a better present: The Liberal Democratic Party, which has ruled Japan for the past six decades, overwhelmingly voted him in as its new president, replacing retiring Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. Since the LDP controls the Lower House of the Diet, Abe on Sept. 26 will become Prime Minister and assume stewardship of the world's second largest economy.
Like his predecessor and mentor Koizumi, Abe belongs to a political family dynasty that goes back three generations: his grandfather, an accused war criminal, went on to be Prime Minister in the late 1950s, and his grand-uncle took the same job a decade later. His father was Foreign Minister.
Like Koizumi, Abe comes to power with a lot of media worship and fanfare. He's riding a wave of public adulation, and there will be great expectations attached to his premiership.
LIKE FATHER, LIKE SON.
Abe is no slouch as a political tactician. His popularity owes much to his hawkish stance toward North Korea and China, and he has portrayed himself as a true economic reformer, though that remains to be seen. He's telegenic, charismatic, talks of "creating a new and beautiful nation," and is an advocate of revising the section of Japan's constitution that prevents the country from using military means to settle international disputes.
Abe is Japan's youngest postwar Prime Minister and the first one born after World War II. He represents his generation with energy but is untested as a leader and has benefited from Japan's largely uncritical media.
Abe served as his father's secretary until his death in 1991, and first entered politics in 1993. That's a common practice in a country where sons and daughters routinely inherit their parents' parliamentary seats with the endorsement of the party. He never took a cabinet position until appointed Chief Cabinet Secretary last year. ??Abe has given few hints on how he will manage the country's economy, and the social disparity that grew under Koizumi. Nor has there been much meaningful debate about these domestic issues. Abe's popularity has shielded him from any tough questions.
NOT A FOLLOWER.
An extremely hawkish line on North Korea several years ago, over the issue of Japanese abducted by Pyongyang's secret agents, brought Abe to the nation's attention. The recent missile tests by North Korea have further enhanced his position at a time when the Japanese public is concerned about its security.
Unlike Koizumi, who has pursued a close relationship with the U.S.—whether by sending Japanese troops to Iraq or impersonating Elvis—Abe has declared that he wants Japan to be more than just a follower in international affairs. He thinks Japan should be in the ranks of rule-setting states.
Abe has made it clear that he intends to revise Japan's constitution, originally written by the U.S. after the war, within the next five years. Japan's military, one of the strongest and probably the most technically sophisticated in the world, is likely to see its status raised from the rank of an agency to a ministry under Abe.
WAR SHRINE WAFFLE.
Also unlike Koizumi, who has isolated Japan diplomatically in Asia by insisting on worshiping at the Yasukuni Shrine where war criminals are buried among the war dead, Abe has shown some flexibility in how he will handle relations with China and South Korea. Both countries view the Yasukuni Shrine as a symbol of past Japanese militarism and so have stopped holding summits with Koizumi.
Abe has not made a pledge to the right wing of the LDP, as Koizumi did five years ago, that he would worship at Yasukuni annually. Stating earlier that he would pay homage to Yasukuni on Aug. 15, the date of Japan's defeat in World War II, Abe has dodged the question of whether he would do so as the Prime Minister.
Instead, Abe revealed that he made a private visit to Yasukuni back in April, clearly a calculated move to satisfy the conservatives of the LDP. This will also give him time to repair ties with Beijing without the shadow of Yasukuni. A Japan-China summit would certainly boost Abe's international standing, as most Japanese want to improve relations with China and South Korea.
U.S. OPINIONS.
But whether true reconciliation between Japan and its neighboring countries can be sustained under the Abe administration is uncertain. Abe has been a core supporter of a revisionist history textbook that glosses over Japan's past militarism. He sees it as enhancing Japanese patriotism.
He has openly questioned the legitimacy of the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal that prosecuted Japanese war criminals at the end of World War II. And in recent LDP leadership debates, he was the only candidate who refused to use the word "aggression" to describe Japanese war activities in the Asia Pacific in the last century.
Even the U.S. is taking a closer look at where all these history-related issues are heading. In a House of Representatives Committee on International Relations hearing last week, Republican Chairman Henry Hyde demanded that the Yasukuni Shrine change its war exhibits to reflect the facts. Meanwhile, ranking Democratic member Tom Lantos has compared the Japanese Prime Minister's worshiping of war criminals as equal to honoring Nazi leaders.
With Koizumi stepping down, all eyes are on Abe. Will he look back into Japan's troubled history for inspiration, as Koizumi has done? Or will he look into the future by building bridges with Japan's neighbors as the new leader of a generation?
Friday, September 22, 2006
Dr. Jiang Accompanied Local MLA to Arkansas to discuss oilpatch issues
Grande Prairie-Smoky MLA Mel Knight is in the United States this week trying to ease American worries that Alberta is allowing China to invest too much in the province's oil developments. To help alleviate some concerns, Knight is traveling to the conference with Dr. Wenran Jiang, who will answer some questions about China's growing economy and its energy needs. Read the report here.
Saturday, August 19, 2006
A history lesson for Koizumi
The Japanese prime minister could learn from the example of one of his predecessors
By Wenran Jiang
Saturday, Aug 19, 2006, Page 9
Once again, protests against Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's annual visit to the Yasukuni Shrine are breaking out in China as well as South Korea. Koizumi's insistence on paying homage to the war dead interred at the shrine, where convicted war criminals from World War II are among the buried, has been damaging relations with Japan's neighbors for years. Indeed, Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) continually affirms that he will not hold a summit with a Japanese prime minister who goes to Yasukuni, which most Chinese regard as a glorification of past Japanese aggression and colonialism.
Even some in Japan are becoming critical of Koizumi. While the public remains negative about Chinese outbursts against Japan, a recent survey indicates that more than 70 percent of Japanese view the current state of Japan-China relations as unacceptable. More people do not support Koizumi's annual pilgrimage to Yasukuni, with seven former prime ministers jointly demanding that he refrain from the visits.
Yet Koizumi remains defiant. Moreover, Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzu Abe, the front-runner to succeed him, has openly declared that he will continue to visit the shrine as prime minister. Foreign Minister Taro Aso, another possible successor to Koizumi, has called for the Japanese emperor to pray at Yasukuni.
Lessons to learn
So pessimism appears to be settling in, and the deadlock over Yasukuni appears to be deepening. But the past can do more than bring us troubles of this kind. Even on the issue of Yasukuni, there are positive lessons to be learned.
Consider Yasuhiro Nakasone, Koizumi's predecessor in the 1980s. Both are master politicians who remained popular and served long terms in office. Both are conservative and nationalistic, advocating the revision of the Constitution and an assertive political and military role for Japan abroad. Finally, both are pro-US, with Nakasone declaring Japan to be the US' "unsinkable aircraft carrier" in eastern Asia and Koizumi sending troops to Iraq in support of the US-led war effort.
But a crucial difference between Nakasone and Koizumi is often overlooked: their handling of the Yasukuni controversy and relations with China.
Nakasone broke the taboo by being the first prime minister to worship at Yasukuni in an official capacity on Aug. 15, 1985, the 40th anniversary of the end of World War II. The decision triggered a severe response from China, where students held demonstrations against his visit. Bilateral relations were frozen.
But, instead of capitalizing on domestic resentment over China's criticisms, Nakasone decided not to visit Yasukuni again. He chose to mend relations with China by focusing on the positive aspects of bilateral ties. In 1986, Nakasone went to Beijing at the personal invitation of Chinese Communist Party General-Secretary Hu Yaobang (胡耀邦) and laid the cornerstone for a Sino-Japanese Youth Exchange Center, promising to forge future friendships with China.
This genuine embrace of reconciliation provided much-needed support to Chinese leaders, who were eager to control anti-Japanese sentiments.
Hu praised Nakasone's courage and warned Chinese youth publicly that if they "think merely of the well-being of their own country ? they are not sober-minded patriots."
Nakasone emerged from the crisis and was recognized as a capable statesman in managing Japan's diplomacy with China. There was no accusation that Nakasone was "selling out" to Beijing. Nor were his conservative, nationalist, and pro-US credentials damaged.
More than one option
This episode suggests that Koizumi's hard line position isn't the only option. A Japanese prime minister can be strong without exploiting domestic resentment against the country's neighbors, and conservative, patriotic, and pro-US while forging a healthy working relationship with China. Indeed, the cessation of Yasukuni visits would likely open the door to the long-overdue Sino-Japanese summit, which in turn might strengthen moderate voices in China seeking a future-oriented relationship with Japan.
Unfortunately, Koizumi and his allies are not prepared to move forward on the Yasukuni issue.
As Aso recently put it: "The more China voices [opposition], the more one feels like going there. It's just like when you're told `Don't smoke cigarettes,' it actually makes you want to smoke."
No one expects the current Japanese and Chinese leaders to embrace, as Nakasone and Hu did two decades ago, but it is a sad state of affairs when the leaders of neighboring giants pretend not to see each other at international forums. If Nakasone, who now urges Koizumi to stop the Yasukuni pilgrimage, were to respond to Aso, he might simply extend the analogy: it is not in Japan's national interest to continue to inhale Koizumi's second-hand smoke.
By Wenran Jiang
Saturday, Aug 19, 2006, Page 9
Once again, protests against Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's annual visit to the Yasukuni Shrine are breaking out in China as well as South Korea. Koizumi's insistence on paying homage to the war dead interred at the shrine, where convicted war criminals from World War II are among the buried, has been damaging relations with Japan's neighbors for years. Indeed, Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) continually affirms that he will not hold a summit with a Japanese prime minister who goes to Yasukuni, which most Chinese regard as a glorification of past Japanese aggression and colonialism.
Even some in Japan are becoming critical of Koizumi. While the public remains negative about Chinese outbursts against Japan, a recent survey indicates that more than 70 percent of Japanese view the current state of Japan-China relations as unacceptable. More people do not support Koizumi's annual pilgrimage to Yasukuni, with seven former prime ministers jointly demanding that he refrain from the visits.
Yet Koizumi remains defiant. Moreover, Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzu Abe, the front-runner to succeed him, has openly declared that he will continue to visit the shrine as prime minister. Foreign Minister Taro Aso, another possible successor to Koizumi, has called for the Japanese emperor to pray at Yasukuni.
Lessons to learn
So pessimism appears to be settling in, and the deadlock over Yasukuni appears to be deepening. But the past can do more than bring us troubles of this kind. Even on the issue of Yasukuni, there are positive lessons to be learned.
Consider Yasuhiro Nakasone, Koizumi's predecessor in the 1980s. Both are master politicians who remained popular and served long terms in office. Both are conservative and nationalistic, advocating the revision of the Constitution and an assertive political and military role for Japan abroad. Finally, both are pro-US, with Nakasone declaring Japan to be the US' "unsinkable aircraft carrier" in eastern Asia and Koizumi sending troops to Iraq in support of the US-led war effort.
But a crucial difference between Nakasone and Koizumi is often overlooked: their handling of the Yasukuni controversy and relations with China.
Nakasone broke the taboo by being the first prime minister to worship at Yasukuni in an official capacity on Aug. 15, 1985, the 40th anniversary of the end of World War II. The decision triggered a severe response from China, where students held demonstrations against his visit. Bilateral relations were frozen.
But, instead of capitalizing on domestic resentment over China's criticisms, Nakasone decided not to visit Yasukuni again. He chose to mend relations with China by focusing on the positive aspects of bilateral ties. In 1986, Nakasone went to Beijing at the personal invitation of Chinese Communist Party General-Secretary Hu Yaobang (胡耀邦) and laid the cornerstone for a Sino-Japanese Youth Exchange Center, promising to forge future friendships with China.
This genuine embrace of reconciliation provided much-needed support to Chinese leaders, who were eager to control anti-Japanese sentiments.
Hu praised Nakasone's courage and warned Chinese youth publicly that if they "think merely of the well-being of their own country ? they are not sober-minded patriots."
Nakasone emerged from the crisis and was recognized as a capable statesman in managing Japan's diplomacy with China. There was no accusation that Nakasone was "selling out" to Beijing. Nor were his conservative, nationalist, and pro-US credentials damaged.
More than one option
This episode suggests that Koizumi's hard line position isn't the only option. A Japanese prime minister can be strong without exploiting domestic resentment against the country's neighbors, and conservative, patriotic, and pro-US while forging a healthy working relationship with China. Indeed, the cessation of Yasukuni visits would likely open the door to the long-overdue Sino-Japanese summit, which in turn might strengthen moderate voices in China seeking a future-oriented relationship with Japan.
Unfortunately, Koizumi and his allies are not prepared to move forward on the Yasukuni issue.
As Aso recently put it: "The more China voices [opposition], the more one feels like going there. It's just like when you're told `Don't smoke cigarettes,' it actually makes you want to smoke."
No one expects the current Japanese and Chinese leaders to embrace, as Nakasone and Hu did two decades ago, but it is a sad state of affairs when the leaders of neighboring giants pretend not to see each other at international forums. If Nakasone, who now urges Koizumi to stop the Yasukuni pilgrimage, were to respond to Aso, he might simply extend the analogy: it is not in Japan's national interest to continue to inhale Koizumi's second-hand smoke.
Wednesday, August 16, 2006
China and Japan: Reconciliation or Confrontation?
by Wenran Jiang
(Aug 16, 2006)
Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Volume 6, Issue 17
Openly defiant of the mounting domestic opposition, the strong protests from Beijing and Seoul and the growing criticism of international opinion, on August 15 Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi paid homage to the Yasukuni Shrine where Class-A war criminals from World War II are honored among the fallen Japanese soldiers. Despite having made five visits in the past, for the first time, he chose to visit the shrine on August 15, the anniversary of Japan’s defeat in 1945. This fulfillment of his campaign pledge from earlier was clearly an affront to the leaders of China and South Korea, and damage to Japan’s relations with its neighbors is expected. Yet, Koizumi will step down from the prime minister’s post in September and the question now is whether his successor will seek reconciliation with Japan’s neighbors and end the country’s diplomatic stalemate.
Intensifying Efforts of Reconciliation
Having given up on Koizumi, Beijing is now looking ahead and has stepped up its diplomatic activities in the past few months to ensure that Japan’s next prime minister will not repeat Koizumi’s confrontational approach to China. While maintaining that there would be no bilateral summits so long as Japan’s prime minister visits Yasukuni, top Chinese leaders have met with several visiting Japanese delegations and leaders, including the new opposition party leader, Ichiro Ozawa of the Democratic Party of Japan, who is critical of Koizumi’s China policy.
While the bilateral talks on the dispute over the exploration of oil and gas fields in the East China Sea have stalled after several rounds of negotiations, Beijing has been trying to find a new focus in its relations with Japan through cooperation in the areas of energy conservation, efficiency and environmental protection. Led by China’s powerful National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), a multi-ministry effort has resulted in Sino-Japanese cooperation on Energy Saving and Environmental Protection in Kyoto a few months ago and was met with much greater interest and participation from both sides than expected (the author’s interview with NDRC officials; China Brief, June 7).
In the recently held Beijing-Tokyo Forum, Chinese Ambassador to Japan Wang Yi, Japan’s chief cabinet secretary and the leading candidate to replace Koizumi, Shinzo Abe, and other high-profile figures from China and Japan exchanged views on possible ways to improve bilateral relations in the post-Koizumi era. Viewing these developments in a broader context, Koizumi’s latest Yasukuni visit may have a short-lived negative impact on the future of Japan’s relations with China. The focus seems to be on the most promising things that the two countries can do to advance reconciliation and there are a number of emerging policy options that are being discussed by policy makers, academics and the mass media in both China and Japan [1].
Three Possible Ways of Advancing Reconciliation
First, as a short-term solution, many agree that it would benefit Japan as well its neighbors if top Japanese leaders were to stop visiting the Yasukuni Shrine. This would certainly place Sino-Japanese relations back on track for the “second normalization” process—regular bilateral meetings at all levels, especially the summit meetings. Clearly, the Yasukuni Shrine remains the central issue of the current deadlock in Sino-Japanese relations, and no additional reconciliation measures can take place without sorting out this controversial issue between Tokyo and its neighbors. Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni have damaged Japan’s relations with China as well as with others. It has put Tokyo’s ties with Seoul at the lowest point in many years, and there is growing evidence that the Yasukuni issue and Japan’s deteriorating relations with its neighboring countries are perceived in Washington as detrimental to U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Prominent U.S. Congressman Henry Hyde wrote a letter prior to Koizumi’s visit to the United States in May, demanding as a precondition for any consideration of addressing the U.S. Congress the commitment by the Japanese prime minister to cease his visits to the Yasukuni Shrine.
There have been promising signs of a potential breakthrough on the issue of Yasukuni. In spite of grassroots pressure to get tough with Japan, Chinese leaders have instead decided to look for a “face-saving” way for Japan to end the Yasukuni visits. There also have been growing voices in Japan that oppose visits to the Yasukuni Shrine by future Japanese prime ministers. In a recent opinion poll, 60 percent of the Japanese public indicated that they are opposed to Koizumi’s Yasukuni visits, with only 20 percent supporting them. Furthermore, an overwhelming 82 percent of those surveyed said that the next prime minister should not visit Yasukuni, while only 10 percent supported the continued homage (Asahi Shimbun, July 25). The changing tide of public opinion in Japan has also been strengthened by a memo made public by an imperial household official, which clearly indicated that the late-Emperor Hirohito was critical of putting the war criminals into Yasukuni back in the late 1970s and stopped going to the shrine ever since. The coming departure of Koizumi will provide an opportunity for Shinzo Abe and other potential successors to make a firm commitment against visiting the shrine.
Second, in the medium-term, many advocate that China and Japan should establish a number of mechanisms to manage the bilateral relationship of the new century: institutionalized official dialogues that address bilateral differences, private sector associations that deal with bilateral business ties and regular track-II style meetings that bring government officials, business, academics and public opinion leaders together. While historical issues may dominate the headlines, China-Japan relations are multi-dimensional and require extensive care at several levels. The existing institutions, largely built in the 1970s after the two countries established diplomatic relations, are either outdated or ineffective. Many old “Japan hands” in China and old “China hands” in Japan, who bridged both sides for most of the postwar decades, have passed away. “Friendship” organizations on both sides have had difficulties coping with the new changes and the growing negative attitudes of peoples in both countries toward one another. In addition, the crucial institutions that can effectively address bilateral differences are very few in number. Meaningful and effective working institutions, as many have realized, will improve communications, benefit mutual understanding and lead to reconciliation between Japan and China.
Such institution-building projects may produce tangible results in the near future because there is a certain consensus in both countries that the communication channels established in the 1970s and 1980s are no longer suitable for the 21st century. At the same time, the attempt to cope with pressing issues such as the East China Sea energy dispute and the North Korean nuclear crisis has resulted in existing management mechanisms (although not institutionalized) between Tokyo and Beijing. The challenge for both countries will be the task of making them more permanent and effective. The task may also be made easier now that both countries have much younger and more professional diplomats, a much more internationalized business community and an academic workforce with significantly more international exposure. These developments will no doubt facilitate the task of reconciliation between Japan and China.
Finally, in the long-term, there have been calls for Japan to undergo a thorough national reflection on its war past. Simultaneously, there have also been voices advocating that China should be more self-reflective and forgiving in order to establish a future-oriented, healthy bilateral relationship. The momentum for such long-term solutions is partly due to the recognition that true reconciliation must be based on soul-searching and nationwide reflections of the past. There are also concerns that the growing negative feelings of the two peoples only fuel narrow-minded nationalism. It is necessary for the leaders of both countries to resist the temptations of using nationalism for political gains. Both peoples need to come to terms with each other at the emotional level and learn to treat each other as equals. With the realization that external forces, international institutions and world opinions can affect the behaviors of Japan and China—both powerful states—substantial international initiatives around the world are gradually becoming a part of the China-Japan reconciliation process.
There are reasons to be cautiously optimistic for the long-term reconciliation between China and Japan. An unintended consequence of Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, a purely political move to benefit his leadership ambitions, has been the nationwide debate in Japan on its attitude toward its past aggressions. In China, internal and open debates about Beijing’s Japan policy have also been going on for sometime, with ideas such as the “new thinking” on Japan being proposed (China Brief, February 1, 2005). Meanwhile, world opinion, assisted by the rapidly evolving communication technologies, will have a continual impact on the leadership and the public in both Japan and China.
It was not so long ago when Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso described his resentment of Chinese criticism of the Japanese leadership’s Yasukuni visits in such a way: “The more China voices [opposition], the more one feels like going there. It’s just like when you’re told ‘Don’t smoke cigarettes,’ it actually makes you want to smoke” (Xinhua, January 30). In an about face, Aso now openly calls for the reform of the Yasukuni Shrine, even proposing that the Yasukuni Shrine lose its religious status and hinting at the possibility of separating the Class-A war criminals from the other soldiers (Mainichi Shimbun, August 8) . Beijing’s latest outrage over Koizumi’s Yasukuni visit aside, the good news may well be that the Japanese have finally come to realize it is not in their own national interest to continue to inhale Koizumi’s second-hand smoke.
Notes:
1. This is the central theme of an international workshop organized by Professor Peter Van Ness at the Australian National University from August 17-18, with participants coming from Japan, China, Australia and other parts of the world, including this author.
(Aug 16, 2006)
Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Volume 6, Issue 17
Openly defiant of the mounting domestic opposition, the strong protests from Beijing and Seoul and the growing criticism of international opinion, on August 15 Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi paid homage to the Yasukuni Shrine where Class-A war criminals from World War II are honored among the fallen Japanese soldiers. Despite having made five visits in the past, for the first time, he chose to visit the shrine on August 15, the anniversary of Japan’s defeat in 1945. This fulfillment of his campaign pledge from earlier was clearly an affront to the leaders of China and South Korea, and damage to Japan’s relations with its neighbors is expected. Yet, Koizumi will step down from the prime minister’s post in September and the question now is whether his successor will seek reconciliation with Japan’s neighbors and end the country’s diplomatic stalemate.
Intensifying Efforts of Reconciliation
Having given up on Koizumi, Beijing is now looking ahead and has stepped up its diplomatic activities in the past few months to ensure that Japan’s next prime minister will not repeat Koizumi’s confrontational approach to China. While maintaining that there would be no bilateral summits so long as Japan’s prime minister visits Yasukuni, top Chinese leaders have met with several visiting Japanese delegations and leaders, including the new opposition party leader, Ichiro Ozawa of the Democratic Party of Japan, who is critical of Koizumi’s China policy.
While the bilateral talks on the dispute over the exploration of oil and gas fields in the East China Sea have stalled after several rounds of negotiations, Beijing has been trying to find a new focus in its relations with Japan through cooperation in the areas of energy conservation, efficiency and environmental protection. Led by China’s powerful National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), a multi-ministry effort has resulted in Sino-Japanese cooperation on Energy Saving and Environmental Protection in Kyoto a few months ago and was met with much greater interest and participation from both sides than expected (the author’s interview with NDRC officials; China Brief, June 7).
In the recently held Beijing-Tokyo Forum, Chinese Ambassador to Japan Wang Yi, Japan’s chief cabinet secretary and the leading candidate to replace Koizumi, Shinzo Abe, and other high-profile figures from China and Japan exchanged views on possible ways to improve bilateral relations in the post-Koizumi era. Viewing these developments in a broader context, Koizumi’s latest Yasukuni visit may have a short-lived negative impact on the future of Japan’s relations with China. The focus seems to be on the most promising things that the two countries can do to advance reconciliation and there are a number of emerging policy options that are being discussed by policy makers, academics and the mass media in both China and Japan [1].
Three Possible Ways of Advancing Reconciliation
First, as a short-term solution, many agree that it would benefit Japan as well its neighbors if top Japanese leaders were to stop visiting the Yasukuni Shrine. This would certainly place Sino-Japanese relations back on track for the “second normalization” process—regular bilateral meetings at all levels, especially the summit meetings. Clearly, the Yasukuni Shrine remains the central issue of the current deadlock in Sino-Japanese relations, and no additional reconciliation measures can take place without sorting out this controversial issue between Tokyo and its neighbors. Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni have damaged Japan’s relations with China as well as with others. It has put Tokyo’s ties with Seoul at the lowest point in many years, and there is growing evidence that the Yasukuni issue and Japan’s deteriorating relations with its neighboring countries are perceived in Washington as detrimental to U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Prominent U.S. Congressman Henry Hyde wrote a letter prior to Koizumi’s visit to the United States in May, demanding as a precondition for any consideration of addressing the U.S. Congress the commitment by the Japanese prime minister to cease his visits to the Yasukuni Shrine.
There have been promising signs of a potential breakthrough on the issue of Yasukuni. In spite of grassroots pressure to get tough with Japan, Chinese leaders have instead decided to look for a “face-saving” way for Japan to end the Yasukuni visits. There also have been growing voices in Japan that oppose visits to the Yasukuni Shrine by future Japanese prime ministers. In a recent opinion poll, 60 percent of the Japanese public indicated that they are opposed to Koizumi’s Yasukuni visits, with only 20 percent supporting them. Furthermore, an overwhelming 82 percent of those surveyed said that the next prime minister should not visit Yasukuni, while only 10 percent supported the continued homage (Asahi Shimbun, July 25). The changing tide of public opinion in Japan has also been strengthened by a memo made public by an imperial household official, which clearly indicated that the late-Emperor Hirohito was critical of putting the war criminals into Yasukuni back in the late 1970s and stopped going to the shrine ever since. The coming departure of Koizumi will provide an opportunity for Shinzo Abe and other potential successors to make a firm commitment against visiting the shrine.
Second, in the medium-term, many advocate that China and Japan should establish a number of mechanisms to manage the bilateral relationship of the new century: institutionalized official dialogues that address bilateral differences, private sector associations that deal with bilateral business ties and regular track-II style meetings that bring government officials, business, academics and public opinion leaders together. While historical issues may dominate the headlines, China-Japan relations are multi-dimensional and require extensive care at several levels. The existing institutions, largely built in the 1970s after the two countries established diplomatic relations, are either outdated or ineffective. Many old “Japan hands” in China and old “China hands” in Japan, who bridged both sides for most of the postwar decades, have passed away. “Friendship” organizations on both sides have had difficulties coping with the new changes and the growing negative attitudes of peoples in both countries toward one another. In addition, the crucial institutions that can effectively address bilateral differences are very few in number. Meaningful and effective working institutions, as many have realized, will improve communications, benefit mutual understanding and lead to reconciliation between Japan and China.
Such institution-building projects may produce tangible results in the near future because there is a certain consensus in both countries that the communication channels established in the 1970s and 1980s are no longer suitable for the 21st century. At the same time, the attempt to cope with pressing issues such as the East China Sea energy dispute and the North Korean nuclear crisis has resulted in existing management mechanisms (although not institutionalized) between Tokyo and Beijing. The challenge for both countries will be the task of making them more permanent and effective. The task may also be made easier now that both countries have much younger and more professional diplomats, a much more internationalized business community and an academic workforce with significantly more international exposure. These developments will no doubt facilitate the task of reconciliation between Japan and China.
Finally, in the long-term, there have been calls for Japan to undergo a thorough national reflection on its war past. Simultaneously, there have also been voices advocating that China should be more self-reflective and forgiving in order to establish a future-oriented, healthy bilateral relationship. The momentum for such long-term solutions is partly due to the recognition that true reconciliation must be based on soul-searching and nationwide reflections of the past. There are also concerns that the growing negative feelings of the two peoples only fuel narrow-minded nationalism. It is necessary for the leaders of both countries to resist the temptations of using nationalism for political gains. Both peoples need to come to terms with each other at the emotional level and learn to treat each other as equals. With the realization that external forces, international institutions and world opinions can affect the behaviors of Japan and China—both powerful states—substantial international initiatives around the world are gradually becoming a part of the China-Japan reconciliation process.
There are reasons to be cautiously optimistic for the long-term reconciliation between China and Japan. An unintended consequence of Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, a purely political move to benefit his leadership ambitions, has been the nationwide debate in Japan on its attitude toward its past aggressions. In China, internal and open debates about Beijing’s Japan policy have also been going on for sometime, with ideas such as the “new thinking” on Japan being proposed (China Brief, February 1, 2005). Meanwhile, world opinion, assisted by the rapidly evolving communication technologies, will have a continual impact on the leadership and the public in both Japan and China.
It was not so long ago when Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso described his resentment of Chinese criticism of the Japanese leadership’s Yasukuni visits in such a way: “The more China voices [opposition], the more one feels like going there. It’s just like when you’re told ‘Don’t smoke cigarettes,’ it actually makes you want to smoke” (Xinhua, January 30). In an about face, Aso now openly calls for the reform of the Yasukuni Shrine, even proposing that the Yasukuni Shrine lose its religious status and hinting at the possibility of separating the Class-A war criminals from the other soldiers (Mainichi Shimbun, August 8) . Beijing’s latest outrage over Koizumi’s Yasukuni visit aside, the good news may well be that the Japanese have finally come to realize it is not in their own national interest to continue to inhale Koizumi’s second-hand smoke.
Notes:
1. This is the central theme of an international workshop organized by Professor Peter Van Ness at the Australian National University from August 17-18, with participants coming from Japan, China, Australia and other parts of the world, including this author.
Beijing hopes visits to the shrine will be a thing of the past
On August 16, 2006, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by South China Morning Post on Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's recent visit to the Yasukuni Shrine on the 61st anniversary of Japan's surrender in the second world war.
Mr Koizumi is likely to be replaced by Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe. Although Mr Abe is a part of the conservative faction of the Liberal Democratic Party, and has taken a hawkish stance on China and North Korea, Beijing is hoping growing public opinion against visits to the shrine and pressure from Japanese business to improve relations will force him to end the controversial visits and pave the way for normalisation of relations.
Dr. Jiang said Mr Abe, the grandson of a member of Japan's second world war cabinet, was a staunch nationalist and favoured visits to the shrine. He said, however, "the pressure now is enormous" not only from China, South Korea and the United States, but increasingly from the Japanese public.
Public opinion has turned against the visits after it was recently disclosed that Emperor Hirohito stopped visiting the shrine when Yasukuni secretly honoured 14 class-A war criminals - including the executed wartime prime minister General Hideki Tojo - in 1978.
You can read the article here.
Mr Koizumi is likely to be replaced by Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe. Although Mr Abe is a part of the conservative faction of the Liberal Democratic Party, and has taken a hawkish stance on China and North Korea, Beijing is hoping growing public opinion against visits to the shrine and pressure from Japanese business to improve relations will force him to end the controversial visits and pave the way for normalisation of relations.
Dr. Jiang said Mr Abe, the grandson of a member of Japan's second world war cabinet, was a staunch nationalist and favoured visits to the shrine. He said, however, "the pressure now is enormous" not only from China, South Korea and the United States, but increasingly from the Japanese public.
Public opinion has turned against the visits after it was recently disclosed that Emperor Hirohito stopped visiting the shrine when Yasukuni secretly honoured 14 class-A war criminals - including the executed wartime prime minister General Hideki Tojo - in 1978.
You can read the article here.
Friday, July 14, 2006
China's Party All Aglow, but May Be Blinkered
On July 14, 2006, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Los Angeles Times on Chinese Communist Party's ideological campaign. "History will once again prove that the Communist Party of China is a glorious, great and correct party," said Ouyang Song, deputy head of the party's organization department, who helped oversee the campaign.
From the outside, the campaign looks increasingly out of step with much of the rest of China, which has seen a capitalist-style leap in economic growth, highlighted by an explosion of consumer choice, including entertainment options from MTV to MP3, soap operas to beauty pageants.
"Very few people take it seriously," said Dr. Jiang. "But to totally dismiss it is not quite accurate either. They hope to go back to the original party ideals, a cleaner organization that's closer to the people and more disciplined."
You can read the article here.
From the outside, the campaign looks increasingly out of step with much of the rest of China, which has seen a capitalist-style leap in economic growth, highlighted by an explosion of consumer choice, including entertainment options from MTV to MP3, soap operas to beauty pageants.
"Very few people take it seriously," said Dr. Jiang. "But to totally dismiss it is not quite accurate either. They hope to go back to the original party ideals, a cleaner organization that's closer to the people and more disciplined."
You can read the article here.
Monday, July 10, 2006
China Isn't Desperate For Canadian Oil
On July 10, 2006, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Daily Oil Bulletin on China's interest in Canada's oilsands.
Wenran suggested that major Canadian oilsands producers are indifferent to the Chinese market, but part of the explanation may also be that Chinese oil companies don't have to come to Canada.
You can read the article here.
Wenran suggested that major Canadian oilsands producers are indifferent to the Chinese market, but part of the explanation may also be that Chinese oil companies don't have to come to Canada.
You can read the article here.
Friday, July 07, 2006
China wants nothing less than equity stake in oilsands
On July 7, 2006, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Calgary Herald on Chinese investment in Alberta's oilsands industry.
Song Yiwu, vice-president of the China National Oil and Gas Exploration and Development Corporation the international wing of the Chinese National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC) told a TD oilsands conference his company is looking to secure a minimum of 200,000 barrels per day (bpd) from Canada as part of his country's efforts to diversify oil supplies from around the globe.
Dr. Jiang said it's in Canada's interest to engage China. "China is coming it's the reality. The issue is, how do we work with China? We should work with China together to help solve their problems and benefit ourselves at the same time."
You can read the article here.
Song Yiwu, vice-president of the China National Oil and Gas Exploration and Development Corporation the international wing of the Chinese National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC) told a TD oilsands conference his company is looking to secure a minimum of 200,000 barrels per day (bpd) from Canada as part of his country's efforts to diversify oil supplies from around the globe.
Dr. Jiang said it's in Canada's interest to engage China. "China is coming it's the reality. The issue is, how do we work with China? We should work with China together to help solve their problems and benefit ourselves at the same time."
You can read the article here.
Wednesday, June 21, 2006
China's Booming Energy Relations With Africa
by Wenran Jiang
(Jun 21, 2006)
Jamestown Foundation, China Brief
With continuous economic growth averaging an astonishing annual rate of 10 percent over the past quarter century, China has transformed its landscape, become one of the largest economic powerhouses on earth, created development opportunities for its trading partners around the world and, in the process, generated huge demands for new sources of energy and other resources. Africa, on the other hand, has been left behind in the global quest for industrial modernization, economic prosperity and political stability. Yet, into Africa the Chinese are coming. They are coming for trade, investment and joint ventures, and they are consuming all the energy, minerals and other raw materials that the continent can offer.
An Evolution of Traditional Sino-African Ties
Africa's importance to China is reflected by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's ongoing tour of Africa. According to China's Ministry of Commerce, the seven countries on his itinerary—Egypt, Ghana, the Republic of Congo, Angola, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda—have a combined trade volume of over US$20 billion with China, or 50.6 percent of total China-Africa trade last year. Only two months earlier, Chinese President Hu Jintao visited three other African states—Morocco, Nigeria and Kenya—following his trip to the United States and Saudi Arabia.
Such high-profile visits, a recurring practice over the past few years, have aroused speculation that Beijing's pursuit of great power status may include a new grand strategy regarding Africa. After all, top Chinese leaders have done the same extensive tours to Latin American countries since late 2004 when President Hu first visited Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Cuba. China's ties with African countries, however, can be traced back to the 1950s when newly emerging African states declared their independence. From the 1950s to 1970s, China developed close relations with many of these countries based primarily on shared ideological belief and political identity: anti-colonialism, national independence, economic self-reliance and Third World cooperation. Beijing provided substantial aid and other assistance to struggling African states in order to demonstrate that China was on the side of the Third World.
Things changed in the late 1970s. China's economic reforms gradually moved China away from its radical revolutionary worldview of the past. Beijing's open-door policy, primarily designed to attract foreign trade, investment and joint-venture opportunities from Western countries and to facilitate China's entry into the World Trade Organization, moved China much closer to a market economy where profits, not political agendas, drove most of the economic and trade activities. In this process, China's relations with African and other Third World countries have also evolved from anti-colonial brothers-in-arms to economic and trade partners based on market principles. Yet, many things have remained the same. Beijing continues to pay and train young African diplomats in the Chinese Foreign Ministry's prestigious Foreign Affairs University, a practice that has continued for many years; China continues to present itself as a member of the Third World; and since 1991, every Chinese foreign minister's first visit abroad each year has been to an African country. Beijing has even named 2006 the "Year of Africa," and it is getting ready to host a Sino-African summit toward the end of this year. Furthermore, according to Beijing's report to the People's Congress, most of China's foreign aid—totaling 7.5 billion yuan ($950 million) last year—has gone to more than 50 African countries. In fact, Wen claimed that China has offered Africa more than $44 billion in aid over the past 50 years to finance 900 infrastructure projects (AP, June 18). Meanwhile, all signs indicate that China-African relations are entering a new phase centered on energy and raw materials.
The New Focus on Energy
China's relentless pursuit of economic development turned the country into a net petroleum importer in 1993, and by the turn of the new century, its dependency on foreign oil had jumped to about 40 percent of its demand. Beijing's new target is to quadruple its economy again by 2020, as it did from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s. To achieve this goal, however, China must rely even more on external energy supplies as the Middle Kingdom already burns through 6.3 million barrels of oil a day. Although still far behind the United States, which consumes some 20 million barrels a day, the International Energy Bureau projects that Chinese consumption will reach a daily level of 10 million barrels within the next two decades or so.
Thus, China's quest for energy and other resources has brought China to Africa with urgency. Chinese customs statistics reveal that from 2001 to 2005, China's trade with Africa increased 268 percent, slower only than the growth of China's trade with the Middle East in the same period (367 percent), but faster than China's trade growth with Latin America (238 percent), ASEAN (170 percent), European Union (184 percent) and North America (163 percent). In the first quarter of 2006, the Ministry of Commerce reported that China's trade with the seven countries on Premier Wen's current African touring list amounted to $6.56 billion dollars, a surge of 168.2 percent. It is not surprising, therefore, that in such a broad economic context, Africa has turned into a major energy supplier to China in recent years. Back in 2003, both President Hu and Premier Wen visited several oil-producing African states with Chinese energy company executives, and since then China has become involved in an increasing number of energy deals on the continent that bear a number of unique characteristics.
Energy Security with Chinese Characteristics
First, Beijing is willing to get into the "troubled zones" with bold investment and aid packages in exchange for energy. When Angola ended its 27-year civil war in 2002, few foreign countries and firms were willing to invest in the country. China, on the other hand, committed a $3 billion oil-backed credit line to rebuild the country's shattered infrastructure. Beijing also made Angola its largest foreign aid destination. Now, Angola is the second largest oil producer after Nigeria in sub-Saharan Africa, producing 1.4 million barrels per day with one-third of its oil exports—13 percent of total Chinese imports—going to China. In the first four months of this year, Angola was also the largest supplier of crude to the Chinese market after Saudi Arabia (AFP, June 20). Similar arrangements have been made with Nigeria and other countries as well.
Second, Chinese energy companies are committing large amounts of funding and labor for exploration and development rights in resource-rich countries. Sudan is one of the earliest and largest overseas energy projects by China's major energy companies. Chinese operations in Sudan include investment, development, pipeline building and a large number of Chinese labor deployments. Today, China has $4 billion of investment in the country. The China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC) has a 40 percent controlling stake in Greater Nile Petroleum that dominates Sudan's oilfields. Last year, China purchased more than half of Sudan's oil exports, and earlier this year, China National Offshore Oil Corp. (CNOOC) announced that it had bought a 45 percent stake in a Nigerian oil-and-gas field for $2.27 billion and also purchased 35 percent of an exploration license in the Niger Delta for $60 million. Chinese companies have made similar investments in Angola and other countries.
Third, Chinese energy companies enter into joint-ventures with national governments, state-controlled energy companies or individual enterprises in order to establish a long-term local presence. It appears that the Chinese companies are often willing to outbid their competitors in major contracts awarded by African governments because their concerns are not in short-term returns but rather in strategic positioning for the future.
Fourth, China does not take into consideration the particular concerns of the United States or other Western countries when selecting energy cooperation partners and has a different set of standards on how to advance political reform and human rights in Africa. Most notoriously, China has been willing to engage in energy deals with the Sudanese government despite the ongoing crisis in Darfur. Likewise, China has just reached an energy and mining deal worth $1.3 billion with Zimbabwe. In exchange for building three coal-fired thermal power stations, Zimbabwe is likely to repay the Chinese investment with its rich deposits of platinum, gold, coal nickel and diamonds (The Guardian, June 16).
A Model for Future Cooperation or a Return to the Past?
In the past few years, the demands from China and other developing economies for oil and natural gas have become the major factor, although not the only one, that has driven up world energy prices. Chinese energy companies' extensive activities in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and Central Asia in search of oil and gas assets have created anxiety regarding the world's future supply of energy. Discussions of a new "great game"—a term traditionally associated with competition among major world powers for the control of Eurasian oil resources since the late nineteenth century—have become frequent among observers of energy security.
Today, Africa supplies China with nearly a third of its oil imports. Beijing's extensive engagement and its ascending status in Africa also raises important questions on the nature of China's involvement in the continent as well as Beijing's long-term objectives in the region. Critics charge that China has pursued mercantilist policies in the region for pure economic benefits without human rights or environmental concerns. Due to China's support, they argue, the Sudanese government has been able to continue its genocidal policy in the Darfur region, and the Mugabe regime has been able to survive and carry on its abuses of human rights in Zimbabwe.
Officially, Beijing rejects the criticism with two arguments. The first is China's trademark policy of non-interference in domestic affairs. As Premier Wen stated, "We believe that people in different regions and countries, including those in Africa, have their right and ability to handle their own issues" (South China Morning Post, June 19). The second is China's emphasis that its involvement in Africa is different from the colonialism of the past, and that an affluent China is now putting money back into the local African economy. As Chinese leaders like to say, it is a win-win situation.
With China speedily expanding its activities in Africa, international concerns over Chinese behavior are also deepening and calls for Beijing to be a more responsible world power are becoming stronger. There are also indications that Chinese policy makers, academics, NGOs and even enterprises are beginning to reflect upon China's role in Africa. Many African countries are benefiting from a "China boom," but they would be better served if Beijing were to take further steps in balancing between economic interests and the welfare of the African people. Only by doing so would China be able to demonstrate to the world that its arrival in Africa is indeed different from the old colonial powers.
(Jun 21, 2006)
Jamestown Foundation, China Brief
With continuous economic growth averaging an astonishing annual rate of 10 percent over the past quarter century, China has transformed its landscape, become one of the largest economic powerhouses on earth, created development opportunities for its trading partners around the world and, in the process, generated huge demands for new sources of energy and other resources. Africa, on the other hand, has been left behind in the global quest for industrial modernization, economic prosperity and political stability. Yet, into Africa the Chinese are coming. They are coming for trade, investment and joint ventures, and they are consuming all the energy, minerals and other raw materials that the continent can offer.
An Evolution of Traditional Sino-African Ties
Africa's importance to China is reflected by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's ongoing tour of Africa. According to China's Ministry of Commerce, the seven countries on his itinerary—Egypt, Ghana, the Republic of Congo, Angola, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda—have a combined trade volume of over US$20 billion with China, or 50.6 percent of total China-Africa trade last year. Only two months earlier, Chinese President Hu Jintao visited three other African states—Morocco, Nigeria and Kenya—following his trip to the United States and Saudi Arabia.
Such high-profile visits, a recurring practice over the past few years, have aroused speculation that Beijing's pursuit of great power status may include a new grand strategy regarding Africa. After all, top Chinese leaders have done the same extensive tours to Latin American countries since late 2004 when President Hu first visited Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Cuba. China's ties with African countries, however, can be traced back to the 1950s when newly emerging African states declared their independence. From the 1950s to 1970s, China developed close relations with many of these countries based primarily on shared ideological belief and political identity: anti-colonialism, national independence, economic self-reliance and Third World cooperation. Beijing provided substantial aid and other assistance to struggling African states in order to demonstrate that China was on the side of the Third World.
Things changed in the late 1970s. China's economic reforms gradually moved China away from its radical revolutionary worldview of the past. Beijing's open-door policy, primarily designed to attract foreign trade, investment and joint-venture opportunities from Western countries and to facilitate China's entry into the World Trade Organization, moved China much closer to a market economy where profits, not political agendas, drove most of the economic and trade activities. In this process, China's relations with African and other Third World countries have also evolved from anti-colonial brothers-in-arms to economic and trade partners based on market principles. Yet, many things have remained the same. Beijing continues to pay and train young African diplomats in the Chinese Foreign Ministry's prestigious Foreign Affairs University, a practice that has continued for many years; China continues to present itself as a member of the Third World; and since 1991, every Chinese foreign minister's first visit abroad each year has been to an African country. Beijing has even named 2006 the "Year of Africa," and it is getting ready to host a Sino-African summit toward the end of this year. Furthermore, according to Beijing's report to the People's Congress, most of China's foreign aid—totaling 7.5 billion yuan ($950 million) last year—has gone to more than 50 African countries. In fact, Wen claimed that China has offered Africa more than $44 billion in aid over the past 50 years to finance 900 infrastructure projects (AP, June 18). Meanwhile, all signs indicate that China-African relations are entering a new phase centered on energy and raw materials.
The New Focus on Energy
China's relentless pursuit of economic development turned the country into a net petroleum importer in 1993, and by the turn of the new century, its dependency on foreign oil had jumped to about 40 percent of its demand. Beijing's new target is to quadruple its economy again by 2020, as it did from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s. To achieve this goal, however, China must rely even more on external energy supplies as the Middle Kingdom already burns through 6.3 million barrels of oil a day. Although still far behind the United States, which consumes some 20 million barrels a day, the International Energy Bureau projects that Chinese consumption will reach a daily level of 10 million barrels within the next two decades or so.
Thus, China's quest for energy and other resources has brought China to Africa with urgency. Chinese customs statistics reveal that from 2001 to 2005, China's trade with Africa increased 268 percent, slower only than the growth of China's trade with the Middle East in the same period (367 percent), but faster than China's trade growth with Latin America (238 percent), ASEAN (170 percent), European Union (184 percent) and North America (163 percent). In the first quarter of 2006, the Ministry of Commerce reported that China's trade with the seven countries on Premier Wen's current African touring list amounted to $6.56 billion dollars, a surge of 168.2 percent. It is not surprising, therefore, that in such a broad economic context, Africa has turned into a major energy supplier to China in recent years. Back in 2003, both President Hu and Premier Wen visited several oil-producing African states with Chinese energy company executives, and since then China has become involved in an increasing number of energy deals on the continent that bear a number of unique characteristics.
Energy Security with Chinese Characteristics
First, Beijing is willing to get into the "troubled zones" with bold investment and aid packages in exchange for energy. When Angola ended its 27-year civil war in 2002, few foreign countries and firms were willing to invest in the country. China, on the other hand, committed a $3 billion oil-backed credit line to rebuild the country's shattered infrastructure. Beijing also made Angola its largest foreign aid destination. Now, Angola is the second largest oil producer after Nigeria in sub-Saharan Africa, producing 1.4 million barrels per day with one-third of its oil exports—13 percent of total Chinese imports—going to China. In the first four months of this year, Angola was also the largest supplier of crude to the Chinese market after Saudi Arabia (AFP, June 20). Similar arrangements have been made with Nigeria and other countries as well.
Second, Chinese energy companies are committing large amounts of funding and labor for exploration and development rights in resource-rich countries. Sudan is one of the earliest and largest overseas energy projects by China's major energy companies. Chinese operations in Sudan include investment, development, pipeline building and a large number of Chinese labor deployments. Today, China has $4 billion of investment in the country. The China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC) has a 40 percent controlling stake in Greater Nile Petroleum that dominates Sudan's oilfields. Last year, China purchased more than half of Sudan's oil exports, and earlier this year, China National Offshore Oil Corp. (CNOOC) announced that it had bought a 45 percent stake in a Nigerian oil-and-gas field for $2.27 billion and also purchased 35 percent of an exploration license in the Niger Delta for $60 million. Chinese companies have made similar investments in Angola and other countries.
Third, Chinese energy companies enter into joint-ventures with national governments, state-controlled energy companies or individual enterprises in order to establish a long-term local presence. It appears that the Chinese companies are often willing to outbid their competitors in major contracts awarded by African governments because their concerns are not in short-term returns but rather in strategic positioning for the future.
Fourth, China does not take into consideration the particular concerns of the United States or other Western countries when selecting energy cooperation partners and has a different set of standards on how to advance political reform and human rights in Africa. Most notoriously, China has been willing to engage in energy deals with the Sudanese government despite the ongoing crisis in Darfur. Likewise, China has just reached an energy and mining deal worth $1.3 billion with Zimbabwe. In exchange for building three coal-fired thermal power stations, Zimbabwe is likely to repay the Chinese investment with its rich deposits of platinum, gold, coal nickel and diamonds (The Guardian, June 16).
A Model for Future Cooperation or a Return to the Past?
In the past few years, the demands from China and other developing economies for oil and natural gas have become the major factor, although not the only one, that has driven up world energy prices. Chinese energy companies' extensive activities in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and Central Asia in search of oil and gas assets have created anxiety regarding the world's future supply of energy. Discussions of a new "great game"—a term traditionally associated with competition among major world powers for the control of Eurasian oil resources since the late nineteenth century—have become frequent among observers of energy security.
Today, Africa supplies China with nearly a third of its oil imports. Beijing's extensive engagement and its ascending status in Africa also raises important questions on the nature of China's involvement in the continent as well as Beijing's long-term objectives in the region. Critics charge that China has pursued mercantilist policies in the region for pure economic benefits without human rights or environmental concerns. Due to China's support, they argue, the Sudanese government has been able to continue its genocidal policy in the Darfur region, and the Mugabe regime has been able to survive and carry on its abuses of human rights in Zimbabwe.
Officially, Beijing rejects the criticism with two arguments. The first is China's trademark policy of non-interference in domestic affairs. As Premier Wen stated, "We believe that people in different regions and countries, including those in Africa, have their right and ability to handle their own issues" (South China Morning Post, June 19). The second is China's emphasis that its involvement in Africa is different from the colonialism of the past, and that an affluent China is now putting money back into the local African economy. As Chinese leaders like to say, it is a win-win situation.
With China speedily expanding its activities in Africa, international concerns over Chinese behavior are also deepening and calls for Beijing to be a more responsible world power are becoming stronger. There are also indications that Chinese policy makers, academics, NGOs and even enterprises are beginning to reflect upon China's role in Africa. Many African countries are benefiting from a "China boom," but they would be better served if Beijing were to take further steps in balancing between economic interests and the welfare of the African people. Only by doing so would China be able to demonstrate to the world that its arrival in Africa is indeed different from the old colonial powers.
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