In June 2006, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Oilweek Magazine on China's energy industry and its foray into the Canadian oil sands development.
Dr. Jiang rails against the Canadian government’s short-sightedness when it comes to allowing business exchange between the two countries.
You can read the article here.
On world politics, globalization, development, energy security, East Asia, Canadian foreign policy ...
Thursday, June 08, 2006
Wednesday, June 07, 2006
China Looks Beyond Koizumi in its Japan Diplomacy
by Wenran Jiang
Volume 6, Issue 12 (June 07, 2006)
China Brief, Jamestown Foundation
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi is reportedly preparing for another visit to the Yasukuni Shrine where World War II war criminals are being honored among the war dead. If he carries out his sixth homage before stepping down as the prime minister in September, Tokyo’s relations with China, South Korea and other Asian countries are certain to become more strained. There are positive signs, however, that Sino-Japanese relations are improving—an indication that both senior Chinese leaders and their Japanese counterparts are willing to look beyond Koizumi.
Resumption of High-Level Contacts
Political relations between China and Japan have been at low ebb for much of the past five years since Koizumi began his pilgrimages to Yasukuni. The deadlock over the issue, combined with the large-scale anti-Japanese demonstrations in major Chinese cities in the spring of 2005, has cut off much of the senior level contacts between Tokyo and Beijing. Chinese President Hu Jintao reiterated China’s bottom line on its policy toward Japan in late March: there would be no summit between the two countries as long as Japan’s prime minister visits the Yasukuni Shrine. Nevertheless, in spite of the political impasse, bilateral economic relations have developed along a separate track.
Two years ago, China became Japan’s largest trading partner and Tokyo is keenly aware that much of Japan’s economic recovery in the past years is due primarily to a growing Chinese market. China and Japan have continued to hold bilateral strategic consultations and negotiations aimed at resolving disputes over territories and exclusive economic zones in the East China Sea. After much speculation and negotiation, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing met with Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso on the sidelines of an Asia economic conference in Doha, Qatar. This was the first foreign-minister level meeting of the two countries in a year and the first time for Aso in his capacity as the foreign minister to meet his Chinese counterpart. The two ministers chatted about sports and took a forward-looking posture. “We will benefit from good relations,” Li said. “But if we fight, we will both be worse off. The world also wants Japan-China relations to improve.” Aso’s response echoed this tone: “We should have more dialogue. We should do that especially when we have difficulties, and Japan is open to this” (The Daily Yomiuri, May 25).
Both Li and Aso agreed that the two sides should speed up negotiations on the East China Sea dispute where Japan fears that China’s development of gas fields on the Chinese side of Japan’s declared “median line” (not acknowledged by Beijing) might lead to the loss of resources on the Japanese side. Aso has also proposed another meeting in Malaysia as a part of the “ASEAN+3” (Association of Southeast Asian Nations plus South Korea, Japan and China) next month when ASEAN foreign ministers will meet with their counterparts from China, Japan and South Korea. Aso even predicted with optimism that Japan is on its way to restoring relations with both China and South Korea.
A New Focus of Bilateral Cooperation
A few days after the meeting of the two foreign ministers, China’s Minister of Commerce Bo Xilai met with Japan’s Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Toshihiro Nikai while attending the Sino-Japan Forum on Energy Saving and Environmental Protection in Kyoto. Participating in one of the largest bilateral events in recent memory with 700 government and business leaders from both sides, Bo was received by the Japanese side with formal head-of-the-state status (Kyodo, May 28). He talked to Nikai about the importance of bilateral commerce and how cold political relations have affected economic ties. In the end, both agreed to pursue further collaboration in the areas of energy efficiency and environmental protection.
Senior-level attention in these areas has marked a renewed focus in the development of bilateral relations. China’s “11th five-year program” has placed a tremendous emphasis on energy conservation and environment-friendly measures. Japan, on the other hand, is one of the most energy efficient users in the world and is a leader in many of the technologies needed by China. Nobuyori Kodaira, director-general of Japan’s Natural Resources and Energy Agency, who recently engaged in bitter talks with China over the East China Sea dispute, has now signed a memorandum of cooperation with China on energy conservation.
But Bo went further to suggest broader, long-term cooperation based on energy and the environment. He drew a comparison to the European Union that began with the European Coal and Steel Community centered on France and Germany. "If China and Japan can do better in the area of energy and environmental cooperation, Sino-Japanese relations will be pushed to a new platform,” said Bo (Kyodo, May 30).
Tokyo seems to have sensed the new momentum. In what will certainly be seen by Beijing as a positive step forward, it announced that Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA) to China for the 2005 fiscal year—frozen due to the deadlock over the East China Sea negotiations—will be resumed with 74 billion yen (US$650 million) worth of low interest loans and assistance being dispersed soon (Asahi Shimbun, June 6). When Tokyo began to provide China with ODA in the late 1970s, it was part and parcel of Japan’s energy security policy. The initial projects focused on large infrastructure projects that directly benefited Chinese exports of coal and oil to Japan. After becoming a net oil importer in 1993, China continued to supply Japan with good-quality, low-cost crude from its Northeast Daqing Oil Fields, only stopping in early 2004 when the two sides could not agree on the pricing. At the same time, China, with its own energy in serious short supply, overtook Japan as the second-largest energy consumer in the world. Although Japan has substantially decreased its ODA to China since the 1990s and expects a total suspension in the near future, it remains an important source of finance and is a symbol of close economic relations between the two countries. In the past few years, Japanese ODA to China has shifted to environment-related projects since China’s growth has caused many environmental problems that have an increasingly detrimental effect on Japan.
Post-Koizumi Diplomacy in Full Swing but Obstacles Ahead
These developments are certainly music to the ears of those who would like to see China and Japan overcome the “Yasukuni syndrome” and move forward to build better relations that will benefit not only the two countries, but also the entire Asia-Pacific region. Even on issues of history, Beijing has indicated through informal channels that it is willing to conduct joint studies with Japan—a sign of flexibility in searching for a breakthrough in this sensitive area. Beijing’s new posture toward Japan recalls its efforts in the 2001-2004 period when Chinese leaders implicitly endorsed the “new thinking” on Japan advocated by some scholars and journalists who argued that China should move beyond issues of history and forge a future-oriented relationship with Japan. Unfortunately, neither the Japanese leadership nor other segments of Japanese society responded with positive measures and the “new thinking” lost its appeal in China and was largely discarded.
The tide seems to be changing now and the Japanese public is overwhelmingly concerned about the state of Japan’s deteriorating relations with China. Furthermore, seven former prime ministers have called on Koizumi to stop visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, the business community has clearly voiced its opposition to Koizumi’s homage and consensus is growing that the next prime minister should refrain from going to Yasukuni in order to repair relations with Japan’s Asian neighbors. Shinzo Abe, Koizumi’s chief cabinet secretary and a leading contender for the prime minister’s position, has recently softened his hawkish stand on the Yasukuni issue. Once adamant about going to Yasukuni if selected as the next prime minister, Abe is now refusing to give a clear answer. Aso, another contender for the prime minister position and an advocate for the emperor’s worshipping at Yasukuni, also treads carefully on the issue: “I’ll make an appropriate decision with both my personal belief and my public duty taken into consideration” (The Daily Yomiuri, May 25). Additionally, former cabinet secretary Yasuo Fukuda has clearly expressed his opposition to the Yasukuni visit and has built his bid for the prime minister’s post mainly on the resumption of healthy, friendly ties with Beijing and Seoul.
While it is unclear how the Yasukuni issue and the “history question” will manifest itself in Japanese politics in the next few months, it is unlikely to be a source of military conflict. A much more difficult obstacle, however, lies in the East China Sea where territorial claims by both China and Japan have caused much tension. In a world of diminishing resources, it is estimated that there are 200 trillion cubic feet of potential gas reserves and up to 100 billion barrels of oil deposits on the entire shelf of the East China Sea. The reserves, close to both Japan and China, could provide a long-term, secure supply to both countries if a cooperative solution is worked out. Yet, the complex interdependence between Beijing and Tokyo has created an economic security dilemma—one country’s drive to secure its own energy supply has turned into a real or perceived depletion of the other’s potential resources.
Although the positions of Beijing and Tokyo remain at odds after the fourth round of negotiations, both sides have expressed willingness to continue negotiations that would allow for joint-exploration. It is evident that both countries are attempting to search for grounds of cooperation and are making an effort to move beyond the areas of contention. One can only hope that the potential Koizumi visit to the Yasukuni shrine will not derail the hard-earned progress in Sino-Japanese relations.
Volume 6, Issue 12 (June 07, 2006)
China Brief, Jamestown Foundation
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi is reportedly preparing for another visit to the Yasukuni Shrine where World War II war criminals are being honored among the war dead. If he carries out his sixth homage before stepping down as the prime minister in September, Tokyo’s relations with China, South Korea and other Asian countries are certain to become more strained. There are positive signs, however, that Sino-Japanese relations are improving—an indication that both senior Chinese leaders and their Japanese counterparts are willing to look beyond Koizumi.
Resumption of High-Level Contacts
Political relations between China and Japan have been at low ebb for much of the past five years since Koizumi began his pilgrimages to Yasukuni. The deadlock over the issue, combined with the large-scale anti-Japanese demonstrations in major Chinese cities in the spring of 2005, has cut off much of the senior level contacts between Tokyo and Beijing. Chinese President Hu Jintao reiterated China’s bottom line on its policy toward Japan in late March: there would be no summit between the two countries as long as Japan’s prime minister visits the Yasukuni Shrine. Nevertheless, in spite of the political impasse, bilateral economic relations have developed along a separate track.
Two years ago, China became Japan’s largest trading partner and Tokyo is keenly aware that much of Japan’s economic recovery in the past years is due primarily to a growing Chinese market. China and Japan have continued to hold bilateral strategic consultations and negotiations aimed at resolving disputes over territories and exclusive economic zones in the East China Sea. After much speculation and negotiation, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing met with Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso on the sidelines of an Asia economic conference in Doha, Qatar. This was the first foreign-minister level meeting of the two countries in a year and the first time for Aso in his capacity as the foreign minister to meet his Chinese counterpart. The two ministers chatted about sports and took a forward-looking posture. “We will benefit from good relations,” Li said. “But if we fight, we will both be worse off. The world also wants Japan-China relations to improve.” Aso’s response echoed this tone: “We should have more dialogue. We should do that especially when we have difficulties, and Japan is open to this” (The Daily Yomiuri, May 25).
Both Li and Aso agreed that the two sides should speed up negotiations on the East China Sea dispute where Japan fears that China’s development of gas fields on the Chinese side of Japan’s declared “median line” (not acknowledged by Beijing) might lead to the loss of resources on the Japanese side. Aso has also proposed another meeting in Malaysia as a part of the “ASEAN+3” (Association of Southeast Asian Nations plus South Korea, Japan and China) next month when ASEAN foreign ministers will meet with their counterparts from China, Japan and South Korea. Aso even predicted with optimism that Japan is on its way to restoring relations with both China and South Korea.
A New Focus of Bilateral Cooperation
A few days after the meeting of the two foreign ministers, China’s Minister of Commerce Bo Xilai met with Japan’s Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Toshihiro Nikai while attending the Sino-Japan Forum on Energy Saving and Environmental Protection in Kyoto. Participating in one of the largest bilateral events in recent memory with 700 government and business leaders from both sides, Bo was received by the Japanese side with formal head-of-the-state status (Kyodo, May 28). He talked to Nikai about the importance of bilateral commerce and how cold political relations have affected economic ties. In the end, both agreed to pursue further collaboration in the areas of energy efficiency and environmental protection.
Senior-level attention in these areas has marked a renewed focus in the development of bilateral relations. China’s “11th five-year program” has placed a tremendous emphasis on energy conservation and environment-friendly measures. Japan, on the other hand, is one of the most energy efficient users in the world and is a leader in many of the technologies needed by China. Nobuyori Kodaira, director-general of Japan’s Natural Resources and Energy Agency, who recently engaged in bitter talks with China over the East China Sea dispute, has now signed a memorandum of cooperation with China on energy conservation.
But Bo went further to suggest broader, long-term cooperation based on energy and the environment. He drew a comparison to the European Union that began with the European Coal and Steel Community centered on France and Germany. "If China and Japan can do better in the area of energy and environmental cooperation, Sino-Japanese relations will be pushed to a new platform,” said Bo (Kyodo, May 30).
Tokyo seems to have sensed the new momentum. In what will certainly be seen by Beijing as a positive step forward, it announced that Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA) to China for the 2005 fiscal year—frozen due to the deadlock over the East China Sea negotiations—will be resumed with 74 billion yen (US$650 million) worth of low interest loans and assistance being dispersed soon (Asahi Shimbun, June 6). When Tokyo began to provide China with ODA in the late 1970s, it was part and parcel of Japan’s energy security policy. The initial projects focused on large infrastructure projects that directly benefited Chinese exports of coal and oil to Japan. After becoming a net oil importer in 1993, China continued to supply Japan with good-quality, low-cost crude from its Northeast Daqing Oil Fields, only stopping in early 2004 when the two sides could not agree on the pricing. At the same time, China, with its own energy in serious short supply, overtook Japan as the second-largest energy consumer in the world. Although Japan has substantially decreased its ODA to China since the 1990s and expects a total suspension in the near future, it remains an important source of finance and is a symbol of close economic relations between the two countries. In the past few years, Japanese ODA to China has shifted to environment-related projects since China’s growth has caused many environmental problems that have an increasingly detrimental effect on Japan.
Post-Koizumi Diplomacy in Full Swing but Obstacles Ahead
These developments are certainly music to the ears of those who would like to see China and Japan overcome the “Yasukuni syndrome” and move forward to build better relations that will benefit not only the two countries, but also the entire Asia-Pacific region. Even on issues of history, Beijing has indicated through informal channels that it is willing to conduct joint studies with Japan—a sign of flexibility in searching for a breakthrough in this sensitive area. Beijing’s new posture toward Japan recalls its efforts in the 2001-2004 period when Chinese leaders implicitly endorsed the “new thinking” on Japan advocated by some scholars and journalists who argued that China should move beyond issues of history and forge a future-oriented relationship with Japan. Unfortunately, neither the Japanese leadership nor other segments of Japanese society responded with positive measures and the “new thinking” lost its appeal in China and was largely discarded.
The tide seems to be changing now and the Japanese public is overwhelmingly concerned about the state of Japan’s deteriorating relations with China. Furthermore, seven former prime ministers have called on Koizumi to stop visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, the business community has clearly voiced its opposition to Koizumi’s homage and consensus is growing that the next prime minister should refrain from going to Yasukuni in order to repair relations with Japan’s Asian neighbors. Shinzo Abe, Koizumi’s chief cabinet secretary and a leading contender for the prime minister’s position, has recently softened his hawkish stand on the Yasukuni issue. Once adamant about going to Yasukuni if selected as the next prime minister, Abe is now refusing to give a clear answer. Aso, another contender for the prime minister position and an advocate for the emperor’s worshipping at Yasukuni, also treads carefully on the issue: “I’ll make an appropriate decision with both my personal belief and my public duty taken into consideration” (The Daily Yomiuri, May 25). Additionally, former cabinet secretary Yasuo Fukuda has clearly expressed his opposition to the Yasukuni visit and has built his bid for the prime minister’s post mainly on the resumption of healthy, friendly ties with Beijing and Seoul.
While it is unclear how the Yasukuni issue and the “history question” will manifest itself in Japanese politics in the next few months, it is unlikely to be a source of military conflict. A much more difficult obstacle, however, lies in the East China Sea where territorial claims by both China and Japan have caused much tension. In a world of diminishing resources, it is estimated that there are 200 trillion cubic feet of potential gas reserves and up to 100 billion barrels of oil deposits on the entire shelf of the East China Sea. The reserves, close to both Japan and China, could provide a long-term, secure supply to both countries if a cooperative solution is worked out. Yet, the complex interdependence between Beijing and Tokyo has created an economic security dilemma—one country’s drive to secure its own energy supply has turned into a real or perceived depletion of the other’s potential resources.
Although the positions of Beijing and Tokyo remain at odds after the fourth round of negotiations, both sides have expressed willingness to continue negotiations that would allow for joint-exploration. It is evident that both countries are attempting to search for grounds of cooperation and are making an effort to move beyond the areas of contention. One can only hope that the potential Koizumi visit to the Yasukuni shrine will not derail the hard-earned progress in Sino-Japanese relations.
Tuesday, May 09, 2006
China Attacks Its Woes With an Old Party Ritual
On March 9, 2006, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the New York Times on the Chinese Communist Party's recent "preserving the progressiveness" ideological campaign.
For 14 months and counting, the party's 70 million rank-and-file members have been ordered to read speeches by Mao and Deng Xiaoping, as well as the numbing treatise of 17,000-plus words that is the party constitution. Mandatory meetings include sessions where cadres must offer self-criticisms and also criticize everyone else.
Dr. Jiang observed that it is an effort to cope with the declining reputation of the party and the distrust of the people toward party officials.
"The executives were asking me if this political movement will affect China's way of doing business," Mr. Jiang said. "The Chinese immediately reassured us that it wouldn't."
You can read the article here.
For 14 months and counting, the party's 70 million rank-and-file members have been ordered to read speeches by Mao and Deng Xiaoping, as well as the numbing treatise of 17,000-plus words that is the party constitution. Mandatory meetings include sessions where cadres must offer self-criticisms and also criticize everyone else.
Dr. Jiang observed that it is an effort to cope with the declining reputation of the party and the distrust of the people toward party officials.
"The executives were asking me if this political movement will affect China's way of doing business," Mr. Jiang said. "The Chinese immediately reassured us that it wouldn't."
You can read the article here.
Wednesday, April 19, 2006
CHINA: New rules 'aimed at tightening local media'
On April 19, 2006, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Straits Times on China's recent media rules aimed at cleaning up and filtering out foreign influences from local news and entertainment content.
Dr. Jiang noted that the oscillation of positions on media control is inextricably linked to which faction within the Communist Party is having the upper hand. "The recent clampdown is a sign that at this point in time, the conservatives, who favour tight control, appear to be winning," he said.
You can read the article here.
Dr. Jiang noted that the oscillation of positions on media control is inextricably linked to which faction within the Communist Party is having the upper hand. "The recent clampdown is a sign that at this point in time, the conservatives, who favour tight control, appear to be winning," he said.
You can read the article here.
Friday, April 14, 2006
US-China Differences Go Way Beyond Protocol for Hu's Visit
On April 14, 2006, Dr. Jiang was interviewed by CNSNews on Chinese President Hu Jintao's debut trip to the U.S. last fall.
China's embassy in Washington, official media, and -- more than once this week -- the foreign ministry in Beijing all have referred to the April 18-21 trip as a "state visit." But the White House pointedly described it as merely "a visit" and the agenda does not include the official state dinner or banquet traditionally associated with the highest-level visit by a head of state.
Professor Jiang says getting the full state-visit treatment "is important for Hu politically back home, and for the international image of this ascending economic power abroad."
But the move from Washington will be seen as "a slap in Hu's face," Jiang said. "It suggests that Washington doesn't fundamentally acknowledge the legitimacy of China's authoritarian communist government."
You can read the article here.
China's embassy in Washington, official media, and -- more than once this week -- the foreign ministry in Beijing all have referred to the April 18-21 trip as a "state visit." But the White House pointedly described it as merely "a visit" and the agenda does not include the official state dinner or banquet traditionally associated with the highest-level visit by a head of state.
Professor Jiang says getting the full state-visit treatment "is important for Hu politically back home, and for the international image of this ascending economic power abroad."
But the move from Washington will be seen as "a slap in Hu's face," Jiang said. "It suggests that Washington doesn't fundamentally acknowledge the legitimacy of China's authoritarian communist government."
You can read the article here.
Monday, February 27, 2006
Farmers take fight to Internet arena
On February 27, 2006, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Straits Times on how Chinese discontented farmers are using the internet to vent their grievances.
In the past, Beijing could regard the peasants as a backward lot whose interests were strictly parochial. Their grievances, no matter how intense, were isolated from the outside world, said Wenran.
You can read the article here.
In the past, Beijing could regard the peasants as a backward lot whose interests were strictly parochial. Their grievances, no matter how intense, were isolated from the outside world, said Wenran.
You can read the article here.
Saturday, February 25, 2006
Land rights and graft a thorny issue
On February 25, 2006, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Straits Times on the growing rights movement among Chinese peasants stemming from China's ambiguous and frequently abused land ownership-acquisition policies.
Analysts are divided on whether China's rural reforms can succeed without addressing the thorny questions of land-ownership and rights.
Professor Jiang Wenran thinks the land issue will neither make nor break the bid to improve rural living. He commented that the land-rights issue is not the key issue that is going to make Chinese peasants better or worse off.
You can read the article here.
Analysts are divided on whether China's rural reforms can succeed without addressing the thorny questions of land-ownership and rights.
Professor Jiang Wenran thinks the land issue will neither make nor break the bid to improve rural living. He commented that the land-rights issue is not the key issue that is going to make Chinese peasants better or worse off.
You can read the article here.
Rural unrest not near any 'tipping point'
On February 25, 2006, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Straits Times on rural unrest in China.
For now, experts do not think the country is close to any 'tipping point', citing the lack of an organised political opposition.
But Wenran noted that it would be a mistake for Beijing to take comfort from such observations, adding that every new protest inched the regime closer to a potential crisis.
You can read the article here.
For now, experts do not think the country is close to any 'tipping point', citing the lack of an organised political opposition.
But Wenran noted that it would be a mistake for Beijing to take comfort from such observations, adding that every new protest inched the regime closer to a potential crisis.
You can read the article here.
Wednesday, February 22, 2006
China: threat or victim of U.S. fuels policy?
Washington accused of manipulating oil markets to slow pace of modernization
by Wenran Jiang
(Feb 22, 2006)
Edmonton Journal
China's growing appetite for energy has caused widespread concern around the world.
The Middle Kingdom is blamed for the sharp increase in global oil prices in the past few years. The United States is uneasy about Beijing's evolving cosy relations with major oil producers such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Venezuela, many of which are hostile toward Washington. And there are growing calls for containing China as an energy threat in a world of diminishing resources.
But many Chinese are resentful of such attitudes. Rather, they argue that China is the victim of mounting oil prices. In 2004 alone, Beijing spent an extra $7 billion US of its foreign exchange due to climbing oil prices, with payment totalling more than $43 billion US, making oil the country's largest single import item.
While the Western mainstream holds that the global increase in demand -- especially from China and India -- and decreasing spare production capacity will keep oil prices high, Beijing sees the real cause of high oil prices as manipulation of the energy markets by Western government-backed, profit-seeking "international petroleum crocodiles." Reports of huge earnings by Western energy firms only enhance such perceptions.
When the U.S. Congress voted overwhelmingly to block the sale of American energy company Unocal to China's National Offshore Oil Corp. last fall, it became further proof to many in China that the United States doesn't play by market rules -- its intention is to halt China's pace of modernization by keeping energy prices dear and keeping Chinese firms out of the global energy equity market.
CHINESE ENERGY FIRMS BITTER
Chinese energy companies are keenly aware of the volatile situation and high risks involved in their energy investment ventures in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. And they are bitter when Western media accuse them of being in bed with dictators or "rogue states" as defined by the United States.
Given the perception gap, the recent Chinese debates on energy security have resulted in some people strongly advocating for a speedy buildup of China's navy in order to protect vital energy shipping routes.
Currently, a popular Chinese online novel, The Battle in Protecting Key Oil Routes, depicts a war scenario in 2008 near the Strait of Malacca where the Chinese navy destroys the entire U.S. Pacific carrier group in a decisive sea battle.
But more seriously, all Chinese government officials who talk about energy nowadays emphasize that China is not just the second-largest energy consumer on earth but also the second-largest energy producer, with only six per cent of its annual energy needs coming from abroad.
They quote statistics that China accounts for only three per cent of overall global oil trade. The psychological impact of the dragon's thirst for oil aside, this does not seem to be the number that will drive up energy prices.
Beijing also announced recently that China's demands for external oil grew by only 3.3 per cent last year, which is more than 30 per cent lower than in 2004. "China will import less oil and oil products in 2006 than in the previous years," says Lu Jianhua, director of the foreign trade department of the Ministry of Commerce. "It is unfair to blame China for the rising international oil prices."
Meanwhile, China has begun to implement a range of policies to boost domestic energy exploration and production, together with energy diversification and conservation measures. We also hear that China is not in a hurry to fill its strategic oil reserve under current conditions, and that the newly added electricity supply will meet China's demands this year.
Such a calculated move reflects at least four policy priorities of the Chinese leadership on energy security:
- China is refocusing on the self-reliance strategy that depends primarily on domestic energy sources to meet economic development needs;
- Beijing's drive to increase energy and power production to satisfy the explosive demands for energy in the past two years has some initial success;
- China does not want to be seen as so desperate for oil that it would pursue a scorched-earth strategy for energy acquisitions around the world;
- China is learning to play the psychological game in the global marketplace by lowering expectations of China's demands for oil, thus taking away what Beijing believes to be an unjustifiable excuse for big Western oil companies to increase oil prices.
It may well be the case that China's energy demand will slow down substantially this year. It is also true that China, with 22 per cent of the world's population, consumes just over six per cent of global oil production while the United States, with only five per cent of the world's population, uses 20 per cent of the world's daily oil supply.
On a per capita basis, the Chinese only consume a fraction of the oil that their American counterparts do.
BIG GREENHOUSE GAS EMITTER
But China remains the second largest emitter of carbon-dioxide after the Unites States; most of its cities and rivers are severely polluted; it burns three times as much energy as the global average and many times more than industrialized countries in producing every unit of GDP; and it is willing to spend $150 billion on renewable and alternative energy in the next 15 years.
Instead of blaming Beijing for its energy demands or containing China as an energy threat, industrialized countries should seize China's vast energy market potential in technologies of energy conservation and efficiency, environmental protection techniques and know-how, renewable and alternative energy production, and joint-efforts in managing global warming.
A co-operative approach to solving common energy securities concerns between China and the West will moderate Beijing's foreign policy behaviour, thus making easier the task of solving tough issues such as the ongoing Iranian nuclear crisis.
by Wenran Jiang
(Feb 22, 2006)
Edmonton Journal
China's growing appetite for energy has caused widespread concern around the world.
The Middle Kingdom is blamed for the sharp increase in global oil prices in the past few years. The United States is uneasy about Beijing's evolving cosy relations with major oil producers such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Venezuela, many of which are hostile toward Washington. And there are growing calls for containing China as an energy threat in a world of diminishing resources.
But many Chinese are resentful of such attitudes. Rather, they argue that China is the victim of mounting oil prices. In 2004 alone, Beijing spent an extra $7 billion US of its foreign exchange due to climbing oil prices, with payment totalling more than $43 billion US, making oil the country's largest single import item.
While the Western mainstream holds that the global increase in demand -- especially from China and India -- and decreasing spare production capacity will keep oil prices high, Beijing sees the real cause of high oil prices as manipulation of the energy markets by Western government-backed, profit-seeking "international petroleum crocodiles." Reports of huge earnings by Western energy firms only enhance such perceptions.
When the U.S. Congress voted overwhelmingly to block the sale of American energy company Unocal to China's National Offshore Oil Corp. last fall, it became further proof to many in China that the United States doesn't play by market rules -- its intention is to halt China's pace of modernization by keeping energy prices dear and keeping Chinese firms out of the global energy equity market.
CHINESE ENERGY FIRMS BITTER
Chinese energy companies are keenly aware of the volatile situation and high risks involved in their energy investment ventures in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. And they are bitter when Western media accuse them of being in bed with dictators or "rogue states" as defined by the United States.
Given the perception gap, the recent Chinese debates on energy security have resulted in some people strongly advocating for a speedy buildup of China's navy in order to protect vital energy shipping routes.
Currently, a popular Chinese online novel, The Battle in Protecting Key Oil Routes, depicts a war scenario in 2008 near the Strait of Malacca where the Chinese navy destroys the entire U.S. Pacific carrier group in a decisive sea battle.
But more seriously, all Chinese government officials who talk about energy nowadays emphasize that China is not just the second-largest energy consumer on earth but also the second-largest energy producer, with only six per cent of its annual energy needs coming from abroad.
They quote statistics that China accounts for only three per cent of overall global oil trade. The psychological impact of the dragon's thirst for oil aside, this does not seem to be the number that will drive up energy prices.
Beijing also announced recently that China's demands for external oil grew by only 3.3 per cent last year, which is more than 30 per cent lower than in 2004. "China will import less oil and oil products in 2006 than in the previous years," says Lu Jianhua, director of the foreign trade department of the Ministry of Commerce. "It is unfair to blame China for the rising international oil prices."
Meanwhile, China has begun to implement a range of policies to boost domestic energy exploration and production, together with energy diversification and conservation measures. We also hear that China is not in a hurry to fill its strategic oil reserve under current conditions, and that the newly added electricity supply will meet China's demands this year.
Such a calculated move reflects at least four policy priorities of the Chinese leadership on energy security:
- China is refocusing on the self-reliance strategy that depends primarily on domestic energy sources to meet economic development needs;
- Beijing's drive to increase energy and power production to satisfy the explosive demands for energy in the past two years has some initial success;
- China does not want to be seen as so desperate for oil that it would pursue a scorched-earth strategy for energy acquisitions around the world;
- China is learning to play the psychological game in the global marketplace by lowering expectations of China's demands for oil, thus taking away what Beijing believes to be an unjustifiable excuse for big Western oil companies to increase oil prices.
It may well be the case that China's energy demand will slow down substantially this year. It is also true that China, with 22 per cent of the world's population, consumes just over six per cent of global oil production while the United States, with only five per cent of the world's population, uses 20 per cent of the world's daily oil supply.
On a per capita basis, the Chinese only consume a fraction of the oil that their American counterparts do.
BIG GREENHOUSE GAS EMITTER
But China remains the second largest emitter of carbon-dioxide after the Unites States; most of its cities and rivers are severely polluted; it burns three times as much energy as the global average and many times more than industrialized countries in producing every unit of GDP; and it is willing to spend $150 billion on renewable and alternative energy in the next 15 years.
Instead of blaming Beijing for its energy demands or containing China as an energy threat, industrialized countries should seize China's vast energy market potential in technologies of energy conservation and efficiency, environmental protection techniques and know-how, renewable and alternative energy production, and joint-efforts in managing global warming.
A co-operative approach to solving common energy securities concerns between China and the West will moderate Beijing's foreign policy behaviour, thus making easier the task of solving tough issues such as the ongoing Iranian nuclear crisis.
Friday, February 10, 2006
The world's energy reserves: Where the buffalo roam...
On February 10, 2006, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Independence Online Edition on China's commercial interests in Canada's oil sands sector.
The province of Alberta in Canada's west is sitting on the world's second largest oil reserves. Its vast fields cover 149,000 square kilometres, an area larger than England, and experts estimate it holds 1.7 trillion barrels of oil. A mere sliver, 10 per cent, is recoverable at today's oil prices, but that is enough to make Canada's viable supply second only to that of Saudi Arabia.
"Some Americans think one more barrel to China means one less barrel to America," said Professor Jiang. "China's investment is still a cautious one as they watch and see if the oil sands are viable and profitable."
Click here to read the article.
The province of Alberta in Canada's west is sitting on the world's second largest oil reserves. Its vast fields cover 149,000 square kilometres, an area larger than England, and experts estimate it holds 1.7 trillion barrels of oil. A mere sliver, 10 per cent, is recoverable at today's oil prices, but that is enough to make Canada's viable supply second only to that of Saudi Arabia.
"Some Americans think one more barrel to China means one less barrel to America," said Professor Jiang. "China's investment is still a cautious one as they watch and see if the oil sands are viable and profitable."
Click here to read the article.
Thursday, February 09, 2006
Energy reshapes China's priorities
On February 9, 2006, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by Seattel Times on China's global quest for crude oil.
Jiang described the country's energy grab as "driven by desperation." Already there are blackouts in major cities. If development hits a speed bump, the Communist Party in power may lose its grip if it can't deliver jobs and economic growth.
Although China's rise is often viewed negatively in the U.S., evidenced by political interference in the Unocal deal, perceptions of China are more positive elsewhere, Jiang said.
You can read the article here.
Jiang described the country's energy grab as "driven by desperation." Already there are blackouts in major cities. If development hits a speed bump, the Communist Party in power may lose its grip if it can't deliver jobs and economic growth.
Although China's rise is often viewed negatively in the U.S., evidenced by political interference in the Unocal deal, perceptions of China are more positive elsewhere, Jiang said.
You can read the article here.
Thursday, February 02, 2006
Ignoring China's energy needs risky: expert
On February 2, 2006, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Business Edge, warning the Canadian government and the energy industry that they must make China more of a priority or risk losing out on potential billions in future business.
You can read the article here.
You can read the article here.
Friday, January 06, 2006
China's energy security strategy
My keynote speech at the 3rd Canadian Oil Sands Summit on January 18th in Calgary. Details of the conference HERE.
Sunday, December 18, 2005
My recent op-ed & comments in the press
CBC Radio Edmonton | On Internet censorship in China, Feb. 22, 2006
BBC | On Sino-Japanese relations, Feb. 22, 2006
BBC | On China-Pakistan relations, Feb. 19, 2006
Aljazeera | On Chinese media: reform or on ice? Feb. 14, 2006
Voice of America | In-stadio guest on Issues & Opinions, Feb. 14, 2006
The Independent | On Canadian oil sands, Feb. 9, 2006
Seattle Times | Report on my talk at Seattle Economists Club, Feb. 9, 2006
Sing Tao Daily | On Canada's new cabinet & relations with China, Feb. 6, 06
Business Edge | On China-Canada energy relations, Feb. 3, 2006
The Standard | Social cost of China's prosperity, Jan. 26, 2006
First Business News | On Canadian election, Jan. 26, 2006
Sing Tao Daily | On Canadian election, Jan. 25, 2006
Ta Kung Pao | On Canada Chinese in Canadian politics, Jan. 24, 2006
BBC World Service | On Canadian election, Jan. 24, 2006
CRI | On Canadian election & Canada-China relations, Jan. 24, 2006
LA Times | On China's energy development strategy, Jan. 23, 2006
BBC World Service | On high police casualties in China, Jan. 23, 2006
New China News Agency | On Chinese Canadians in politics, Jan. 22, 2006
China Brief | Special issue on social unrest in China, Jan. 20, 2006
BBC World Service | On Chinese farmers protest movement, Jan. 15, 2006
Reuters | China's position on Iran's nuclear standoff, Jan. 13, 2006
The Globe & Mail op-ed | The casualties of China's rising tide, Jan. 9, 2006
CBC Radio International | On China's development outlook, Jan. 5, 2006
Sing Tao Daily | On Canadian election & foreign policy, Jan. 4, 2006
China Central TV 9 Dialogue |On the person(s) of the year, Jan. 3, 2006
CBC Radio As It Happens | On the rise of China, Jan. 2, 2006
NPR | On China's crackdown on liberal press, Jan. 2, 2006
BBC World Service| On Hu Jintao's new year address, Jan. 1, 2006
Voice of America | China's latest media crackdown, Dec. 30, 2005
Voice of America | China's latest media crackdown (Chinese), Dec. 30, 2005
BBC World Service| On Japan's relations with China, Dec. 25, 2005
Danish Radio | On China's western development, Dec. 22, 2005
UPI | On China's urban-rural divide, Dec. 19, 2005
BBC World Service | On the Kazakhstan-China pipeline, Dec. 15, 2005
CBC Radio International | On WTO Hong Kong meeting, Dec. 15, 2005
CNN | Internview on China's growing social unrest, Dec. 13, 2005
The Globe & Mail | On East Asia Summit, Dec. 13, 2005
Edmonton Journal | My full page article: Fallout of China's boom, Dec. 11,05
China Brief features my article: The cost of China's modernization, Dec. 6, 05
L.A. Times | On Shonghua River pollution, Dec. 4, 2005
BBC World Service | On the cost of China's modernization, Dec. 4, 2005
Voice of America |On China's increasing coalmine accidents, Dec. 3, 2005
Danish Radio | On the lack of responsibility in China's mines, Dec. 3, 2005
BBC World Service | On Montreal Climate Conference, Dec. 3, 2005
NPR Marketplace | On Songhua River pollution, Dec. 2, 2005
Danish Radio | On China's environment decision making, Dec. 2, 2005
The Straits Times | On China's treatment of bad news, Nov. 30, 2005
China Central TV| On the fall of the Martin cabinet, Nov. 29, 2005
BBC World Service | The "head tax" on Chinese immigrants, Nov. 28, 2005
Voice of America | On China's environmental disasters, Nov. 28, 2005
BBC World Service | On UN climate conference in Montreal, Nov.27, 2005
Danish Radio | On Harbin river pollution & enviroment, Nov. 30, 2005
The Globe & Mail Commentary | Free trade and APEC, Nov. 25, 2005
L.A. Times | On Harbin Songhua river pollution, Nov. 25, 2005
BBC World Service | On CCP commemoration of Hu Yaobang, Nov. 17, 2005
CBC TV NewsWorld | Live on Japan's imperial family politics, Nov. 15, 2005
BBC News World Edition | On rural-urban divide in China, Nov.10, 2005
Xinhua | On my speech at the China Rising conference, Nov. 10, 2005
Edmonton Journal/Ideas | China's hunger for nuclear power, Nov. 9, 2005
The Japan Times | On Sino-Japanese relations, Nov. 8, 2005
CBC Radio Edmonton | On Alberta-China relations, Nov. 4, 2005
BBC World Service | On civilian deaths in Iraq (in Chinese), Oct. 30, 2005
The Globe & Mail | On Chinese perceptions of Canada, Oct. 29, 2005
The Globe & Mail | On Canada's economic ties with China, Oct. 29, 2005
South China Morning Post Column | on Yasukuni, Oct. 20, 2005
The Globe & Mail Column| On Koizumi's visit to Yasukuni, Oct. 18, 2005
South China Morning Post Column | on Chinese politics, Oct. 17, 2005
BBC World Service | On Koizumi's Yasukuni visit (in Chinese), Oct. 17, 2005
BBC World Service | On Rumsfeld's visit to China (in Chinese), Oct. 16, 2005
CBC Viewpoint Column| Chinese leaders' priorities, Oct. 14, 2005
CBC Radio | On Canada-US-China relations, Oct. 14, 2005
Reuters | On China's wealth gap reaching critical level, Oct. 7, 2005
BBC World Service | On East China Sea energy dispute (in Chinese), Oct.4, 2005
BBC World Service | Interview on Iran's nuclear issue (in Chinese), Sept. 25, 2005
The Straits Times | On Hu Jintao's North American visit, Sept. 23, 2005
World Journal | Featured interview on Canada-China relations, Sept. 19, 2005
The Globe & Mail | Comments on Hu Jintao's visit to Canada, Sept. 16, 2005
Knight Rider | Interview on Sino-Japanese relations, Sept. 16, 2005
VOA | Interview on Hu Jintao's North American trip, Sept. 14, 2005
Sing Tao Daily | On Canada-China strategic partnership, Sept. 13, 2005
AFP | On the ruch by the US and China to Alberta oil, Sept. 12, 2005
The Globe & Mail | Commentary: How do we engage China? Sept. 8, 2005
Radio Canada International | On Hu Jintao's visit to Canada, Sept. 8, 2005
Sohu.com | Comments on Hu Jintao's Canadian visit, Sept. 6, 2005
The Macleans | Interview on Chinese politics, Aug. 29, 2005
BusinessWeek | Special on China and India: Experts Roundtable, Aug. 22, 2005
Reuters | Interview on Chinese energy firm CNOOC's bid for Unocal, Aug. 5, 2005
KCRW Radio/NBR | Interview on US-China energy relations, Aug.2, 2005
China Brief | The Unocal Bid: China's Treasure Hunt of the Century, July 19, 2005
Sing Tao Daily | On China's overseas corporate expansion, July 17, 2005
Los Angeles Times | A new player in the Canadian sandbox, July 17, 2005
NPR - To the Point | Panel interview on China's quest for energy, June 29, 2005
BBC | On Sino-Japanese relations, Feb. 22, 2006
BBC | On China-Pakistan relations, Feb. 19, 2006
Aljazeera | On Chinese media: reform or on ice? Feb. 14, 2006
Voice of America | In-stadio guest on Issues & Opinions, Feb. 14, 2006
The Independent | On Canadian oil sands, Feb. 9, 2006
Seattle Times | Report on my talk at Seattle Economists Club, Feb. 9, 2006
Sing Tao Daily | On Canada's new cabinet & relations with China, Feb. 6, 06
Business Edge | On China-Canada energy relations, Feb. 3, 2006
The Standard | Social cost of China's prosperity, Jan. 26, 2006
First Business News | On Canadian election, Jan. 26, 2006
Sing Tao Daily | On Canadian election, Jan. 25, 2006
Ta Kung Pao | On Canada Chinese in Canadian politics, Jan. 24, 2006
BBC World Service | On Canadian election, Jan. 24, 2006
CRI | On Canadian election & Canada-China relations, Jan. 24, 2006
LA Times | On China's energy development strategy, Jan. 23, 2006
BBC World Service | On high police casualties in China, Jan. 23, 2006
New China News Agency | On Chinese Canadians in politics, Jan. 22, 2006
China Brief | Special issue on social unrest in China, Jan. 20, 2006
BBC World Service | On Chinese farmers protest movement, Jan. 15, 2006
Reuters | China's position on Iran's nuclear standoff, Jan. 13, 2006
The Globe & Mail op-ed | The casualties of China's rising tide, Jan. 9, 2006
CBC Radio International | On China's development outlook, Jan. 5, 2006
Sing Tao Daily | On Canadian election & foreign policy, Jan. 4, 2006
China Central TV 9 Dialogue |On the person(s) of the year, Jan. 3, 2006
CBC Radio As It Happens | On the rise of China, Jan. 2, 2006
NPR | On China's crackdown on liberal press, Jan. 2, 2006
BBC World Service| On Hu Jintao's new year address, Jan. 1, 2006
Voice of America | China's latest media crackdown, Dec. 30, 2005
Voice of America | China's latest media crackdown (Chinese), Dec. 30, 2005
BBC World Service| On Japan's relations with China, Dec. 25, 2005
Danish Radio | On China's western development, Dec. 22, 2005
UPI | On China's urban-rural divide, Dec. 19, 2005
BBC World Service | On the Kazakhstan-China pipeline, Dec. 15, 2005
CBC Radio International | On WTO Hong Kong meeting, Dec. 15, 2005
CNN | Internview on China's growing social unrest, Dec. 13, 2005
The Globe & Mail | On East Asia Summit, Dec. 13, 2005
Edmonton Journal | My full page article: Fallout of China's boom, Dec. 11,05
China Brief features my article: The cost of China's modernization, Dec. 6, 05
L.A. Times | On Shonghua River pollution, Dec. 4, 2005
BBC World Service | On the cost of China's modernization, Dec. 4, 2005
Voice of America |On China's increasing coalmine accidents, Dec. 3, 2005
Danish Radio | On the lack of responsibility in China's mines, Dec. 3, 2005
BBC World Service | On Montreal Climate Conference, Dec. 3, 2005
NPR Marketplace | On Songhua River pollution, Dec. 2, 2005
Danish Radio | On China's environment decision making, Dec. 2, 2005
The Straits Times | On China's treatment of bad news, Nov. 30, 2005
China Central TV| On the fall of the Martin cabinet, Nov. 29, 2005
BBC World Service | The "head tax" on Chinese immigrants, Nov. 28, 2005
Voice of America | On China's environmental disasters, Nov. 28, 2005
BBC World Service | On UN climate conference in Montreal, Nov.27, 2005
Danish Radio | On Harbin river pollution & enviroment, Nov. 30, 2005
The Globe & Mail Commentary | Free trade and APEC, Nov. 25, 2005
L.A. Times | On Harbin Songhua river pollution, Nov. 25, 2005
BBC World Service | On CCP commemoration of Hu Yaobang, Nov. 17, 2005
CBC TV NewsWorld | Live on Japan's imperial family politics, Nov. 15, 2005
BBC News World Edition | On rural-urban divide in China, Nov.10, 2005
Xinhua | On my speech at the China Rising conference, Nov. 10, 2005
Edmonton Journal/Ideas | China's hunger for nuclear power, Nov. 9, 2005
The Japan Times | On Sino-Japanese relations, Nov. 8, 2005
CBC Radio Edmonton | On Alberta-China relations, Nov. 4, 2005
BBC World Service | On civilian deaths in Iraq (in Chinese), Oct. 30, 2005
The Globe & Mail | On Chinese perceptions of Canada, Oct. 29, 2005
The Globe & Mail | On Canada's economic ties with China, Oct. 29, 2005
South China Morning Post Column | on Yasukuni, Oct. 20, 2005
The Globe & Mail Column| On Koizumi's visit to Yasukuni, Oct. 18, 2005
South China Morning Post Column | on Chinese politics, Oct. 17, 2005
BBC World Service | On Koizumi's Yasukuni visit (in Chinese), Oct. 17, 2005
BBC World Service | On Rumsfeld's visit to China (in Chinese), Oct. 16, 2005
CBC Viewpoint Column| Chinese leaders' priorities, Oct. 14, 2005
CBC Radio | On Canada-US-China relations, Oct. 14, 2005
Reuters | On China's wealth gap reaching critical level, Oct. 7, 2005
BBC World Service | On East China Sea energy dispute (in Chinese), Oct.4, 2005
BBC World Service | Interview on Iran's nuclear issue (in Chinese), Sept. 25, 2005
The Straits Times | On Hu Jintao's North American visit, Sept. 23, 2005
World Journal | Featured interview on Canada-China relations, Sept. 19, 2005
The Globe & Mail | Comments on Hu Jintao's visit to Canada, Sept. 16, 2005
Knight Rider | Interview on Sino-Japanese relations, Sept. 16, 2005
VOA | Interview on Hu Jintao's North American trip, Sept. 14, 2005
Sing Tao Daily | On Canada-China strategic partnership, Sept. 13, 2005
AFP | On the ruch by the US and China to Alberta oil, Sept. 12, 2005
The Globe & Mail | Commentary: How do we engage China? Sept. 8, 2005
Radio Canada International | On Hu Jintao's visit to Canada, Sept. 8, 2005
Sohu.com | Comments on Hu Jintao's Canadian visit, Sept. 6, 2005
The Macleans | Interview on Chinese politics, Aug. 29, 2005
BusinessWeek | Special on China and India: Experts Roundtable, Aug. 22, 2005
Reuters | Interview on Chinese energy firm CNOOC's bid for Unocal, Aug. 5, 2005
KCRW Radio/NBR | Interview on US-China energy relations, Aug.2, 2005
China Brief | The Unocal Bid: China's Treasure Hunt of the Century, July 19, 2005
Sing Tao Daily | On China's overseas corporate expansion, July 17, 2005
Los Angeles Times | A new player in the Canadian sandbox, July 17, 2005
NPR - To the Point | Panel interview on China's quest for energy, June 29, 2005
Wednesday, November 30, 2005
China: Officials still tend to hide bad news
On November 30, 2005, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Straits Times on a recent blast at a PetroChina plant in north-eastern Jilin province on Nov 13, spiltting 100 tonnes of benzene into the Songhua River.
But if change does not come soon, there will be more accidents and deaths -- resulting in high economic cost, warned Professor Jiang.
A systemic overhaul is needed for things to improve, said Prof Jiang. He said: "Detailed instructions on every level of government's role and responsibility must be spelt out. This will ensure officials are accountable as they cannot push the blame to someone else."
Click here to read the article.
But if change does not come soon, there will be more accidents and deaths -- resulting in high economic cost, warned Professor Jiang.
A systemic overhaul is needed for things to improve, said Prof Jiang. He said: "Detailed instructions on every level of government's role and responsibility must be spelt out. This will ensure officials are accountable as they cannot push the blame to someone else."
Click here to read the article.
Monday, November 28, 2005
Coal Mine Explosion Kills 134 Workers in China
On November 28, 2005, Dr. Wenran Jiang was interviewed by the Voice of America on the recent mine explosion in northeastern China that killed 134 workers. The blast at Qitaihe in China's Heilongjiang Province happened at a time when China is stocking up on coal supplies ahead of the approaching winter.
"China uses a lot of energy, so therefore [there are] a lot of energy-related accidents. Almost every other week, we have such accidents," Dr. Jiang said. "These are actually partly [caused by] the industrialization process, and partly due to the market-driven, all-for-money drive by local governments."
Read the article here.
"China uses a lot of energy, so therefore [there are] a lot of energy-related accidents. Almost every other week, we have such accidents," Dr. Jiang said. "These are actually partly [caused by] the industrialization process, and partly due to the market-driven, all-for-money drive by local governments."
Read the article here.
Friday, November 25, 2005
With free trade all talk, APEC risks becoming irrelevant
by Wenran Jiang
(Nov 25, 2005)
The Global and Mail
Prime Minister Paul Martin must have heaved a sigh of relief to leave domestic headaches behind for a few days when he flew to South Korea for the annual APEC summit last week.
The Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation forum seems an ideal international stage for Mr. Martin and many of his 20 counterparts to boost their image. Representing more than 40 per cent of the world's population, the APEC group is the largest regional trading bloc, commanding nearly 50 per cent of global trade volume and 60 per cent of GDP. It has generated nearly 70 per cent of global economic growth in the past decade. In a joint declaration, members expressed support for the World Trade Organization talks in Hong Kong next month, combatting the spread of avian flu, and fighting terrorism.
But image-polishing is not quite the same as tangible achievement. Contrary to the carefully chosen theme of this year's forum -- "Toward One Community: Meet the Challenge, Make the Change" -- beneath the surface, APEC is disintegrating into regional and bilateral blocs and lacks the leadership to meet many of its challenges.
Free-trade rhetoric has never been as strongly propagated by governments as the dominant ideology and unmistakable path to prosperity, yet every major global free-trade mechanism has trouble reaching a consensus. The implementation of the WTO's 2001 Doha commitment to global open trade is stalled; the coming talks are at risk because rich countries won't end domestic agricultural subsidies. Similar issues caused the dismal failure of the recently held Summit of the Americas, where the Free Trade Area of the Americas, being negotiated for more than a decade, faced fierce resistance from Southern Latin American states.
The APEC club, hailed as a major free-trade advocate, has done little beyond issue statements. Nor is there any clear road map on how to realize the goals of an Asia Pacific open market by all advanced economies in 2010, followed by all others in 2020.
The APEC community is gradually becoming an empty shell, shrinking into isolated resort gatherings of government elites, while mass protests gain momentum, intensifying global discontent.
While most countries belong to some form of global, regional and bilateral trade regimes, they tend to employ protectionist measures whenever self-perceived interests are at stake. The U.S. refusal to abide by NAFTA rulings over the softwood lumber dispute with Canada is a frustrating example. China complains bitterly that its textile exports, which comply with the WTO-mandated schedule that all barriers be lifted this year, are being blocked by the United States and European Union.
APEC countries are committed to mutual tariff reduction but a mechanism is missing to move beyond paperwork.
Threatened by the growing and perceived protectionist movements, many countries are seeking bilateral and intraregional trade deals, making WTO and larger regional organizations such as APEC more and more a theatre for talk rather than serious action. China has moved to establish a free-trade zone with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); its free-market status has been recognized by New Zealand and South Korea; Australia and the EU are negotiating with Beijing for the same arrangement; Japan is chasing China, in fear of lagging behind.
Next month, there will be several summits centred on ASEAN and China: The ASEAN plus Three
(China, Japan, South Korea) conference, the ASEAN-India conference, and the ASEAN plus Russia conference.
However, the most visible challenge and alternative to the U.S.-centred Asia Pacific order will come when the first East Asian Summit is held in Malaysia next month. While ASEAN, China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and India will all be at the table, neither the U.S. nor Canada is invited. This is a serious development, if not a setback for Ottawa's Asian diplomacy. Mr. Martin has threatened Washington with closer ties to Asia as a counterbalance to U.S. protectionism. But everyone knows he has no action plan to back up his rhetoric. The only way to get back in the game is to take aggressive measures that reconnect Canada with other Asia Pacific countries. The newly established free-trade negotiation with Japan is a step in the right direction but it is not bold enough. For Canada not to be left out of the world's emerging and most dynamic trading bloc, similar actions must be taken with China and ASEAN.
Unfortunately, rather than asserting much-needed leadership and projecting a distinct Canadian mark on the other side of the Pacific, Mr. Martin is busy marking his calendar for a federal election.
(Nov 25, 2005)
The Global and Mail
Prime Minister Paul Martin must have heaved a sigh of relief to leave domestic headaches behind for a few days when he flew to South Korea for the annual APEC summit last week.
The Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation forum seems an ideal international stage for Mr. Martin and many of his 20 counterparts to boost their image. Representing more than 40 per cent of the world's population, the APEC group is the largest regional trading bloc, commanding nearly 50 per cent of global trade volume and 60 per cent of GDP. It has generated nearly 70 per cent of global economic growth in the past decade. In a joint declaration, members expressed support for the World Trade Organization talks in Hong Kong next month, combatting the spread of avian flu, and fighting terrorism.
But image-polishing is not quite the same as tangible achievement. Contrary to the carefully chosen theme of this year's forum -- "Toward One Community: Meet the Challenge, Make the Change" -- beneath the surface, APEC is disintegrating into regional and bilateral blocs and lacks the leadership to meet many of its challenges.
Free-trade rhetoric has never been as strongly propagated by governments as the dominant ideology and unmistakable path to prosperity, yet every major global free-trade mechanism has trouble reaching a consensus. The implementation of the WTO's 2001 Doha commitment to global open trade is stalled; the coming talks are at risk because rich countries won't end domestic agricultural subsidies. Similar issues caused the dismal failure of the recently held Summit of the Americas, where the Free Trade Area of the Americas, being negotiated for more than a decade, faced fierce resistance from Southern Latin American states.
The APEC club, hailed as a major free-trade advocate, has done little beyond issue statements. Nor is there any clear road map on how to realize the goals of an Asia Pacific open market by all advanced economies in 2010, followed by all others in 2020.
The APEC community is gradually becoming an empty shell, shrinking into isolated resort gatherings of government elites, while mass protests gain momentum, intensifying global discontent.
While most countries belong to some form of global, regional and bilateral trade regimes, they tend to employ protectionist measures whenever self-perceived interests are at stake. The U.S. refusal to abide by NAFTA rulings over the softwood lumber dispute with Canada is a frustrating example. China complains bitterly that its textile exports, which comply with the WTO-mandated schedule that all barriers be lifted this year, are being blocked by the United States and European Union.
APEC countries are committed to mutual tariff reduction but a mechanism is missing to move beyond paperwork.
Threatened by the growing and perceived protectionist movements, many countries are seeking bilateral and intraregional trade deals, making WTO and larger regional organizations such as APEC more and more a theatre for talk rather than serious action. China has moved to establish a free-trade zone with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); its free-market status has been recognized by New Zealand and South Korea; Australia and the EU are negotiating with Beijing for the same arrangement; Japan is chasing China, in fear of lagging behind.
Next month, there will be several summits centred on ASEAN and China: The ASEAN plus Three
(China, Japan, South Korea) conference, the ASEAN-India conference, and the ASEAN plus Russia conference.
However, the most visible challenge and alternative to the U.S.-centred Asia Pacific order will come when the first East Asian Summit is held in Malaysia next month. While ASEAN, China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and India will all be at the table, neither the U.S. nor Canada is invited. This is a serious development, if not a setback for Ottawa's Asian diplomacy. Mr. Martin has threatened Washington with closer ties to Asia as a counterbalance to U.S. protectionism. But everyone knows he has no action plan to back up his rhetoric. The only way to get back in the game is to take aggressive measures that reconnect Canada with other Asia Pacific countries. The newly established free-trade negotiation with Japan is a step in the right direction but it is not bold enough. For Canada not to be left out of the world's emerging and most dynamic trading bloc, similar actions must be taken with China and ASEAN.
Unfortunately, rather than asserting much-needed leadership and projecting a distinct Canadian mark on the other side of the Pacific, Mr. Martin is busy marking his calendar for a federal election.
Friday, November 11, 2005
China's post-Unocal energy strategy
I was invited to give the opening keynote speech on this subject at the Regional Economic Leadership Forum, Whistler, BC on Nov. 17, 2005, organized by Pacific NorthWest Economic Region.
Is China's media fairer toward Japan?
This Japan Times article, with my interview in it, is also carried by China's offical China Daily.
Thursday, November 10, 2005
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